Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists (review)
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Marina McCoy defends three interrelated claims about the topic mentioned in her title. First, the distinction between philosophy and rhetoric in the dialogues is not as clear as some commentators seem to think. Second, since philosophy as practiced by Socrates includes important rhetorical dimensions, there is no important methodological distinction between philosophy and rhetoric. Third, it is his virtues—and not any particular method—that differentiate Socrates the philosopher from sophists and rhetoricians. McCoy pursues different aspects of her theses through the Apology, Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, Sophist (and Theaetetus), and Phaedrus.
Her approach coheres with that of a contemporary school of interpretation according to which a proper appreciation of the dramatic setting of each dialogue will show that the content of Socratic conversation is not meant to be a body of substantive philosophical doctrine. Rather, Socrates’ quarry is the souls of his interlocutors. McCoy’s contribution to this line of interpretation focuses on the relation between philosophy and rhetoric. The dialogues frequently portray the two as opposed. In general terms, philosophy seeks the truth and rhetoric seeks to win arguments. Yet, Plato portrays Socrates sometimes as a philosopher and sometimes as a sophist or rhetorician—all the while making a distinction between philosophy and rhetoric. McCoy takes the line that, while he may use rhetoric, Socrates does so for philosophical rather than sophistical purposes. However, while philosophical rhetoric aims at the truth, it does not so much teach as motivate. Socrates’ rhetoric is meant to make his interlocutors care about the state of their souls and even make them pursue the truth. The ‘even’ marks the fact that, while Socrates is not meant to be purveying any substantive doctrine, neither is he a skeptic. He thinks it is vital to pursue the truth, even if he does not know what it is.
The virtue of McCoy’s book is its focus on the ways in which Plato portrays Socrates as a rhetorician. Think of Socrates’ sly introduction to his apology, where he disclaims any rhetorical skill but proceeds to show considerable amounts of it. Many readers appreciate the irony without understanding the details. McCoy fills in the blank by showing how this speech uses many recognized rhetorical devices. Indeed, she argues that Socrates’ Apology and Gorgias’s Defense of Palamedes share a similar rhetorical structure—although Socrates’ aim is different from Gorgias’s. We see how Socrates uses rhetoric to vindicate philosophy and convict Athenians of their failures in that regard. The Phaedrus is particularly fruitful territory for McCoy’s approach. Socrates presents, in great detail, the philosophical method of collection and division. Then he uses it at the beginning of a very rhetorical account of erôs. The point of this combination of philosophy and rhetoric is to make Phaedrus love the forms. Of course, since Socrates does not claim to have knowledge of these, he does not give Phaedrus an account of them. Rather, he inspires an erotic desire—a sort of craving emptiness—for knowledge of the forms. If we want to envision this kind of erôs, perhaps we could imagine generations of academic philosophers striving, without success, to make the theory of forms work. [End Page 131]
This book makes a valuable contribution by clearly exhibiting Socrates’ rhetorical aspect. However, because of what might be seen as over-devotion to this aspect, it is dismissive of the content of Socratic conversation. While such conversation is supposed to inspire love of forms, McCoy’s approach shows little interest in the epistemological and metaphysical issues that Socrates’ talk of forms raises throughout the dialogues. Of course, only so much ground can be covered in a thematic study like this one. However, since we are also told that philosophy is open-ended and self-critical, not bound by specific doctrine, one is left with the impression that love of forms really amounts to love for a certain kind of abstract thinking that characterizes philosophical investigation in general. We can highlight the issue...
