Abstract
The way in which the main part of contemporary moral philosophy presents itself has been questioned for some time now. The objections from communitarian and feminist philosophers have become especially prominent. A good deal of their criticism has been directed against Kant’s moral theory and its successor models. Communitarians doubt the adequacy of Kant’s definition of the moral point of view and his concept of the moral subject for empirical beings “embedded” in social contexts.1 And feminist philosophers regard the strong emphasis on purely formal principles in most modern ethics, which is due to Kant’s influence, as partly responsible for the fact that moral philosophers up to now have not properly considered what it means to include women among moral subjects, and have hardly addressed issues of women’s discrimination.
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Notes
Cf. Michael Sandel: Liberalism and the limits of Justice,Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press 1982, pp.19ff. and pp.142ff.
Cf. Onora O’Neill: Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press 1989; Otfried Höffe: Immanuel Kant,München: C.H. Beck 1988; Barbara Herman: “The Practice of Moral Judgment”, in: The Journal of Philosophy LXXXII, 8, 1985, pp.414–436; Barbara Herman: “Integrity and Impartiality”, in: The Monist 66, 2, 1983, pp.233–250. The mentioned authors do not explicitly address communitarianism and feminism. Only Onora O’Neill in the Preface to her book Constructions of Reason mentions shortly that her reading of Kant bypasses communitarian critique. Cf. Onora O’Neill: Constructions of Reason, op.cit.,p.X and XI.
Barbara Herman: “The Practice of Moral Judgment”, op.cit., p.414.
Onora O’Neill: Constructions of Reason, op.cit., p.84.
Barbara Herman: “The Practice of Moral Judgment”, op.cit., p.416.
Immanuel Kant: “Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals”, in: The Moral Law. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated and analysed by H.J. Paton, London and New York: Routledge 1991, p. 118.
Onora O’Neill: “Between Consenting Adults”, in: Constructions of Reason, op.cit., pp.118ff.
Cf. Herta Nagl-Docekal: “Kant, The Women’s Moral Theorist?”, in: Robin May Schott (ed.): Feminist Perspectives on Kant,Penn State Press (forthcoming).
See also Lawrence Blum: Friendship, Altruism and Morality, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980.
The demand that a moral theory should address issues of caring can count as feminist insofar as relationships of care constitute a large part of the moral experiences of most women. And one relevant contribution of communitarianism seems to be the idea that a society where people do no more than respect their fellow’s liberal rights lacks important values. A society worth living in cannot do without communal values like ties of friendship, caring, love and solidarity. Cf. Amy Gutmann: “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism”, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, 3, 1985, pp. 308–322.
Immanuel Kant: The Doctrine of Virtue,translated by Mary J. Gregor, New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row 1964, § 30, p.120.
Cf. Barbara Herman: “Could It Be Worth Thinking About Kant on Sex and Marriage”, in: Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (eds.): A Mind of One’s Own. Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press 1993, p.52. Herman there states that the Groundwork “provides neither a systematic account of the basic concepts of moral discourse nor a practical procedure for resolving moral queries and/or difficulties (despite appearances and traditional reading). Its task is to establish a connection between morality and metaphysics: If morality is to oblige (necessitate), it can do so only if the will (understood as practical reason) is free.” (Ibid.)
Onora O’Neill: “Consistency in Action”, in: Constructions of Reason, op.cit.,p.96.
Barbara Herman: “The Practice of Moral Judgment”, op.cit.,p.416.
Immanuel Kant: The Doctrine of Virtue, op.cit., § 35, p.126.
Cf. Barbara Herman: “Integrity and Impartiality”, op.cit.,p.240.
Barbara Herman: “The Practice of Moral Judgment”, op.cit.,p.425. (“RMS” refers to “rules of moral salience”.)
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Pauer-Studer, H. (1994). Kant and Social Sentiments. In: Pauer-Studer, H. (eds) Norms, Values, and Society. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2454-8_21
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