Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Attempts

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

It’s generally assumed that, if an agent x acts by ϕ-ing, then there occurs an event which is x’s ϕ-ing. But what about when an agent tries to do something? Are there such things as attempts? The standard answer is ‘Yes’. But in a series of articles, and now a book, David-Hillel Ruben has argued that the answer is ‘No’: what happens when x tries to ϕ isn’t that an attempt occurs; rather, what happens is simply that a certain subjunctive conditional fact obtains; x tries to ϕ just in case, had all the necessary conditions for success obtained, x would have intentionally ϕ-ed. I defend the existence of attempts. Following Ruben, I frame the issue in terms of the logical form of trying sentences (i.e. sentences which report that an agent tried to do such-and-such). Against Ruben’s view that such sentences express subjunctive conditionals, I argue that they express existential quantifications over attempts qua events. Thus, trying sentences are true only if attempts qua events exist.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See, e.g., Armstrong (1973), Hornsby (1980, ch.3), and O’Shaughnessy (1973).

  2. See, e.g., Adams (1995), Buckareff (2005), Cleveland (1997), Hornsby (1980, chs.3–4), McCann (1975), O’Shaughnessy (1973) and Pietroski (2000, ch.1).

  3. Ruben (2016, 273, 2018, 122). My presentation of Ruben’s view is slightly simplified. The consequent of this conditional is officially a disjunction: either x would have intentionally ϕ-ed or x would have been intentionally ϕ-ing (‘x is ϕ-ing’ doesn’t always imply ‘x ϕ-ed’; consider ‘x is walking to the store’). Since nothing I say hinges on this complication, I ignore it in what follows.

  4. Davidson (1967). For detailed development, see Landman (2000) and Parsons (1990).

  5. Here, ‘Agent’ and ‘Patient’ denote thematic roles, i.e. ways of being involved in an event. As I’ll understand these roles, the agent of an event is simply the doer of whatever that event is a doing of (e.g. the agent of a kiss is the kisser) while the patient of an event is simply whatever has that thing done to it (e.g. the patient of a kiss is the kissee). Thus, they’re what Dowty (1989, 109–114, 1991, 571–575) calls ‘proto-roles’.

    Note that (1ND) is simplified in two respects. First, tense is ignored. Second, while (1ND) contains a single event-variable, some Neo-Davidsonians argue that action sentences like (1) should be analysed using two event-variables: one for a basic action and one for a result which that action produces (Davidson, 1985a; Ludwig, 2010; Pietroski, 2000, ch.1). Since nothing I say hinges on these complications, I ignore them.

  6. I assume a Quinean conception of ontological commitment (Quine, 1948). For further discussion and defense, see Payton (2021, 23–30).

  7. See Sect. 4. For a different argument against volitionism, see Ruben (2018, 104–121).

  8. Ruben calls this ‘the physical action theory’ of trying, since, as it’s typically developed, it allows an attempt to be identical to some token physical action. This label isn’t ideal, however, since we can (and I do) allow for such identities while rejecting this conception of what trying consists in.

  9. See Ruben (2015, 12n.8, 2018, 48n.10) for sources.

  10. It’s sometimes claimed that cases of naked trying are cases of ‘total action failure’: when Landry’s patient tries to perform the basic action of raising her arm, and fails to do so, she doesn’t act or exercise her agency at all—see Ruben (2018, 32), Adams and Mele (1992, 328), Enç (2003, 19), and Hornsby (1980, 42). I find this view implausible. Moreover, we can reject teleologism, on the ground that it rules out naked trying, while allowing that naked attempts are actions. You might think that naked attempts are basic actions—Landry’s patient doesn’t try to raise her arm by doing anything else—and that the problem for teleologism is that it effectively requires all attempts non-basic. (Recall, one’s means of ϕ-ing can’t simply be to try to ϕ; otherwise, no reductive identification of x’s attempt to ϕ with x’s ψ-ing is achieved.).

  11. See also Buckareff (2005). Note: to adopt this view, you needn’t think that an attempt to ϕ must be initiated by an intention with ϕ-ing as its content. You may think it’s possible for x to set ϕ-ing as her goal, and try to ϕ, even in cases where she doesn’t intend to ϕ. For relevant discussion, see Bratman (1987, ch.9), Hornsby (1995), Mele (2003) and Ruben (2018, 134–137, 145–155). Note also that the process view is compatible with the claim that naked attempts are actions: you might think that the patient’s attempt to raise her arm is an action, because it’s caused and sustained by the right sorts of mental states and events.

  12. Bayer (1997, 4–5) distinguishes lexical Neo-Davidsonian semantics, on which at least some thematic roles are built into the denotations of verbs—see, e.g., (Landman 2000, ch.2)—and compositional Neo-Davidsonian semantics, on which the denotation of a verb is simply an event-type, and thematic roles are contributed by other (perhaps unpronounced) lexical items, special compositional rules, or other means—see, e.g., Parsons (1990, ch.5) and Dowty (1989, 88–96). I remain officially neutral between these two approaches.

  13. The treatment of ‘quickly’ actually needs to be more complex. No event is quick or slow simpliciter, but only relative to standard of evaluation. Similar remarks apply to adverbs like ‘noisily’ and ‘quietly’, which I also discuss below. For my preferred account of how standards of evaluation are fixed, and how they figure in the analysis of action sentences, see Payton (2021, 211–217). Nothing hinges on these complications for present purposes, so I ignore them.

  14. I say ‘somehow’ because, as we’ll see, Ruben and I disagree on how adverbs function outside the scope of ‘try’.

  15. The narrow-scope reading is more easily triggered if we shift the location of the adverb: ‘Alice noisily tried to open the door’. For some adverbs, the wide-scope reading isn’t clearly available at all—consider ‘Alice tried hard to close the gap’ or ‘Alice tried repeatedly to remember Beth’s name’. Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion.

  16. See, e.g., Salmon (1986) and Soames (2002, ch.8).

  17. See, e.g., Richard (1990, ch.3).

  18. For further discussion of the intensionality of trying, see Ruben (2018, 69–73).

  19. My presentation is simplified in another way; see note 3.

  20. Following Davidson (1971, 45–47), I allow that x’s ϕ-ing can be token-identical to x’s ψ-ing, even if x ϕ-s intentionally but ψ-s unintentionally. An event’s status as intentional is relative to an event-type; or, as Davidson puts it, an event is only intentional ‘under a description’. Davidson (1967, 121–122; 1985b, 218–219) denies that an event’s being intentional under a certain description should be represented by a predicate denoting a property of events, but see Payton (2021, 154–157) for criticism.

  21. You might worry that Charlie can’t be the agent of a seeing, in the way that Alice can be the agent of a kiss, since perception isn’t an action. But see note 5 and sources cited therein.

  22. See Parsons (1990, 15–17) and Payton (2021, 138–144) for further development of this argument.

  23. For further discussion of the perception of attempts, and of token actions more generally, see Hornsby (1986), Steward (2000) and Payton (2021, 138–150). Note that the point also applies in cases of naked trying: while I might be able to see that the patient is trying to raise her arm (e.g. if she furrows her brows in frustration upon repeated failed attempts), I can’t literally see her try to raise her arm. In cases of naked trying, attempts remain wholly inner, and are no easier to see than the firings of neurons or the activities of the digestive system.

  24. An anonymous referee worried that (10) sounds less natural than similar sentences in which the relevant behaviour isn’t described as an attempt—e.g., ‘Charlie saw Alice kiss Beth, and David saw it, too.’ But compare (10) to the following dialogue:

    Charlie: Alice just tried to kiss Beth.

    David:I know, I saw it, too.

  25. Objection: Charlie doesn’t see Alice; he only sees a part of her.

    Reply: We only ever see parts of people (roughly, their surfaces). If generalized, this objection implies that we never see people at all.

  26. Ruben (2018, 90–92) suggests that apparent anaphoric reference to attempts can always be treated as anaphoric reference to facts.

  27. Note: the problem isn’t that this property is understood using a conditional—you might think that dispositional properties like colours, whose instantiations are visible, are to be understood in conditional terms. The problem is just that it’s not clear how the instantiation of this property could be visible. Compare: the property being a philosopher isn’t, and doesn’t bring with it, a power to affect anyone’s visual systems; the fact of my being a philosopher doesn’t seem to be the kind of thing one can see.

  28. See, e.g., Armstrong (1978, 122–125, 1988, 1997, 188–189) and Barker and Jago (2012, 120–121).

  29. Perhaps seeing F’s being a requires somehow cognizing that a is F? I.e. perhaps the reason Charlie can’t see the fact of Alice trying to kiss Beth is that he doesn’t know, or is otherwise unaware, that she’s trying to kiss Beth? But this risks confusing seeing with seeing that. (In Payton (2021, 147–149), I suggest that this is a general problem for those who believe in Armstrongian facts and think they can be seen).

  30. Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion.

  31. On my preferred view, the status of one event as the by-act of another, like the status of an event as intentional, must be relativized to event-types. This requires a four-placed predicate, ‘By(e1)(e2)(E1)(E2)’.

  32. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point.

References

  • Adams, F. (1995). Trying: You’ve got to believe. Journal of Philosophical Research, 20, 549–561.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adams, F., & Mele, A. R. (1992). The intention/volition debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 22(3), 323–337.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Acting and trying. Philosophical Papers, 2(1), 1–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism I: Nominalism and Realism. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1988). Can a naturalist believe in universals? In E. Ullmann-Margalit (Ed.), Science in reflection (pp. 103–115). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Barker, S., & Jago, M. (2012). Being positive about negative facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(1), 117–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bayer, S. L. (1997). Confessions of a Lapsed Neo-Davidsonian: Events and Arguments in Compositional Semantics. Routledge Publishing Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bratman, M. (1987). Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buckareff, A. A. (2005). How (not) to think about mental action. Philosophical Explorations, 8(1), 83–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cleveland, T. (1997). Trying without willing: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1967). The logical form of action sentences. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on actions and events (2nd ed., pp. 105–122). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Davidson, D. (1971). Agency. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on actions and events (2nd ed., pp. 43–61). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Davidson, D. (1985a). Adverbs of action. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on actions and events (2nd ed., pp. 293–304). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Davidson, D. (1985b). Reply to Bruce Vermazen. In B. Vermazen & M. B. Hintikka (Eds.), Essays on Davidson: Actions and events (pp. 217–221). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dowty, D. R. (1989). On the semantic content of the notion of ‘thematic role.’ In G. Chierchia, B. H. Partee, & R. Turner (Eds.), Properties, types, and meaning. Volume II: Semantic issues (pp. 69–129). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Dowty, D. R. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67(3), 547–619.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Enç, B. (2003). How we act: Causes, reasons, and intentions. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hornsby, J. (1980). Actions. Routledge & Keagan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hornsby, J. (1986). Bodily movements, actions, and epistemology. Reprinted in her (1997) Simple mindedness: In defense of naïve naturalism in the philosophy of mind (pp. 93–102). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

  • Hornsby, J. (1995). Reasons for trying. Journal of Philosophical Research, 20, 525–539.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Landman, F. (2000). Events and plurality: The Jerusalem lectures. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Landry, O. (1855). Mémoire sur la Paralysie du Sentiment d’Activité Musculaire. Typographie Henry Plon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ludwig, K. (2010). Adverbs of action and logical form. In T. O’Connor & C. Sandis (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of action (pp. 40–49). Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • McCann, H. (1975). Trying, paralysis, and volition. Review of Metaphysics, 28(3), 423–442.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. R. (2003). Intending and trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the video arcade. In M. Sintonen, P. Ylikosky, & K. Miller (Eds.), Realism in action (pp. 129–135). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • O’Shaugnessy, B. (1973). Trying as the mental pineal glad. Journal of Philosophy, 70(13), 365–386.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parsons, T. (1990). Events in the semantics of English. The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Payton, J. D. (2021). Negative actions: Events, absences, and the metaphysics of agency. Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pietroski, P. M. (2000). Causing actions. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O. (1948). On what there is. Reprinted in his (1980), From a logical point of view (2nd ed., pp. 1–19). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

  • Richard, M. (1990). Propositional attitudes: An essay on thoughts and how we ascribe them. Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ruben, D.-H. (2013). Trying in some way. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(4), 719–733.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ruben, D.-H. (2015). The physical action theory of trying. Methode, 4(6), 1–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruben, D.-H. (2016). A conditional theory of trying. Philosophical Studies, 173(1), 271–287.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ruben, D.-H. (2018). The metaphysics of action: Trying, doing. Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s puzzle. The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soames, S. (2002). Beyond rigidity: The unfinished semantics agenda of ‘naming and necessity.’ Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Steward, H. (2000). Do actions occur inside the body? Mind & Society, 1(2), 107–125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, B. (1985). Modes of occurrence. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, G. M. (1989). The intentionality of human action. Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Thanks to two anonymous referees for feedback on a previous version. Research for this article was partially funded by a Postdoctoral Fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Funding

Partial financial support was received from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

    Jonathan D. Payton

Authors
  1. Jonathan D. Payton
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jonathan D. Payton.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Payton, J.D. Attempts. Philos Stud 179, 363–382 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01662-9

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01662-9

Keywords

Search

Navigation