Abstract
Indispensablists argue that when our belief system conflicts with our experiences, we can negate a mathematical belief but we do not because if we do, we would have to make an excessive revision of our belief system. Thus, we retain a mathematical belief not because we have good evidence for it but because it is convenient to do so. I call this view ‘mathematical convenientism.’ I argue that mathematical convenientism commits the consequential fallacy and that it demolishes the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument and Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to anonymous referees for sharp criticisms.
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Park, S. Against Mathematical Convenientism. Axiomathes 26, 115–122 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-015-9281-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-015-9281-z