Abstract
The question “What makes a promise binding?” has received much attention both from philosophers and lawyers. One argument is that promises are binding because the act of making a promise creates expectations in the promisee, which expectations it would be morally wrong to disappoint. Another argument is grounded in the effects engendered by the making of a promise, specifically actions taken in reliance upon the promise. These two positions, the so-called expectation and reliance theories, have traditionally been thought to be incommensurable. In a recent article, ‘Promises and Practices’, Thomas Scanlon advances a theory of promising developed out of both of these positions. This article argues that Scanlon's argument fails because it cannot avoid the incommensurability of the expectation and reliance principles.
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Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Eastern and Central Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, and the North American Society for Social Philosophy. My sincere thanks to Jefferson White, Richard Bronaugh, Joseph Raz, and Richard Hull for comments and discussion of drafts of this article. I also wish to thank Tim Scanlon for being the commentator on an earlier version of this paper, read at the Central Division meeting of the A.P.A. in April of 1991, and for a lengthy correspondence over his account of the moral basis of promising.
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Patterson, D.M. The value of a promise. Law Philos 11, 385–402 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01003983
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01003983