It is a consequence of Quine's confirmation holism that the logical laws are in principle revisable. Some have worried this is at odds with another dictum in Quine, viz., that any translation which construes speakers as systematically illogical is ipso facto inadequate. In this paper, I try to formulate exactly what the problem is here, and offer a solution to it by (1) disambiguating the term 'logic,' and (2) appealing to a Quinean understanding of 'necessity.' The result is that the different theses in Quine's philosophy of logic are to be situated within different contexts of inquiry. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
CITATION STYLE
Parent, T. (2008). Quine and logical truth. Erkenntnis, 68(1), 103–112. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9080-z
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