Abstract
Social processes like voting procedures, debates, etc. depend crucially on the precise rules which define them. This rule sensitivity is illustrated by two examples, in the case of preference aggregation by the parliamentary debate concerning the German capital, and in the case of judgement aggregation by the doctrinal paradox or discursive dilemma. Using social choice functions and the theory of mechanism design, one can formulate what it means for a particular set of rules to be correct under a given game-theoretic solution concept. Furthermore, it is argued that in particular methods from logic and computer science are useful to describe and reason about the rules of play in a precise manner.
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Pauly, M. Changing the Rules of Play. Topoi 24, 209–220 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-005-5056-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-005-5056-2