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A New Account of Thick Concepts

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References

  1. See Philippa Foot, “Moral Arguments,” in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978). Also see Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 37–42; Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 243–262; Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 14–17; and Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 11–15.

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  2. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 140–155.

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  5. See Allan Gibbard, “Thick Concepts and Warrant For Feelings,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (Supplementary) (1992).

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Correspondence to Andrew Payne.

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Payne, A. A New Account of Thick Concepts. J Value Inquiry 39, 89–103 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-006-0114-6

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