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The Kalām Cosmological Argument, the Big Bang, and Atheism

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Abstract

While there has been much work on cosmological arguments, novel objections will be presented against the modern day rendition of the Kalām cosmological argument as standardly articulated by William Lane Craig. The conclusion is reached that this cosmological argument and several of its variants do not lead us to believe that there is inevitably a supernatural cause to the universe. Moreover, a conditional argument for atheism will be presented in light of the Big Bang Theory.

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Notes

  1. Most of the responses to Craig’s work on the Kalām cosmological argument have attempted to provide objections to him. However, for some instances of further support of the Kalām argument other than from Craig, see Koons (1997); Oderberg (2001, 2002); Moreland (2003), Kabay (2005). Further discussion of this above work is not engaged here since their particular defenses of the Kalām contention do not address and are not relevant to the particular objections I will be presenting in this paper.

  2. Throughout this paper, “time” will refer to differentiated time. When discussing undifferentiated time, I will preface “time” with “undifferentiated.”

  3. To note, the Hartle-Hawking model is a hybrid of relativistic and quantum mathematical methods that attempts to put forth a theory of the “quantum” creation of the world from nothing, but this model does not include the cosmological application of a well-established theory of quantum gravitation as would be desired but only a very hypothetical attempt to construct a provisional model to stand in for such a theory.

  4. This point may be the same point made by Smith when he writes that the first premise is about macroscopic events but the singularity is not even an event in four-dimensional spacetime (Craig and Smith 1993, 119–120). Although it may be unclear and Smith discusses this topic in a few quick sentences, it appears like he might want to conclude that the first premise does not even apply to the singularity. However, even if my point here echoes Smith, I offer my own objections in the immediate subsequent paragraphs.

  5. In physics, entities with infinite values are considered “non-physical” since they defy all attempts to measure them, even estimates carried out on a purely theoretical basis. Hence, the Big Bang singularity is deemed to be an abstract rather than physical object in part because it contains infinite properties such as infinite density and temperature. The initial singularity is also an abstract object because it is held to exist before the existence of spacetime.

  6. To note, Grünbaum (1994) makes the separate and distinct point that since the singularity does not exist in time, it is not an event. Events supposedly must have the property of being in time. Thus, the singularity cannot have a cause such as God since only events can be caused. I believe Grünbaum’s criticism of the Kalām argument is incorrect because the Big Bang is an event. For, an interesting concern arises here in that if the singularity cannot be a part of an event and only events can cause events, then how can the singularity cause the beginning of the universe? This is a concern for both the theist and atheist because the Big Bang Theory maintains that the singularity caused the universe, where the theist adds the additional point that God caused the singularity. In response, we simply may broaden our notion of an “event” to include occurrences that do not exist in time, such as the singularity and its explosion at t = 0.

  7. One may question why Ockham’s razor may apply before the singularity to eliminate God from the equation. If all else is equal between any two competing theories, then parsimony can come in to play to adjudicate between them. At hand, we have two competing theories about whether there is or is not a God that created the singularity. A major focus of the very theories at hand is on possible events before the singularity. Insofar as we have competing theories about the possible existence of a supernatural entity before the singularity and Ockham’s razor may apply between any competing theories, Ockham’s razor can be relevant. Moreover, in essence, we are dealing with an ontological question as to whether a supernatural entity exists before the singularity or not. Hence, ontological parsimony can be a relevant factor. Ontological parsimony can indiscriminately apply to theories that contain entities that do not exist in real time as well as to abstract objects.

  8. For an alternate positive argument for atheism using the Big Bang Theory, see work done by Quentin Smith (Craig and Smith 1993).

  9. Recall from above that even on this a priori justification-based understanding of KCA2, KCA2 is still an invalid argument.

  10. Since the Big Bang singularity is not in time, we cannot understand causation in respect to the singularity causing the universe to come into existence in Humean terms, where causation includes the notion of temporal priority. Rather, we may understand causation in this particular instance in conditional terms or perhaps more traditionally as a relation of production.

  11. Notice that the causal explanation here is a novel non-mechanistic causal explanation since it is not concerned with a physical-to-physical act of causation. Once again, that there can be this abstract-to-physical non-mechanistic causation has been defended and argued for above.

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Park, J.J. The Kalām Cosmological Argument, the Big Bang, and Atheism. Acta Anal 31, 323–335 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-015-0273-9

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