Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-m9kch Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-24T06:25:33.995Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

CAPTURING CONSEQUENCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 March 2019

ALEXANDER PASEAU*
Affiliation:
Wadham College, University of Oxford
*
*WADHAM COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD OXFORD OX1 3PN, UK E-mail: alexander.paseau@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Abstract

First-order formalisations are often preferred to propositional ones because they are thought to underwrite the validity of more arguments. We compare and contrast the ability of some well-known logics—these two in particular—to formally capture valid and invalid arguments. We show that there is a precise and important sense in which first-order logic does not improve on propositional logic in this respect. We also prove some generalisations and related results of philosophical interest. The rest of the article investigates the results’ philosophical significance. A first moral is that the correct way to state the oft-cited superiority of first-order logic vis-à-vis propositional logic is more nuanced than often thought. The second moral concerns semantic theory; the third logic’s use as a tool for discovery. A fourth and final moral is that second-order logic’s transcendence of first-order logic is greater than first-order logic’s transcendence of propositional logic.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barwise, J. & Feferman, S. (editors) (1985). Model-Theoretic Logics. New York: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
Baumgartner, M. & Lampert, T. (2008). Adequate Formalization. Synthese, 164, 93115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beall, J. C. & Restall, G. (2006). Logical Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Blok, W. & Pigozzi, D. (1989). Algebraizable Logics. Memoirs of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 77. Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society.Google Scholar
Boolos, G. (1975). On second-order logic. The Journal of Philosophy, 72. Reprinted in his Logic, Logic, and Logic. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, pp. 3753.Google Scholar
Czelakowski, J. (2001). Protoalgebraic Logics. Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, D. (1967). The logical form of action sentences. In Rescher, N., editor. The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. Reprinted with criticism, comment and defence in his Essays on Actions & Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 105148.Google Scholar
Font, J. M., Jansana, R., & Pigozzi, D. (2003). A survey of abstract algebraic logic. Studia Logica, 74, 1397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Givant, S. & Halmos, P. (2009). Introduction to Boolean Algebras. New York: Springer.Google Scholar
Glanzberg, M. (2015). Logical consequence and natural language. In Caret, C. R. and Hjortland, O. T., editors. Foundations of Logical Consequence. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 71120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Griffiths, O. & Paseau, A. C. (forthcoming). One True Logic. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Harman, G. (1986). Change in View. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Heim, I. & Kratzer, A. (1998). Semantics in Generative Grammar. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Higginbotham, J., Pianesi, F., & Varzi, A. (editors) (2000). Speaking of Events. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hinman, P. G. (2005). Fundamentals of Mathematical Logic. Wellesley, MA: A.K. Peters.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewitzka, S. (2007). A topological approach to universal logic: Model-theoretical abstract logics. In Beziau, J.-Y., editor. Logica Universalis, Second Edition. Basel: Birkhäuser, pp. 3561.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Monk, J. D. & Bonnet, R. (editors) (1989). Handbook of Boolean Algebras, Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Oliver, A. D. (2010). The matter of form: Logic’s beginnings. In Lear, J. and Oliver, A. D., editors. The Force of Argument: Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley. New York: Routledge, pp. 165185.Google Scholar
Oliver, A. D. & Smiley, T. (2013). Plural Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parsons, T. (1990). Events in the Semantics of English. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Paseau, A. C. (2015). A measure of inferential-role preservation. Synthese, doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0705-5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Priest, G. (2006). Doubt Truth to be a Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1982). Methods of Logic (fourth edition). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Rumfitt, I. (2011). What is logic? In Novák, Z. and Simonyi, A., editors. Truth, Reference and Realism. Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 125–75.Google Scholar
Rumfitt, I. (2015). The Boundary Stones of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, B. (1905). On denoting. Mind, 14, 479493.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shapiro, S. (1991). Foundations without Foundationalism. New York: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Shapiro, S. (1998). Logical consequence: Models and modality. In Schirn, M., editor. The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 131156.Google Scholar
Shapiro, S. (2014). Varieties of Logic. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1950). On referring. Mind, 59, 320344.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Väänänen, J. (2012). Second order logic or set theory. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 18, 91121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yi, B.-U. (2006). The logic and meaning of plurals. Part II. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35, 239288.CrossRefGoogle Scholar