Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. Paradise on the Cheap. Ascriptivism about Ficta I shall present in this paper an ascriptivistic theory of fictional objects, that is partly inspired by P. van Inwagen (1977)'s notion of ascription and by Fine (1982), but that accepts that there are objects that do not exist (e.g., fictional objects). According to my theory, such objects have properties in two different ways: on the one hand, they instantiate properties (e.g., fictional objects instantiate the property of being fictional); on the other hand, some properties are ascribed to them by minded subjects thinking of them. However, this theory is not simply a version of instantiation-centered Meinongianism. It does not assume that there is a primitive distinction between two ways of having properties (e.g., Zalta (1983)'s exemplification and encoding or Rapaport (1976), (1978)’s exemplification and constitution), but it claims that there are some relations (ascription relations) that hold (at least) between minded subjects, fictional objects and properties. Secondly, it does not introduce existing objects' fictional correlates in order to make it true, for example, that Lord Gladstone had a tea with Sherlock Holmes. Thirdly, it provides us with a unified account of thinking of objects as having properties, since such ascription relations may involve existent objects too. Fourthly, it deals with fictional contexts defined by stories, by thinking of them as fictional worlds that are involved within ascription relations1. After having introduced some data (§1) and after having defended the thesis that ficta are mental objects (i.e., objects that depend for their identity conditions on minded subjects) (§2), I shall present the theory (§3) and an ontology of fiction grounded on it (§4). Furthermore, in order to reply to Quine (1948)'s objection about the lack of identity conditions of nonexistents, I shall deal with the identity-conditions of ficta (§5). Finally, I shall interpret the 1 Moreover, my theory could be considered a constructivist theory of fictional items. Along these lines, for example, it partly accepts Roman Ingarden’s constructivism and the idea that we should distinguish between the properties of an object and its ascribed characteristics, even though my theory does not imply that there are properties that can be only possessed by – and not ascribed to – objects. For more details on Ingarden’s view of fictional objects, see, for example, Smith (1980). 1 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. truth-conditions of our initial data (§6) and I shall summarize some advantages of ascriptivism over other theories (§7). 1. The Data. Let me consider one definite fictional object: Sherlock Holmes. It seems true that (1) Sherlock Holmes does not exist, and that (2) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character. However, many philosophers maintain that fictional characters exist (see, for example, Kripke (2013), van Inwagen (1977), Thomasson (1999), (2003)), so that it is literally false that (1), even if there is an interpretation of (1) that turns out to make this statement (seemingly) true (e.g., if (1) claims that Sherlock Holmes is not man). Moreover, artifactualists such as Thomasson hold that ficta are abstract artifacts. I shall not deal with such an approach2. I shall only assume that (1) and (2) claim something true about Sherlock Holmes. Secondly, it is also true that (3) Sherlock Holmes is a detective, even if it is not true that Sherlock Holmes is among existing detectives (I would not look for him in order to solve any real crime!). Yet, if Sherlock Holmes is not an existing detective, how can we claim that it is true that he nevertheless is a detective? In fact, the property of being a detective seems to be an existence-entailing one: for everything that has that property, that thing exists. On the other hand, the property of being a fictional character in (2) seems to be a non-existence entailing property: for everything that has that property, that thing does not exist. 2 For some problems concerning this approach, see Deutsch (1991), Yagisawa (2001), Brock (2010) and Sainsbury (2010). Among other, they claim that this approach does not offer adequate paraphrases for true negative existential statements concerning ficta and that it does not explain how and when ficta start to exist, since they are taken as abstract objects (i.e., necessarily and atemporally or omnitemporally existing objects). 2 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. Furthermore, other (seemingly) true statements seem to concern fictional objects. For example, it seems true that (4) Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes' creator, even if the relation of being some fictional object's creator is far from being clear: what does this relation imply with regard to Sherlock Holmes' ontological status? If it is true that (1), Sherlock Holmes does not literally turn out to exist when he is created by Conan Doyle. Finally, Sherlock Holmes is the protagonist of many stories written by Conan Doyle. Namely, it is true that (5) Conan Doyle is the author of Sherlock Holmes' stories. Yet, what does this relation imply with regard to those stories’ ontological status? Concerning other features of fictional objects, it is worth noticing that such objects always seem to be incomplete and that they sometimes seem to be impossible. This seems to be problematic, since it implies that the laws of bivalence, of excluded middle and of non-contradiction do not hold for every object. When we read Sherlock Holmes' stories, we all believe that Sherlock Holmes does not exist and that he is somehow bounded to his stories. Yet, there are fictional objects that are not story-bounded and/or that are believed to exist, even though they do not exist. For example, Greeks believed that mythical gods such as Apollo existed. Furthermore, we do not believe that Santa Claus exists, even if he is not explicitly bounded to any story. Thus, what does the relation of story-boundedness amount to? And what is a story? Furthermore, partly following A. Voltolini's list of sentences involving fictional objects3, we can individuate, at first, internal fictional sentences (and the corresponding propositions), such as the aforementioned (3) and (6) Sherlock Holmes exists, 3 See Voltolini (2006): 127-186. For another detailed exposition of the ontology of fiction, see Sainsbury (2010). 3 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. that seem to express true propositions at least in some story, even though, as we have already noticed, they express false propositions outside stories. There are problematically true internal fictional sentences, that seem to imply the migration of real objects into fictional stories: (7) Sherlock Holmes lives in London; (8) Sherlock Holmes had a tea with Gladstone. On the one hand, it seems that Conan Doyle refers to the real London and to the real Lord Gladstone when he talks about them in his stories, so that the real London and the real Lord Gladstone should respectively have the properties of having been inhabited by and of having had a tea with Sherlock Holmes – at least, if it is true that (7) and (8). Yet, the real London and the real Lord Gladstone do not have such properties. Thus, by the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, they cannot be identical with London and Lord Gladstone in Conan Doyle’s stories. Internal fictional sentences should be distinguished from internal metafictional sentences, such as (9) in The Hound of the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. Internal fictional and metafictional sentences can be explicit (they can be present in the list of a story's sentences) or implicit (they can be deduced by that list). For example, (10) in The Hound of the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is English seems to express a true proposition, even though Conan Doyle (perhaps) does not explicitly claim that Sherlock Holmes is English. Are such inferences acceptable? And to what extent are they acceptable? Finally, there are sentences in which fictional objects are considered independently of their stories. These are external metafictional sentences. For example, (1), (2), (4)-(6) can be classified into this category. Other examples of such sentences are (11) Sherlock Holmes is more intelligent than Emma Bovary; 4 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. (12) Sherlock Holmes is more beloved than Darth Vader; (13) John admires Sherlock Holmes; (14) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective; (15) Sherlock Holmes is still the paradigmatic detective character; (16) Ulysses inspired both Dante Alighieri and James Joyce; (17) the Faust of Goethe's Faust is an aspect of Faust itself; (18) the Sherlock Holmes of The Hound of the Baskervilles is the same as the Sherlock Holmes of A Study in Scarlet; (19) the Sherlock Holmes of Conan Doyle's stories is the same as the Sherlock Holmes of a recent movie directed by Guy Ritchie; (20) in Hamlet, Gonzago is a fictional character since The Murder of Gonzago is a story within the story Hamlet. In particular, in order to justify the truth of the propositions expressed by (18) and (19), it seems necessary to define a criterion of identity for fictional objects. J. L. Borges, for example, imagined a fictional character which had all the properties of Cervantes' Don Quixote but which was created by another (fictional) author, Pierre Menard. Are Cervantes' Don Quixote and Pierre Menard's Don Quixote identical or not? Are they the same fictional object? 2. Nothing but Mental. My theory is grounded on two assumptions that I cannot defend here. First, existence, as it is involved in the truth-conditions of (1) and of (21) Obama exists, is taken as a first-order informative property (i.e., a property of objects that some objects have and that other objects do not have). Second, it is legitimate to quantify over objects, 5 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. regardless of their existence or non-existence: what is requested by quantification simply is that whatever we quantify over has definite identity-conditions. Thus, Sherlock Holmes is a non-existent object, i.e., he does not instantiate the first-order, informative property of existing. Yet, he is an object. What kind of object? In my perspective, Sherlock Holmes is a mental object, i.e. an object that depends for its identity conditions (for its being an object) on the activity of some minded subject. In order to argue for such a thesis, let me consider Sherlock Holmes' story in the actual world. Sherlock Holmes was invented by Arthur Conan Doyle: if Arthur Conan Doyle had not written Sherlock Holmes' stories, we would not have known any object such as Sherlock Holmes. This does not imply that Sherlock Holmes could not have had any other author. Yet, it is true that Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes' author. Without Arthur Conan Doyle's mental activity, we would not have known that Sherlock Holmes is a detective who lives in London and who has a friend named Watson. We would not have known that Sherlock Holmes is different from Anna Karenina and from Watson and from Emma Bovary, since there would not have been such a fictional character, i.e., Sherlock Holmes would not have had any identity condition making it different from any other non-existent object and from any existent one. On the other hand, why would we have to argue that Sherlock Holmes is an object, regardless of his author's mental activity? Perhaps, because he continues being an object even if Conan Doyle is now dead and because he might have had another author, i.e., he might have been invented by someone else's mental activity. Yet, this does not exclude that Sherlock Holmes actually identity-depends on Arthur Conan Doyle and that we can now quantify over him since Conan Doyle invented him. Yet, an orthodox Meinongian could argue that it was true that Sherlock Holmes did not exist even at a time t0 that preceded the time t1 at which Conan Doyle first thought of him. Thus, in order for the proposition [Sherlock Holmes did not exist 6 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. at t0]4 to be true, Sherlock Holmes had to be an object at t0. Yet, if now consider that proposition, it is now true since Sherlock Holmes now has definite identity conditions – and he has them, since he was defined in his identity conditions by Arthur Conan Doyle. What seems to be implied by the orthodox Meinongian argument is that, provided that it is now true that [Sherlock Holmes did not exist at t0], there was a true proposition at t0, such as the present tensed proposition [Sherlock Holmes does not exist], and that proposition was made true at t0 by Sherlock Holmes’ not instantiating existence (and, moreover, it referred to something, i.e. its truth-value, only if [Sherlock Holmes] referred to something, i.e. Sherlock Holmes, given the Fregean Principle of Compositionality). However, there is no need to posit at t0 such an extra entity, i.e. the present tensed proposition [Sherlock Holmes does not exist]: what is requested in order for [Sherlock Holmes did not exist at t0] to be true simply is that Sherlock Holmes was invented by Arthur Conan Doyle at t1 and that t0 precedes t15. In my perspective, authors do not properly create fictional objects, i.e., they do not make them existents. Minded subjects (such as authors) simply establish their identity conditions, i.e., they simply make them objects. Given the truth of such premises, it is easy to argue that Sherlock Holmes is a mental object: (arg.1) for every object, that object is a mental object iff it depends for its being an object on some minded subject(s); (arg.2) Sherlock Holmes depends for his being an object on some minded subject; (arg.3) thus, Sherlock Holmes is a mental object. Yet, someone could claim that not every mental object is a non-existent object: for example, I could think of my girlfriend, and she would not become a non-existent object because of my thinking of her! However, in order for something to be a mental object, it is not sufficient that 4 I use square brackets [ ] in order to distinguish propositions from statements. I cannot discuss here all the arguments given by Twardoski 1894 (1977) and Meinong (e.g., in Meinong 1904 (1960)) for the mind-independence of non-existent objects. For more details, see also Findlay (1933) and Grossmann (1974). I have only introduced one strong reason for doubting about the mind-independence of ficta. 5 7 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. it is thought of as being such-and-such by some minded object. It must be defined in its identity conditions by some minded object and my girlfriend is (luckily) not defined in her identity conditions by my thinking of her. If you wish, we can claim that something is a weak mental object iff it is thought of as being such-and-such by some minded subject, while something is a strong mental object iff it is defined in its identity conditions by (i.e., it depends on its being an object on) some minded subject. Weak mental objects exist or do not exist, while strong mental objects do not exist. Sherlock Holmes and other fictional characters are strong mental objects and they do not exist6. 3. Ascription Relations. Let me recall my aforementioned example of a true statement involving a fictional object: (3) Sherlock Holmes is a detective. It has already been remarked that there is no detective named "Sherlock Holmes", since the property of being a detective seems to be an existence-entailing one: for every object, that object is a detective only if it exists. However, many Meinongians have argued that there are detectives who do not exist (e.g., Sherlock Holmes), that the instantiation of the property of being a detective does not imply anything about the ontological status of objects that instantiate it7. In other terms, the Sosein of an object (that comprehends, in Sherlock Holmes' case, his being a detective) is independent of its Sein. However, things are not so easy. In fact, our commonsense might reply that, if there were a murder in our town, Sherlock Holmes would not be able to investigate on it and that, since every detective is able to investigate on a murder (at least, since every detective has the power of investigating on a murder), Sherlock Holmes is not a detective. Meinongians might then distinguish between real and fictional One could object that social objects – such as institutions - can be considered strong mental objects, even though they seemingly exist. I reply that, within my perspective, social objects do not properly exist. This does not exclude that they have properties, that they can bear relations, and so on. However, I cannot discuss here such a thesis. 7 See, for example, Routley (1979) and Parsons (1980). 6 8 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. murders (or between real and fictional investigations) and they might claim that, even if Sherlock Holmes is not able to investigate on real murders (or to really investigate on murders), since he is only a fictional detective, he is able to investigate on fictional murders (or he is able to fictionally investigate on murders). Thus, he is a detective, since he is able to (fictionally or really) investigate on (fictional or real) murders. There are real murders and fictional ones, real detectives and fictional ones but, in order for something to be a murder, it does not have to be real, and in order for someone to be a detective, s/he does not have to be real. However, there are features of real murders that are not features of fictional ones; there are features of real detectives that are not features of fictional ones. For example, it seems that real detectives are complete, while fictional ones are somehow incomplete: it seems to be neither true, nor false that Sherlock Holmes had a grandfather named Daniel, while, for every real detective, it is true or false that s/he had a grandfather named Daniel. Furthermore, as we have already remarked, some fictional objects are inconsistent (e.g., round squares or, better, round and non-round circles). In order to avoid complications introduced by the inconsistency and incompleteness of fictional objects and in order to maintain that they are objects, one might choose among different solutions. For example, as it is claimed by ascriptivism, s/he might accept that there are some relations (some ascription relations) between those objects and those properties that they have according to stories. Since, as I have already argued, fictional objects are mental objects, such relations should include minded subjects too. The basis of an ascriptivistic theory of fictional objects is thus represented by the introduction of a family of ascription relations, that hold at least between some object, some property and some minded subject (even if I shall introduce an ascription relation that does not hold for objects). Furthermore, since fictional objects do not have within the actual world (but within some other fictional world) some properties that are ascribed to them, there are ascription relations that involve 9 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. fictional contexts too (i.e., fictional worlds defined by stories, as we will see in the next section). Here are some examples of ascription relations: A1 (a 3-place relation that holds between some object, some property and some minded subject); A2 (a 4-place relation that holds between some object, some property, some minded subject and some fictional context); A3 (a 4-place relation that holds between two objects, some two-place relation and some minded subject); A4 (a 5-place relation that holds between two objects, some two-place relation, some minded subject and some fictional context); and so on. It is worth remarking that: ascription relations do not only involve fictional objects, but existing objects too, as we will see; not every property had by a fictional object is an ascribed property, but there are properties that they simply instantiate (e.g., the property of being fictional). Let me consider Sherlock Holmes' example. Even if it is not true that Sherlock Holmes instantiates the property of being a detective, i.e. it is not true that (3ins.) ~DEh (where "h" stands for Sherlock Holmes and "DE" for the property of being a detective), it is nevertheless true that there is some minded subject that ascribes to him the fictional property of being a detective within some fictional context, i.e. it is true that (3ascr.) ∃m∃cA2DEhmc If it is true that (3), it seems that (3ascr.) expresses its proper logical reading and the logical form of its truth-conditions: if there is some minded subject that ascribes to Sherlock Holmes the property of being a detective within some fictional context, then it is true that (3). It is not necessary that Sherlock Holmes' author (Conan Doyle) ascribes to him that property within some fictional context (some fictional context defined by Conan Doyle's stories) in order for (3) to be true: one and the same Sherlock Holmes might have that property within some other fictional context defined by some other author's stories or by the interpretation of some story about Sherlock Holmes that has not been written by Conan Doyle. For example, if I watched 10 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. the movie directed by Guy Ritchie about Sherlock Holmes and if I did not know that Sherlock Holmes was constituted as a fictional object by Conan Doyle, I could nevertheless ascribe to Sherlock Holmes (to Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes) the property of being a detective within the fictional context defined by that movie. When I shall deal with the identity conditions of fictional objects, this point will become clearer. Ascription relations also hold when some minded subject ascribes to some (fictional or existent) object some property. In fact, ascription relations can involve both existent and nonexistent objects. For example, when I think that Obama is the President of the United States in 2013, I ascribe (by A1) to Obama (the existing Obama) the property of being the President of the United States in 2013. My ascription is veridical iff Obama instantiates the property of being the President of the United States in 2013; otherwise, it is not veridical. A1 does not involve any fictional context: it only involves me (a minded subject), the property of being the President of the United States in 2013 and Obama. The same happens with fictional objects: I ascribe (by A1) to Sherlock Holmes the property of being a fictional object, and my ascription is veridical, since Sherlock Holmes instantiates the property of being a fictional object. Fictional objects are always incomplete and sometimes inconsistent, even if we do not have to deny that the laws of the excluded middle and of non-contradiction hold for them. In fact, it is legitimate to distinguish between two kinds of negation: property-negation (where the ̅) and ascriptionproperty-negation of some property P is the negative property non-P, or P negation (where the ascription negation of some ascription relation A corresponds to its not holding between its relata). Fictional objects are always incomplete as a matter of fact: (incompleteness) for every fictional object, that object is incomplete iff, for at least one n-adic property P, for every minded subject and for every fictional context, neither P is ascribed to that object by that minded subject within that fictional context (i.e., it is not true, by 11 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. ascription-negation, that P is ascribed to that object by that minded subject within that ̅ (i.e., it is not true, by ascription-negation, that P ̅, i.e. the fictional context), nor its negation P property-negation of P, is ascribed to that object by that minded subject within that fictional context). The axiom (incompleteness) neither implies the denial of the law of excluded middle, nor of the law of bivalence. In fact, for every n-adic property (ascription-relations included) and for every fictional object, it is always either true or false that that property is instantiated by that object. Every fictional object is incomplete as a matter of fact, since there is no (finite) minded subject that can think of it as being thus determined with regard to every (ascribed) property. With regard to inconsistency, it seems to me legitimate to claim that there are different kinds (and different degrees) of it. For example: (inconsistency-1) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-1 iff, for every minded subject, for every fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object ̅ P within that context; (inconsistency-2) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-2 iff, for some (but not every) minded subject, for every fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object ̅ P within that context; (inconsistency-3) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-3 iff, for every minded subject, for some (but not every) fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object ̅ P within that context; (inconsistency-4) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-4 iff, for some (but not 12 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. every) minded subject, for some (but not every) fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it ̅ within that context. is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P The round non-round circle is inconsistent-1, since both the properties of being round and of non-being round are ascribed to it within every fictional context by every minded subject. On the other hand, the round square can be inconsistent-2, inconsistent-3 or inconsistent-4, since there can be minded subjects that do not know the rules of geometry and that do not ascribe to it the property of non-being round in virtue of its being a square (inconsistency-2), or there can be fictional contexts where such rules do not hold, so that it is not legitimate to ascribe to it the property of non-being round in virtue of its being a square within those contexts (inconsistency-3), or both (inconsistency-4). Inconsistent fictional objects do not "explode", since no kind of inconsistency implies (inconsistency-0) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-0 iff, for every minded subject, for every fictional context, for every property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object ̅ P within that context. Furthermore, it is not necessary to deny the law of non-contradiction in order to admit inconsistent-0 objects, since it is not the case that, with regard to one and the same n-adic property, that property is both instantiated and not instantiated by an object. Thus, even inconsistent-0 fictional objects are not contradictory: it is neither necessary to admit impossible worlds, nor true contradictions within the actual world in order to deal with them. 4. Stories and Authors. It has already been argued that fictional objects are mental objects and that they are constituted as objects by minded subjects' thinking about them. Thus, it seems to me fair to 13 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. accept (constitution) ∀x(Fx → ∃mCmx) (where "F" stands for the property of being a fictional object and "C" stands for the relation of constituting, that holds between some minded subject and that object). The axiom (constitution) does not exclude that there are objects that are constituted by minded subjects and that are not fictional objects. Intuitively, something is a fictional object iff it is a nonexistent character of a story. Yet, in order to grasp what is for an object to be a fictional object and what is for it to be constituted by some minded subject, it is necessary to introduce further notions. Firstly, I shall take stories as sets of propositions. Secondly, I shall assume that, for every object and every minded subject, that minded subject thinks of that object iff it ascribes to that object by A1 some property, i.e. (thinks of) ∀x∀m(THmx ↔ ∃PA1Pxm) (where "TH" stands for the relation of thinking of). If Conan Doyle thinks of Sherlock Holmes, then he ascribes by A1 to him some property: for example, the property of being a detective according to some story. If I think of Obama, then I ascribe by A1 to him some property: for example, the property of being the President of the United States in 2013. Thirdly, for every proposition and every story, that proposition is true within that story iff it is part of that story, i.e. (true in story) ∀p(TSps ↔ PAps) (where "p" is a variable ranging over propositions, "TS" and "PA" respectively stand for the relations of being true within a story and of being part of). I cannot dwell here on the identity conditions of propositions, even though I think that propositions identity-depend (at least in part) on logical operators such as negation, so that, if one claims that the proposition ~p is part of a story (or, equivalently, that that proposition is true in a story), this does not imply that p is part of that story too. 14 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. The identity of stories depends on propositions that are part of them, i.e. two stories are identical iff all and only the same propositions are part of them: (story-id.) ∀s1∀s2((s1 = s2) ↔ ∀p(PAps1 ↔ PAps2)) (where "s1" and "s2" are variables ranging over stories)8. The original author of a story is the minded subject that grounds, by its activities, the identity of that story. Let me now introduce the notion of context and the relation that holds between stories and fictional contexts: (def.story-context) ∀s∀c(Dsc ↔ ∀p(TSps → TCpc)) (where "c", "s" and "p" are variables respectively ranging over fictional contexts, stories and propositions, "D" stands for the relation of defining, that holds between stories and fictional contexts, "TC" stands for the relation of being true within a context). Intuitively, the idea behind (def.story-context) is that fictional contexts are fictional worlds different from stories: minded subjects, in fact, tend to distinguish between stories and contexts in which what is asserted by those stories is true. It is not necessary that, for any proposition that is true or false in the actual world, that proposition is true or false within stories too: there are (true or false) propositions in the actual world that are not part of any story and, for every story, it is not necessary that it comprehends any proposition of the actual world and that it claims that it is true or false within the fictional context defined by that story. On the other hand, there are propositions that are true within fictional contexts defined by stories and that are not part of those stories: a good interpreter of the story A Study in Scarlet, for example, might claim that it is true in the fictional context defined by A Study in Scarlet that London is in England, even 8 One could ask: is the story uniquely constituted by the proposition [Romeo loves Juliet] identical with the story that is uniquely constituted by the proposition [Juliet is beloved by Romeo]? Intuitively, I would reply that they are the same story, since the proposition [Romeo loves Juliet] is identical with the proposition [Juliet is beloved by Romeo], though this proposition is expressed by two different statements. However, I cannot justify here this reply. 15 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. if the proposition [London is in England] is not part of A Study in Scarlet. For every object, that object is a character of a story iff the original author of the story ascribes to it some property within the fictional context defined by that story: (character) ∀x∀s(CHxs ↔ ∃P∃m∃c(AUOSms & Dsc & A2Pxmc)) (where "CH" stands for the relation of being a character within a story and "AUOS" stands for the relation of being the original author of some story). Thus, a fictum is a non-existent object that is a character of some story: (fictum) ∀x(Fx ↔ (~Ex & ∃sCHxs)) (where "E" stands for the property of existing). Furthermore, I shall define the context of origin of a fictum as follows: (cont.or.) ∀x∀c(COcx ↔ (Fx & ∃s1(CHxs1 & Ds1c & ~∃s2(~(s1 = s2) & CHxs2 & PRs2s1)))) (where "CO" and "PR" respectively stand for the relations of being the context of origin and of preceding). The relation of preceding holds between two stories s3 and s4 iff s3 is constituted as a story at a time t3 that precedes the time t4 at which s4 is constituted as a story. The original author of a fictum is the original author of the story that defines the context of origin of that fictum, i.e. (or.author obj.) ∀x∀m(AUOOxm ↔ ∃s(AUOSms & ∃c(Dsc & COcx))) (where "AUOO" stands for the relation of being the original author of a fictional object). The original author of a fictum is the minded subject that constitutes that fictum as an object. Furthermore, by using the relation of being the original author of a story, it is legitimate to introduce the relation of being the original author of a fictional context: (or.author con.) ∀x∀m(AUOCxm ↔ ∃s(AUOSms & Dsc)) (where "AUOC" stands for the relation of being the original author of a fictional context). The author simpliciter of a fictional object is some minded subject that is the author of a story that 16 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. defines a fictional context within which some property is ascribed to that fictional object, i.e. (sim.author ob.) ∀x∀m(AUOmx ↔ (Fx & ∃P∃s∃c(AUOSms & Dsc & A2Pxmc))) (where "AUO" stands for the relation of being the author simpliciter of an object). After having defined contexts of origins, it is possible to introduce original story-boundedness and story-boundedness simpliciter. Some fictional object is originally story-bound to some story iff that story defines its context of origin: (or.story-bound.) ∀x∀s(BOxs ↔ (Fx & ∃c(COcx & Dsc))) (where "BO" stands for the relation of being originally story-bound to), while it is story-bound simpliciter to some story iff there is some property that is ascribed to it by the original author of that story within the fictional context defined by that story: (sim.story-bound.) ∀x∀s(Bxs ↔ (Fx & ∃P∃m∃c(AUOSms & Dsc & A2Pxmc))) (where "B" stands for the relation of being story-bound simpliciter to). Finally, it is acceptable that someone is a good interpreter of some story iff, for every proposition and every fictional context, that story defines that fictional context and that proposition is true within the story and is part of that story and s/he ascribes to that proposition the relation of being part of that story iff s/he ascribes to that proposition the relation of being true within the fictional context defined by that story, i.e. (good inter.) ∀m∀s(ISms ↔ ∀p∀c((Dsc & TSps & PAps & A3PApsm & A3TSpsm) ↔ A3TCpcm)) (where "IS" stands for the relation of being a good interpreter of some story). All these notions will turn out to be useful for outlining the truth-conditions of our initial data. 5. Identity Conditions for Ficta. In this section, I shall outline four different criteria of identity for fictional objects: fictional object x is identical with fictional object y iff at least one of such criteria holds for them. I do 17 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. not think that I will be exhaustive about this topic (further criteria of identity for ficta might be found out) and I acknowledge that such criteria cannot be established a priori. I have only looked for the truth-conditions of our true statements about the identity of fictional objects and I have restricted my investigation to those cases in which such an identity seems certain (or almost certain). Fictional objects x and y are identical whenever they have the same original author that establishes their identity (ficta-identity-1). It follows that anyone who acknowledges that original author's authority over those fictional objects should recognize their identity. Yet, some fictional objects' identities are not only established by their original authors. Let me suppose that we both think of some fictional object: how can we establish that it is one and the same fictional object, even if we ascribe to that object different properties? It seems to me legitimate to introduce one further situation in which those fictional objects can be identified. According to the criterion (ficta-identity-2), fictional objects x and y can be identified whenever, for any two minded subjects, both subjects think of them and they ascribe to one another the relation of thinking of those objects and they both ascribe to the fictional object they think of the relation of being identical with the fictional object thought of by the other subject. I have to remark that (ficta-identity-2) works from an intrasubjective perspective too. In fact, I can ascribe to some fictional object I am thinking of the relation of being identical with some other fictional object I am thinking of. Thirdly, there are some identities of ficta that are grounded on univocally identifying fictional properties. Let me assume that the variable "x" ranges here only over fictional objects (so that I shall assume a version of (character) that is implicitly restricted to fictional objects). For every fictum x and for every property, I shall define as follows the property of being a univocally identifying fictional property of that fictum: (un.fic.property-1) ∀x∀P(PUFPx ↔ ∀m∀c∀s((CHxs & ISms & Dsc) → (A2Pxmc → 18 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. ∀y(THmy → ((A3Ixym ∨ A3Ix̅ ym) & ~(A3Ixym & A3Ix̅ ym)))))) (where "PUF" stands for the relation of being a univocally identifying fictional property, "I" and "I"̅ respectively stand for the relations of being identical with and of being non-identical with and the variable "x" ranges only over fictional objects, while "y" ranges over every object). Thus, the third situation in which ficta x and y can be identified is whenever they have the same univocally identifying fictional property (ficta-identity-3). For example, a univocally identifying fictional property of Sherlock Holmes is the conjunctive property of being a detective and of having a friend named "Watson" and of living in London. In this situation, there should be sufficiently elastic properties in order to deal with difficult cases of identity between ficta. Yet, one caveat is: do not introduce disjunctive properties. In fact, if minded subjects introduced disjunctive properties for this purpose, by the rule of introduction of disjunction applied to ascribed properties, then every fictional object would turn out to be identical with any other. Thus, I shall reform (un.fic.property-1) as follows: (un.fic.property-2) ∀x∀P(PUFPx ↔ (~DIP & ∀m∀c∀s((CHxs & ISms & Dsc) → (A2Pxmc → ∀y(THmy → ((A3Ixym ∨ A3Ix̅ ym) & ~(A3Ixym & A3Ix̅ ym))))))) (where "DI" stands for the property of being a disjunctive property). The criterion (fictaidentity-3) holds in virtue of (un.fic.property-2), i.e. in virtue of the possession of the same univocally identifying and non-disjunctive fictional property. We can deal with other cases of identity by introducing one further situation that is grounded on story-boundedness. In this situation, the identity between fictional objects x and y holds whenever one of those objects is story-bound to some story and some minded subject, thinking of the other object, ascribes to it some property within some fictional context that has that subject as its original author and that is different from the fictional context defined by the former story and that subject ascribes to those objects the relation of being identical with one 19 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. another (ficta-identity-4). For example, writing a story, I might define a fictional context (i.e., I might be its original author) where the same Sherlock Holmes that is a character in Conan Doyle's stories does something. Thus, my Sherlock Holmes would be identical with Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes. Put together, these four criteria can establish the identity between fictional objects x and y iff at least one of such criteria holds for those objects, i.e. (by taking the variables "x" and "y" as now ranging over every object) (ficta-identity) ∀x∀y((Fx & Fy & x = y) ↔ ∃m(AUOOmx & AUOOmy & A3Ixym) ∨ ∃m1∃m2(THm1x & THm2y & A3THm2ym1 & A3THm1xm2 & A3Ixym1 & A3Iyxm2) ∨ ∃P(PUFPx & PUFPy) ∨ ∃s(Bxs & ∃P∃m∃c(A3Bxsm & ~Dsc & AUOCmc & A2Pymc & A3Iyxm)))) On the other hand, fictional objects x and y are different iff no criterion holds for those objects. No contradictory result is obtained regarding the identity of fictional objects x and y if only one criterion applies to them and other criteria do not apply: in this case, x simply is identical with y. There is no degree of identity between fictional objects (perhaps, there is only some degree of similarity without identity between them). Yet, if one wished to preserve the intuition according to which there seemingly is some degree of identity between them, s/he could claim that there seemingly is some increasing degree of identity whenever more than one criterion holds. One could object against such an account that many minded subjects are not conscious of ascribing properties and identity in such ways. Sure! Yet, I have not claimed that they have to ascribe to themselves the ascription-relations of ascribing properties in such ways, i.e. I have not introduced self-consciousness about ascription. I have only claimed that, as a matter of fact, such criteria of identity ground identity between fictional objects from an ontological viewpoint. 20 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. Furthermore, one should ask whether some character in some fiction is identical with or different from some existing object. I shall firstly introduce the criterion (ex.fic.identity-1), according to which, roughly, some character within a story is identical with some existing object whenever the original author of that story ascribes to that character the property of being identical with that existing object (ex.fic.identity-1). Secondly, one might introduce univocally identifying properties, i.e. properties that are instantiated only by one definite existing object (and that are not disjunctive): (un.property) ∀x∀P(PUPx ↔ (Px & ~DIP & ~∃y(~(x = y) & Py))) (where "PU" stands for the relation of being a univocally identifying property). It is worth remarking that such properties are univocally identifying as a matter of fact, not necessarily, since there might be possible worlds in which an object's univocally identifying properties are different. Thus, the second criterion I shall introduce (ex.fic.identity-2) asserts that some character within a story that has some minded subject as its original author is identical with some existing object whenever that existing object has some univocally identifying property that is ascribed by the original author of that story to that character within the fictional context defined by that story. Finally, the third criterion is based on good interpreters: some character within a story is identical within some existing object whenever every good interpreter of that story ascribes to that character the property of being identical with that existing object (ex.fic.identity-3). Such an identity is not simply grounded on some (but not all) or most (but not all) good interpreters' ascriptions, since there would remain in such a case a shadow of doubt about the truth of some identity statements. On the other hand, different degrees of similarity without identity can be grounded in these latter situations. Put together (and assuming that our variables "x" and "y" range over every object), the final criterion of identity between some existing object and some character within a story asserts 21 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. that: (ex.fic.identity) ∀x∀y∀s(Ex & CHys & x = y) ↔ ∃m(AUOSms & A3Ixym) ∨ ∃P∃m∃c(AUOSms & PUPx & Dsc & A2Pxmc) ∨ ∀m(ISms ↔ A3Ixym) Yet, accepting (ficta-identity) and (ex.fic.identity), some problems arise concerning the transitivity of identity. In fact, let me consider a case in which, by (ficta-identity-4), Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes turns out to be identical with some character of some fictional context that has me as its original author. Furthermore, that character, by (ficta-identity-4) and still in virtue of my power of identifying fictional objects, is identical with Flaubert’s Emma Bovary. It turns out, by the transitivity of identity, that Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes is identical with Flaubert’s Emma Bovary. A different case: by (ficta-identity-4), Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes turns out to be identical with some character of some fictional context that has me as its original author. Furthermore, that character, by (ficta-identity-4), is identical with Conan Doyle’s Watson. It turns out, by the transitivity of identity, that Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes is identical with Conan Doyle’s Watson. Still another case: besides my character that is identical with Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, let me assume that another minded subject identifies, by (ficta-identity-4), some character of some fictional context that has that subject as its original author with Flaubert’s Emma Bovary. Furthermore, by (fictaidentity-2), we establish that my character and that subject’s character are identical. It turns out, by the transitivity of identity, that Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes and Flaubert’s Emma Bovary are identical. Finally, considering a case involving (ex.fic.identity-1), I identify, by (ex.fic.identity-1), some character of some story that has me as its original author with the existing Lord Gladstone. Later on, I identify that character, by (ex.fic.identity-1), with the existing Obama. It turns out, by the transitivity of identity, that Lord Gladstone is identical with Obama. Thus, one should amend (ficta-identity-2), (ficta-identity-4), (ex.fic.identity-1), (ficta-identity) and (ex.fic.identity) in order to avoid such problems. 22 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. I shall introduce the notion of a legitimate identifier as follows: for any minded subject, for objects x and y, that subject is a legitimate identifier of those objects (I shall use "IL" as standing for the relation of being a legitimate identifier) iff it is legitimate that, if that subject ascribes to those objects the relation of being identical, then those objects are identical. Furthermore, it seems to me that, for any minded subject and for objects x and y, that minded subject is a legitimate identifier of x and y iff at least one of the following conditions holds: - that minded subject is the original author of both x and y, or (vel) - there is no other object z, such that there is a criterion of identity not for ficta (e.g., a criterion of identity between existing things), such that x is identical with z iff that criterion holds between them and, as a matter of fact, that criterion does not hold between them and that minded subject nevertheless ascribes the identity between x and z (or the same for y), or (vel) - intuitively, there is no other object z, that is originally authored by another minded subject or that has a fictional context not originally authored by the former minded subject as its context of origin, such that the former minded subject ascribes the identity between z and x, even though the original author of z does not ascribe the identity (or s/he ascribes the non-identity) between y and z, or even though the contexts of origin of y and z – not originally authored by the former minded subject – are different (or the same for y). Put formally: (leg.) ∀m1∀x∀y(ILmxy ↔ ((AUOOm1x & AUOOm1y) ∨ ~∃z∃w(CINFw & (~HOwxz & ((z = x) ↔ (HOwxz)) & A3Iyzm1) ∨ (~HOwyz & ((z = y) ↔ (HOwyz)) & A3Ixzm1))) ∨ ~∃z((A3Ixzm1 & ∃m2(AUOOm2z & ~(m2 = m1) & (A3Iy̅ zm2 ∨ ~A3Iyzm2))) ∨ (A3Iyzm1 & ∃m2(AUOOm2z & ~(m2 = m1) & (A3Ix̅ zm2 ∨ ~A3Ixzm2))) ∨ (~AUOOm1z & A3Ixzm1 & ∃c1∃c2(COc1z & COc2y & ~(c1 = c2) & ~AUOCm1c1 & ~AUOCm1c2)) ∨ (~AUOOm1z & A3Iyzm1 & ∃c1∃c2(COc1z & COc2x & ~(c1 = c2) & ~AUOCm1c1 & 23 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. ~AUOCm1c2))))) (where "IL" stands for the relation of being a legitimate identifier, "CINF" stands for the property of being a criterion of identity that is not for fictional objects, "HO" stands for the relation of holding, that holds between a criterion of identity and objects x and y. I have put the major disjunctions in bold font). Thus, (ficta-identity-2), (ficta-identity-4) and (ex.fic.identity-1) should be amended, by adding that the two minded subjects are legitimate identifiers of those objects (ficta-identity2a), that the minded subject that establishes the identities is a legitimate identifier of the objects involved in those identities, so that we obtain (ficta-identity-4a) and (ex.fic.identity1a). Accordingly, (ficta-identity) and (ex.fic.identity) should be amended as follows: (ficta-identity-a) ∀x∀y((Fx & Fy & x = y) ↔ ∃m(AUOOmx & AUOOmy & A3Ixym) ∨ ∃m1∃m2(THm1x & THm2y & A3THm2ym1 & A3THm1xm2 & ILm1xy & ILm2xy & A3Ixym1 & A3Iyxm2) ∨ ∃P(PUFPx & PUFPy) ∨ ∃s(Bxs & ∃P∃m∃c(ILmxy & A3Bxsm & ~Dsc & AUOCmc & A2Pymc & A3Iyxm))) (ex.fic.identity-a) ∀x∀y∀s(Ex & CHys & x = y) ↔ ∃m(ILmxy & AUOSms & A3Ixym) ∨ ∃P∃m∃c(AUOSms & PUPx & Dsc & A2Pxmc) ∨ ∀m(ISms ↔ A3Ixym)) The fact that the third major disjunct of (leg.) is negated and no other disjunct is true excludes the first, the second and the third case (e.g., I cannot identify my strange Sherlock HolmesWatson (x) with Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes (y), since there is an object z (Conan Doyle’s Watson) that I identify with x, such that both y and z are not originally authored by me and their author ascribes to them the property of non-being identical). The fourth case is excluded by the fact that (leg.)’s second major disjunct is negated, since it is established by a criterion of identity that is not for fictional objects that Obama is distinct from Lord Gladstone, and no other disjunct is true. The criterion (leg.) is not an ad hoc criterion: it preserves the idea that one cannot identify in every case objects x and y by simply 24 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. establishing that they are identical. There are problematic cases of identities between fictional objects. In a first case, the original author of some story is competently acquainted with some fictional object that is constituted within some other story, but s/he attributes to that fictional object properties that are completely different from the ones that are ascribed to it according to the latter story: there might be a literary work where a fictional character named "Sherlock Holmes" is a rapper who lives in New York. Following our criteria of identity, the first fictional object is identical with the second one not in virtue of (ficta-identity-3) but (if the original author of the first story ascribes such an identity) in virtue of (ficta-identity-1) (if both stories have the same original author) or in virtue of (ficta-identity-4a) (if they have different authors). In a second case, two different authors (without respectively knowing their works) constitute fictional objects x and y that are qualitatively really similar. Are they the same fictional object? Yes, if (ficta-identity-3) holds for them, given some univocally identifying fictional property. If they are qualitatively identical (a really implausible, but not impossible case), (ficta-identity-3) certainly holds. On the other hand, if some author thought of a story about some fictional object qualitatively identical with (or very similar to) some other fictional object already constituted by another author and if the former author thought of both objects as identical with one another, then their identity could hold in virtue of (ficta-identity-3) and (fictaidentity-4a). It follows from these solutions that it is not necessary that, for every fictional object, that object has one and only one original author: there might be cases (implausible, I should repeat, but not impossible ones) in which one and the same fictional object has two or more different original authors. If two different authors ground the identity of one and the same story, that story has two different original authors. Furthermore, (ficta-identity-3) makes it possible to think that some fictum could have had a different author. If there is some possible world in which Conan Doyle does not exist and there is some fictional object that is 25 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. qualitatively identical with (or at least very similar to) Sherlock Holmes, but that is authored by some other minded subject (let me call such an object Sherlock Holmes-2), Sherlock Holmes-2 is identical with our Sherlock Holmes in virtue of (ficta-identity-3), so that one and the same object has – in some other possible world – some other author. One further case can be introduced by thinking of three (fictional) characters: within different fictional contexts or within the same context, their original author(s) ascribe(s) to the first one the properties of being a detective and of living in Baker Street 221B, London, and of not having a friend named Watson; to the second one the properties of being a detective and of having a friend named Watson and of not living in Baker Street 221B, London; to the third one the properties of having a friend named Watson and of living in Baker Street 221B, London, and of not being a detective. Are such objects identical with one another? Are they all identical with Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes? The answer to the first question depends on further contextual information, e.g. about their authors. Concerning the second question, it seems difficult to establish whether they are identical with Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes, at least according to (ficta-identity-3), since we cannot use disjunctive properties. However, one might use other criteria to establish their identity or difference, provided further contextual information. Finally, let me analyze a case inspired by one of K. Fine's objections against Parsons’ Meinongianism9. Let me assume that there are two qualitatively identical, yet numerically distinct fictional objects within the same story. How can we ground their being different from one another? Firstly, one should think that this story is incomplete: naming such objects, if we do not have any property in virtue of whose ascription we can understand that the author talks of the former and not of the latter object, then it is hard to distinguish them. Yet, let me assume that the original author does name such objects and that s/he does not ascribe such a 9 See Fine (1984): 103-104. 26 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. property to them, so that we cannot use the negation of (ficta-identity-1) and the fact that no other criterion holds to ground their distinction. Do they turn out to be identical? It seems to me that they do not. In fact, it is legitimate, following (un.fic.property-2), that a good interpreter of the story, in order to preserve their distinction, introduces some univocally identifying fictional property that is ascribed to one of them and whose negation is ascribed to the other, so that, considering that the negation of (ficta-identity-3) is true and that no other criterion holds, they turn out to be different fictional objects. 6. Saving the Data. It is now possible to provide the truth-conditions for our data, i.e. for the plausibly true statements that I have mentioned in §1. It is worth remarking that my interpretation is a reformative one: it aims at showing what propositions are expressed by those statements and to define their truth-conditions. Ascriptivism can preserve both the intuition that it is not necessary to refer to some author or to some definite story in order to claim that (3) Sherlock Holmes is a detective is true (since I could think of Sherlock Holmes as a detective, even if I did not know anything about Conan Doyle or about Conan Doyle's stories) and the intuition that there is some reading of such statements, according to which the propositions that are expressed by them are made true by something involving Conan Doyle and his stories. Let me call the truth-conditions that respect the first intuition "minimal" truth-conditions and the truth-conditions that respect the second one "qualified" truth-conditions. In order for (3) to express a true proposition, it is sufficient that there are minimal truth-conditions, so that (3) expresses (as we have already seen) a proposition that has such a logical form (that implies its having such-and-such truth-conditions): 27 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. (3ascr.) ∃m∃cA2DEhmc However, one might be dissatisfied with such a result: s/he might claim that, for example, by stating that it is true that (3), s/he aims at showing that, according to Conan Doyle or according to his stories or according to some story about Sherlock Holmes, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. Thus, there should be some qualified readings of (3) that express such interpretations. I propose the following readings: (3ascr.qual.-1) ∃m∃c(AUOOmh & A2DEhmc) (3ascr.qual.-2) ∃c(AUOOdh & A2DEhdc) (3ascr.qual.-3) ∃c∃s(CHhs & Dsc & ∀m(ISms → A2DEhmc)) (3ascr.qual.-4) ∃c∃s(AUOSds & CHhs & Dsc & ∀m2(ISm2s → A2DEhm2c)) (where the constant "d" stands for Conan Doyle). By (3ascr.qual.-1), it is claimed that there is some original author of Sherlock Holmes’ that ascribes to him the property of being a detective within some fictional context, while, by (3ascr.qual.-2), it is added that such an author is Conan Doyle. By (3ascr.qual.-3), it is explained that Sherlock Holmes is a character in some story and that every good interpreter of that story ascribes to him the property of being a detective within the fictional context defined by that story, while, by (3ascr.qual.-4), it is added that Conan Doyle is the original author of the story (or of the stories), according to which Sherlock Holmes is such-and-such. What reading should we choose? It depends on the contextual information. However, every qualified reading simply seems to specify, to add further information (e.g., to select some fictional context and/or some minded subject) to the minimal reading. Since there are non-existent objects and there are fictional objects, it is legitimate to read (1) Sherlock Holmes does not exist as (1ascr.) ~Eh 28 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. and (2) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character as (2ascr.-1) Fh With regard to (4) Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes' creator, it is legitimate to claim that it simply asserts that Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes' original author, i.e. that (4ascr.) AUOOdh The statement (5) Conan Doyle is the author of Sherlock Holmes' stories expresses the idea that Conan Doyle is the only original author of Holmes' native stories (i.e., those stories that define Sherlock Holmes' context of origin) and it seems to imply that he is the original author of Holmes too. Thus, it might be rendered as (5ascr.) AUOOdh & ∀s∃c((CHhs & Dsc & COch) → (AUOSds & ~∃m(~(m = d) & AUOSms))) It is worth remarking that, according to this reading, every story about Holmes defines some context that is Holmes' original context, but this context can be common (and should be common) for all those stories. Otherwise, it could not be the common fictional context of origin of Holmes. There can be both minimal and qualified readings of (6) Sherlock Holmes exists, (7) Sherlock Holmes lives in London, (8) Sherlock Holmes had a tea with Gladstone, (9) in The Hound of the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 29 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. Restricting our interpretation to minimal readings, we will have: (6ascr.) ∃m∃cA2Ehmc (even if he does not instantiate existence) (7ascr.) ∃m∃cA4LIhlmc (8ascr.) ∃m∃cA4HThgmc & Eg (9ascr.) ∃m∃c(DsHc & A2DEhmc) (where the constants "g", "l" and "sH" respectively stand for Lord Gladstone, London and the story The Hound of the Baskervilles, while "LI" and "HT" respectively stand for the relations of living in and of having a tea with). Concerning (8), we do not have to introduce any fictional duplicate of Gladstone and we do not have to block the inference from (8) to (8') Gladstone had a tea with Sherlock Holmes, since it is true that the relation of having a tea with is ascribed by some minded subject both to Sherlock Holmes and to Gladstone within some fictional context, even if it is not true that they instantiate such a relation. Furthermore, the theory does not have to introduce any distinction between fictional objects and their existing correlates (e.g., between the fictional Gladstone and the real one). The interpretation of (10) in The Hound of the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is English, even if such a statement is not present in Conan Doyle's story, can be given as follows. Firstly, I shall assume that there is a relation R, i.e. the relation of being reasonable that some minded subject ascribes some property to some object within some fictional context. The instantiation of this relation is governed by this equivalence: (reasonable) ∀x∀P1∀m1∀c(RA2P1xm1c ↔ ∃m2(AUOCm2c & ~AP1xm2c & ~∃P2(~(P2 = P1) & AP2xm2c & (AP2xm2c → AP1xm2c)) & ∃P3(~(P3 = P1) & AP3xm2c & (AP3xm2c → AP1xm2c)))) (where "P1", "P2" and "P3" are variables ranging over properties). This equivalence is 30 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. grounded on three ideas: a property that it is reasonable for some minded subject to ascribe to some object within some fictional context is a property (a) whose negation is not ascribed to that object within that context by its original author, (b) whose negation is not implied by the ascription of any other property, (c) whose ascription is implied by the ascription of some other property. It is difficult to interpret stories and their authors' intentions, so that it turns out to be difficult to interpret their ascriptions too. Yet, it is difficult from our viewpoint, i.e. from interpreters' viewpoint, not from authors' viewpoint, and this latter viewpoint is what grounds the truth of (10). Thus, (10) can be minimally read as (10ascr.) ∃m∃c(DsHc & RA2ENhmc) (where "EN" stands for the property of being English). Among our data, there are also statements that involve intentional properties, such as the properties of being more beloved than, of being more famous than, and so on: (12) Sherlock Holmes is more beloved than Darth Vader, (13) John admires Sherlock Holmes. Since such properties are not existence-entailing (in order for something or for someone to be loved or admired, it or s/he does not have to exist), one might simply introduce relations such as the relation of being more beloved than and of admiring: (12) BEhdV (13) ADjh (where "BE" and "AD" respectively stand for the relations of being more beloved than and of admiring, while the constants "dV" and "j" respectively stand for Darth Vader and John). I shall leave to the reader the task of determining the equivalences that rule the instantiation of such relations (e.g., someone is more beloved than someone else iff it is the case that...). Things become quite different with (11) Sherlock Holmes is more intelligent than Emma Bovary, 31 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. since the n-adic properties of being intelligent and of being more intelligent than someone else seem to be existence-entailing: in order for every object to instantiate those n-adic properties, it has to exist. Yet, one might think of degrees of intelligence too and minimally read (11) as follows: (11ascr.) ∃m(∃c1(A2INT1hmc1) & A7GRINT1INT2m) ∃c2(A2INT2bmc2) & GRINT1INT2 & (where "INT1" and "INT2" respectively stand for Sherlock Holmes' and Emma Bovary's degrees of intelligence, "GR" stands for the relation of being greater than, A7 is some special ascription relation that holds for relations between properties outside fictional contexts, even without involving objects, and the constant "b" stands for Emma Bovary). It is not necessary that Sherlock Holmes and Emma Bovary "live" in the same fictional context in order to compare their intelligence: it is only sufficient that some minded subject ascribes to them some degrees of intelligence, that s/he compares such degrees and that such a comparison actually holds. The statement (14) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective can be interpreted with regard to degrees of fame. Thus, we shall have (14ascr.) ∃m∃c∃s(CHhs & Dsc & A2DEhmc) & FAM1h & ~∃x(DEx & FAM2x & (GRFAM2FAM1 ∨ (FAM2 = FAM1))) (where "FAM1" and "FAM2" respectively stand for different degrees of fame and "DE" stands for the property of being a detective). With regard to (15) Sherlock Holmes is still the paradigmatic detective character, I shall set "still" apart (since I have not dealt here with the relationship between ascriptions and times) and I shall rewrite it as (15') Sherlock Holmes is the paradigmatic detective character. 32 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. How can we deal with the property of being a paradigmatic character with regard to some property (e.g., with regard to the property of being a detective)? First, I shall recall univocally identifying fictional properties, in order to claim that they can be conjunctive. Secondly, I shall introduce the relation of inspiring as follows: (inspiring) ∀x∀m(INSxm ↔ (Fx & ∃P1∃P2∃P3...∃PN(PUFP1x & CONP1 & PRCP2P1 & PRCP3P1 & … & PRCPNP1 & ∃y∃c(AUOCmc & (A2P2ymc ∨ A2P3ymc ∨ … ∨ A2PNymc))))) (where "INS" stands for the relation of inspiring some minded subject, "CON" stands for the property of being a conjunctive property and "PRC" stands for the relation of being a conjoined of a conjunctive property). An original author of a fictional context is maximally inspired by some fictional object when s/he "copies" it, i.e. when s/he puts the same fictional object within his/her originally authored context. Furthermore, it follows from (inspiring) that there are degrees of inspiration, connected with the number of properties that are conjuncts of the univocally identifying fictional property. In order for something to be the most paradigmatic detective character, one has to think that it is a fictional character and that the majority of those that are the original authors of fictional contexts that involve detective characters are inspired by Sherlock Holmes or that the number of such authors that are inspired by Sherlock Holmes is greater than the number of those that are inspired by any other detective character. Yet, the same point can be made with regard to readers or interpreters or (more generally) minded subjects thinking of fictional characters: whenever they think of fictional detectives (i.e., whenever they ascribe to some object the property of being a detective within some fictional context and that object is a fictional character), the absolute majority of them think of Sherlock Holmes or the number of those who think of Sherlock Holmes is greater than the number of those who think of any other fictional detective. I shall not formalize here (15'), since I would have to introduce some 33 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. further technical devices such as plural quantification, but I think that the ascriptivistic interpretation of this statement is now sufficiently clear. On the other hand, one might simply formalize (16) Ulysses inspired both Dante and Joyce as (16ascr.) INSudA & INSujJ (where the constants "u", "dA" and "jJ" respectively stand for Ulysses, Dante and Joyce). Furthermore, it seems to be acceptable that Ulysses inspired Dante more than Joyce, since Dante's Ulysses (i.e., Ulysses within the context defined by Dante's Divina Commedia) has more properties that are part of the conjunctive univocally identifying fictional property of Ulysses (I would rather say that they are identical, following (ficta-identity-3) and/or (fictaidentity-4a)). With regard to (17) the Faust of Goethe's Faust is an aspect of Faust itself, one does not have to introduce any general Faust-character in order to deal with the truth of this statement. It seems to me plausible to claim that (17ascr.) Ff & CHfsF & AUOSgOsF & ∃P1∃P2...∃PN∃PN+1∃s∃m∃c1∃c2(DsFc1 & A2P1fgOc1 & A2P2fgOc1 & … & A2PNfgOc1 & ~A2PN+1fgOc1 & ~(m = gO) & ~(s = sF) & ~(c2 = c1) & AUOSms & A2PN+1fmc2) (where the constants "f", "gO" and "sF" respectively stand for Faust, Goethe and Goethe's Faust). (17ascr.) affirms that there are some properties that are ascribed by Goethe to Faust within the fictional context defined by his Faust but that there are other properties (at least one) that are not ascribed by Goethe to Faust within that fictional context (properties that are thus different from the former ones, if the law of non-contradiction is true) and that are ascribed to Faust within some other fictional context defined by some other story, authored by 34 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. some other author. On the other hand, if there were some general Faust-character, one would have to introduce some arbitrary fictional context (not defined by any story) where that Faust would have his properties, and s/he would have to define some relation between that general Faust-character and Goethe's (and other authors') Faust-characters. Statements (18) Sherlock Holmes in The Hound of the Baskervilles is the same as Sherlock Holmes in A Study in Scarlet and (19) Sherlock Holmes of Conan Doyle's stories is the same as Sherlock Holmes of a recent movie directed by Guy Ritchie are two different identity-statements. From an ascriptivistic perspective, the former can be minimally interpreted as follows: (18ascr.) ∃x∃y∃c1∃c2(DsHc1 & DsSc2 & CHxsH & CHysS & ∃m(A2NHxmc1 & A2NHymc2) & x = y) (where the constants "sS" and "NH" respectively stand for the story A Study in Scarlet and for some property such as the property of being named "Sherlock Holmes"). The identity between the first Sherlock Holmes and the second one is made true by (ficta-identity-1). On the other hand, (19) might be minimally interpreted as (19ascr.) ∃x∃y∃z∃c1∃c2∃s1∃s2(MOx & DRxgR & MAxs1 & CHys1 & AUOSds2 & CHzs2 & Ds1c1 & Ds2c2 & ∃m(A2NHxmc1 & A2NHymc2) & y = z) (where "MO", "DR" and "MA" respectively stand for the property of being a movie, for the relation of being directed by and for the relation of being the material support of some story, while the constant "gR" stands for Guy Ritchie). Our last datum concerns fiction within fiction, namely the statement 35 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. (20) in Hamlet, Gonzago is a fictional character, which can be minimally interpreted as (20ascr.) ∃m∃c(DsHAc & A2FgONmc) (where the constants "sHA" and "gON" respectively stand for the story Hamlet and for Gonzago). Yet, with regard to (20) and with regard to other similar data, one might object: there are minded subjects that ascribe to Gonzago the property of non-being fictional within the fictional context defined by Hamlet. Perhaps, they have misunderstood the story, but if it is minimally sufficient that there is a minded subject that ascribes such a property to Gonzago in order for (20) to be true, it might be nevertheless sufficient to claim that there is some minded subject that ascribes its negation to him in order for (20) to be false, so that it is not the case that it is true that (20). Yet, this objection is a non-sequitur. In fact, if we consider minded subjects that ascribe to Gonzago the property of non-being fictional within the fictional context defined by Hamlet, this situation seems to be expressed by (20ascr.neg.1) ∃m∃c(DsHAc & A2F̅gONmc) which does not contradict (20ascr.), and not by nor by (20ascr.neg.2) ∃m∃c(DsHAc & ~A2FgONmc) (20ascr.neg.3) ~∃m∃c(DsHAc & A2FgONmc) which would contradict (20ascr.), while (20ascr.neg.1) and (20ascr.neg.2) do not/would not contradict it. It is not true that (20ascr.neg.3), since there is, at least under some qualified reading, some minded subject (e.g. Shakespeare) that ascribes that property to Gonzago within the fictional context defined by Hamlet. Furthermore, given that that qualified reading is true of (20), (20ascr.neg.1) expresses a bad interpretation of Hamlet (i.e., the minded subject that makes it true that (20ascr.neg.1) is a bad interpreter of Hamlet) and (20ascr.neg.2) 36 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. expresses an incomplete one. 7. Paradise on the Cheap. Ascriptivism can provide identity conditions for ficta and it can deal with many data and problems. Furthermore, it is not forced to admit that there are violations of the law of noncontradiction, of excluded middle and of bivalence10. It preserves the intuition that ficta are somehow "created" by their authors without affirming that they exist, so that it does not have the problems that are typically associated with abstract artifactualism11. It performs all these tasks without heavy ontological price: ascriptivism neither admits that the objecthood of ficta precedes their authors’ thinking of them, nor that there are unnamed and undiscovered nonexistent objects. Ascriptivism is neither forced to introduce fictional correlates of real objects, nor to deny that the converses of relations between ficta and real objects hold. It accepts that there are existence-entailing properties and it does not take the distinction between two ways of having properties as a primitive fact. Moreover, regarding the constitution of objects, it does not need to distinguish between assumptible and non-assumptible properties12. Finally, many authors who deny that there are ficta admit that there are (seemingly) mind-dependent entities grounding fictionality, such as games of make-believe (see Walton (1990)), fictional intents (see Currie (1990)) or denoting concepts (see Landini (2012) and Orilia (2012)). If there are such entities and if ficta can be considered mind-dependent too, why is it not 10 While modal Meinongians such as Priest (2005) and Berto (2011) and (2013) maintain that there are such worlds and/or such true contradictions. Thus, Everett (2005)’s complaints about the indeterminacy of every fictum and the inconsistency of some ficta are not justified within my theory: ascriptivism neither introduces true contradictions, nor indeterminacy (for every object – and for every fictum too – and for every n-adic property – ascription relations included -, that object instantiates or (aut) does not instantiate that property). 11 For example, ficta are not abstract objects that necessarily exist and that cannot be caused to exist – as it seems to be problematically claimed by abstract artifactualists (see Deutsch (1991)). Furthermore, they are not properly caused to exist: they are simply constituted as objects by their original authors at the time at which they are thought of by them and their authors somehow govern their identity with other objects (see Brock (2010)). There is no ambiguity and no need for paraphrases concerning ficta’s non-existence: they simply do not exist, since they do not instantiate the property of existing (see Deutsch (1991) and Yagisawa (2001)). 12 See Routley (1979), Parsons (1980) and Jacquette (1996). 37 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. legitimate to claim that there are ficta?13 Appendix. What do the Symbols stand for? Variables ranging over… c, c1, c2, … fictional contexts m, m1, m2, … minded subjects P, P1, P2, … n-adic properties ̅ negative property non-P P p, p1, p2, … propositions s, s1, s2, … stories t, t0, t1, t2, … times x, y, z, … objects b d dA dV f g gO gON gR h jJ l sF sH sHA sS u A1 A2 A3 A4 A7 AD AUO AUOC AUOO AUOS B BE 13 Object constants Emma Bovary Conan Doyle Dante Darth Vader Faust Lord Gladstone Goethe Gonzago Guy Ritchie Sherlock Holmes Joyce London Goethe’s Faust the story The Hound of the Baskervilles the story Hamlet the story A Study in Scarlet Ulysses Property and Relation Constants (and items that instantiate them) … is ascribed to … by … (property, object, minded subject) … is ascribed to … by … within … (property, object, minded subject, fictional context) … is ascribed to … and … by … (2-place relation, object, object, minded subject) … is ascribed to … and … by … within … (2-place relation, object, object, minded subject, fictional context) … is ascribed to … and … by … (2-place relation, property, property, minded subject) … admires … (object, object) … is the author simpliciter of … (minded subject, object – fictional) … is the original author of … (minded subject, fictional context) … is the original author of … (minded subject, object – fictional) … is the original author of … (minded subject, story) … is story-bound simpliciter to … (object – fictional, story) … is more beloved than … (object, object) I would like to thank Francesco Orilia and Johann Marek for their useful objections and comments. 38 Michele Paolini Paoletti (Università degli Studi di Macerata) – michele.paolinip@gmail.com In: M. Antonelli, M. David (eds.) (2016), Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI. Berlin, De Gruyter: 99-140. Please quote only from published version. BO C CH CINF CO CON D DE DI DR E EN F FAM1, FAM2 GR HO HT I I̅ IL INS INT1, INT2 IS LI MA MO N NH PA PR PRC PU PUF R T TC TH TS … is originally story-bound to … (object – fictional, story) … constitutes … as an object (minded subject, object) … is a character in … (object, story) … is a criterion of identity that is not for fictional objects (object) … is the context of origin of … (fictional context, object – fictional) … is a conjunctive property (property) … defines … (story, fictional context) … is a detective (object) … is a disjunctive property (property) … is directed by … (object – movie, object) … exists (object) … is English (object) … is a fictional object (object) (different degrees of fame) … is greater than … (different properties as degrees) … holds between … and … (object – criterion of identity, object, object) … has a tea with … (object, object) … is identical with … (object, object) … is non-identical with … (object, object) … is a legitimate identifier of … and … (minded subject, object, object) … inspires … (object, minded subject) (different degrees of intelligence) … is a good interpreter of … (minded subject, story) … lives in … (object, object) … is the material support of … (object, story) … is a movie (object) it is necessary that … has … (object, property) … is named "Sherlock Holmes" (object) … is part of … (proposition, story) … precedes … (story, story) (year, year) (time, time) … is a conjunct of … (property, property – conjunctive) … is a univocally identifying property of … (property, object) … is a univocally identifying fictional property of … (property, object – fictional) it is reasonable … (ascription relation, property, object, minded subject, fictional context) … is true (proposition) … is true in … (proposition, fictional context) … thinks of … (minded subject, object) … is true in … (proposition, story) References Berto, Francesco (2011). 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