Abstract
I reconsider in this article the problem of the Holy Trinity from the standpoint of some recent theories of the ontology of relations. After having presented the problem and after having introduced some basic ontological concepts (i.e., substance, modes, person), I shall briefly dwell on the ontology of non-symmetrical relations and on the O-Roles theory suggested by Francesco Orilia. Afterwards, I shall develop my own solution to the problem of the Holy Trinity by exploring the status of Intratrinitarian relations and of divine Persons. Among other things, I shall defend the thesis that divine Persons are not substances, but peculiar modes of God. I shall also ground the distinction between the properties attributed to God himself and the ones attributed to specific divine Persons. Finally, I shall anticipate and face some objections against my account (e.g., the one of modalism) and argue that it is legitimate to maintain that there is no kind of persons in general—which is a consequence of my view.
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Notes
Williams (2013) distinguishes between three different characterizations of persons: Boethian persons (individual substances endowed with rational nature), Richard of St. Victor’s persons (incommunicable existents of intellectual nature) and Lockean persons (streams of consciousness). As I clarify in this passage, my theory is somehow committed to a weak version of Boethius’ view of persons. However, my theory could be reformulated so as to fit well with Richard of St. Victor’s views. On the contrary, insofar as Lockeans streams of consciousness cannot bear properties (i.e., further modes), it is incompatible with the latter view.
For some terminological and historical matters on the problem of the Holy Trinity in the IVth Century, see for example Dünzl (2007) and Ayres (2004). On the Aristotelian notions of substance, see for example Shields (2014). Let me also point out that, in his Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas introduces an important distinction between two ways of interpreting the term “substance”. “Substance” either means “suppositum” (i.e., what “bears” other entities) or “essentia” (i.e., a composite of matter and form or, for immaterial beings, of form alone). Not all the entities that are substances-supposita are also substances-essentiae. For example, divine Persons are supposita (since they “bear” certain properties) but they are not essentiae (since they do not divide the divine essence) (see St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 30, 1)
See also van Inwagen (1995) for an exposition and defense of the coherence of this solution.
I use the personal pronouns and adjectives “Him”, “His” and “Himself” in order to refer to the three Persons and also in order to refer to God, i.e., the only divine substance. However, I do not imply by this choice that God is some fourth person in addition to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. With God, it is legitimate to use personal pronouns and adjectives (rather than impersonal ones) insofar as the three divine Persons are personal beings.
See Bøhn (2011).
See Moreland, Craig (2003: 575-596).
See Hasker (2013).
See Baber (2002).
For more details, see Hasker (2013) and Tuggy (2016). For further discussion, see also King-Farlow (1983) and Zeis (1993). A recent account of the Holy Trinity in terms of modes has been provided by Heil (2018). Heil appeals to Spinoza’s ontological framework, which implies different results from the ones suggested here.
As one reviewer pointed out, most Eastern Orthodox theologians – and most ancient theologians from Tertullian to St. Basil and St. Gregory of Nyssa – would nevertheless accept the idea that at most one divine Person (i.e., the Father) is absolutely identical with God. Unfortunately, I cannot deal with this solution here.
What if a mode bears another mode that entails concreteness? Does that make the former mode concrete too? I try to reply to this question in a note in section 3, where I briefly deal with the Incarnation of the Son.
In addition, one also has the Problem of the Lack of Relational Order in symmetrical relations.
I am agnostic on the existence of universal relations in addition to – and distinct from – relational modes.
Dorr (2004) argues that there are no non-symmetrical relations in the universe, even if there are non-symmetrical relational predicates. His first argument is based on a principle named “CONVERSES”: for every relation R (be it symmetrical or non-symmetrical) there is a distinct relation R* (i.e., its converse) which is such that, for any x and y, x bears R to y if and only if y bears R* to x. For example: loving and being loved are converse relations. He assumes that CONVERSES is metaphysically necessary. Given further assumptions, he then concludes that there are no non-symmetrical relations. However, O-Roles theorists need not accept “CONVERSES”: non-symmetrical relational modes such as loving* and loving** need not have distinct converse relational modes. Thus, “converses” is not metaphysically necessary. MacBride (2015: 187) allows for the possibility of accepting non-symmetrical relations and rejecting CONVERSES: “Dorr’s thought experiment does not establish that admitting nonsymmetric relations whilst denying CONVERSES is an untenable combination of views – not unless admitting non-symmetric relations was already untenable by itself, in which case adding CONVERSES does not help”. For other criticisms of Dorr’s arguments, see the same article by MacBride.
Are such relations asymmetrical too? If we describe them as holding between the Father and the Son, or between the Holy Spirit, on the one hand, and the Father and the Son, on the other hand, they might look to be asymmetrical: it is not the case that, if the Father begets the Son, then the Son begets the Father. Yet, as it will be clear in a few lines, I maintain that it is one and the same substance (i.e., God) that plays different O-roles in such relations. Therefore, in a sense, it seems that such relations are just non-symmetrical.
Here and in other places, when I use “part” with God, His essence and modes, my use is only a metaphorical one. For God’s essence is simple, so that God’s essence cannot be divided in parts between the divine Persons.
Of course, this does not imply that – given that the Father is the lover in the essential divine loving relation – the Son and the Holy Spirit cannot love anything/anyone else. By claiming that the Father is the lover, I am only concerned here with the essential divine loving relation – and not with other relations of loving.
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I, 29, 4), Augustine (De Trinitate, VII) and Swinburne (1994: 170-191) agree on this point: the nature of divine Persons is relational. However, that the Father is what He is in virtue of begetting the Son, that the Son is what He is in virtue of being begotten by the Father and that the Holy Spirit is what He is in virtue of proceeding from the Father and the Son depend in turn on the essence of God, that includes love, as I explained above. Therefore, what all the divine Persons are depends on the essence of God.
For example, Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I, 40, 2) claims that the Father and the Son are distinguished in virtue of two different relations: Fatherhood and Sonship. Within the Latin Medieval tradition, Friedman (2010) distinguishes between a Dominican, relational account of the Trinity and a Franciscan, emanation account. I take side here with the relational account: divine Persons are what they are in virtue of the O-Roles played by God in Intratrinitarian relations. However, I reject that there are converse relations such as paternity and filiation – as some authors accepting this account claim.
This does not imply that God only loves Himself and that, by loving Himself, He generates the Son. On the contrary, God’s love necessarily comes together with begetting and with two distinct modes, as we will see: the Father and the Son. Therefore, God’s love necessarily comes together with the distinction between these two divine Persons. In addition, the subjects of God’s love are those same modes: the Father and the Son as divine personal modes love each other. See also section 4.
I use “begetting*” instead of “begetting” in order to clarify that this relational mode involves modes and not substances.
Nor can we identify God’s being the Father with the relational mode God’s being agent’s and God’s being patient’s begetting*. For in this case one should then identify the Son with that very relational mode. Thus, the Father would turn out to be identical with the Son. At best, one could try to identify the Father with the very complex mode God’s being agent in the begetting* relational mode with God’s being patient. Yet, it seems to me that the latter would be nothing but a way of interpreting (from the agent’s viewpoint) the relational mode God’s being agent’s and God’s being patient’s begetting*, so that it would not turn out be one further mode. Therefore, it is better to maintain that God’s being the Father is one further mode. Something analogous seems to happen with the other divine Persons. Please notice that, when I claim that something wholly depends on something else, I do not appeal to any specific theory of ontological dependence.
I use “proceeding**” instead of “proceeding” and “proceeding*” in order to clarify that modes themselves play certain O-Roles in this relational mode.
It is worth noticing that the Holy Spirit and the Son are distinct modes, even if they both depend on God’s being patient. The former wholly depends on God’s being patient in the proceeding relation, whereas the latter depends on God’s being patient in the begetting relation. There are two distinct Intratrinitarian relations in their dependence bases.
One reviewer points out that there is an asymmetry here between the Father and the Son, on the one hand, and the Holy Spirit, on the other hand. For the latter somehow depends on the former for being the very mode He is – and not the other way round. Does such an asymmetry imply any sort of minor fundamentality of the Holy Spirit? What I can reply is that all the Persons – and all the Intratrinitarian relations – depend in the same way on God’s divine essence, on what God Himself is. They all flow from that essence. Since there can be no begetting without proceeding and no proceeding without begetting within that essence, one can conclude that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit resulting from such relations share the same degree of ontological fundamentality.
My use of “qua” here is only a way to better characterize certain modes of God, without any special ontological bearings. Thus, my use of “qua” does not imply the acceptance of an ontology of qua objects – see note 29 below.
I do not wish to delve here into the metaphysics of Incarnation. Within my metaphysical picture, assuming a human nature should be primarily taken as a mode of the Son. Namely, there should be the mode the Son’s assuming a human nature*, that should then ground one further mode of God, i.e., God’s assuming qua Son a human nature. It goes without saying that, by assuming a human nature, the Son does not take another, distinct human person, as Nestorians would claim. For the Person that assumed a human nature is always the Son. One additional problem is the following: if the Son assumes a human nature and if human nature entails concreteness, does this make the Son (i.e., a mode) something concrete? It may sound unacceptable to claim that modes (qua individual properties) can also be concrete. Two solutions are available. First, it may be admitted that modes can actually be concrete. Therefore, the Son is concrete. Of course, one should then delve into the relevant meaning of “concrete” at play here. Alternatively, if one wishes to maintain that only substances can be concrete, it may be argued that the Son does not become concrete. What is implied by the Son’s assuming a human nature* is that God assumes the property of being concrete qua Son, i.e., that there exists the mode God’s being concrete qua Son.
Koons (2018) defends the idea that divine Persons are Finean qua objects based on certain relational properties. In brief, on Koons’ view, the nature of God is a non-symmetrical relation of knowing Himself, which gives rise to three relational properties (being the knower; being the known one; being the knower and the known one). Such properties give rise in turn to divine Persons. Even if we both stress the importance of relations and of the active/passive roles in relations, I do not invoke the knowing relation in my solution, I provide a characterization of divine relations in terms of O-Roles (rather than in terms of relational properties) and, more importantly, I do not adopt the qua objects ontology: Persons turn out to be modes of God.
See, for example, Hasker (2013: 115).
Since modes can bear other modes, divine Persons can bear further modes – even though they are borne by God. In a sense, divine Persons turn out to be bearers of modes, but they are not fundamental bearers, as they are borne in turn by God.
In this case, recalling Friedman (2010), one should accept a Franciscan, emanation account of the Trinity – according to which the distinctions between Persons flow from activities performed by God – and then claim that the alternative Dominican, relational account is grounded on the former. This implies, in turn, that the two accounts should be reformulated in order to make them compatible with one another.
Of course, that God begets does not imply that the Son and the Holy Spirit beget too because they are divine Persons of God. For the Son entirely depends on God’s being the begotten one in the begetting relation, whereas the Holy Spirit is not involved in begetting.
See Abelard, Theologia Summi Boni, I, 2.
The historical Sabellius seemingly accepts this view, at least according to Epiphanius, Adversus Haereses, 62.
For example, Baber (2002).
For example, the eleventh Council of Toledo (675) declares that “each single Person is wholly God in Himself”.
Recall that by “substance” I mean here something that is both endowed with a certain essence and that also has the features of Aristotelian primary substances.
However, Merricks (2006: 322-323) argues that “person” applies to different sorts of beings, so that it is difficult to maintain that human and divine persons belong to the same kind.
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