Abstract
I address an argument in value theory which threatens to render nonsensical many debates in modern ethics. Almotahari and Hosein’s (Philos Stud 172(6):1485–1508, 2015) argument against the property of goodness simpliciter is presented. I criticise the linguistic tests they use in their argument, suggesting they do not provide much support for their conclusion. I draw a weaker conclusion from their argument, and argue that defenders of goodness simpliciter have not responded adequately to this milder conclusion. I go on to argue that moral philosophers ought to abandon the property of goodness simpliciter and focus their attention on the property of being a good state of affairs. I defend this property against Almotahari and Hosein’s criticism, and give reasons to think it (rather than goodness simpliciter) is at the heart of moral theory.
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Notes
See (ibid: 1490) for a formalised version of the argument.
Byrne (2016) objects differently that the tests themselves are flawed: an adjective which does have a predicative use may fail them.
Ignoring modal views on which there could not be a unicorn, of any sort.
For example, see Crisp 2003.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping me to see this point.
We are considering the argument scheme: a is good; a is a K; therefore a is a good K. The point of A&H’s test is that if ‘good’ has an attributive reading, then this argument scheme is invalid. Like A&H, I assume that a single instance of this argument which can be given an invalid reading is enough to show that the scheme is invalid. The converse is not true—a valid instance of an argument scheme does not show the scheme to be valid—but that does not undermine my point here. Thanks to a reviewer for pressing for clarity here.
An anonymous reviewer suggested this response.
A reviewer suggested that ‘good as far as sunsets go’ express the property ascribed by ‘good sunset’, and that this paraphrase locution is in the same spirit as A&H’s. It seems to me that, like ‘qua’, the phrase ‘as far as Ks go’ works here largely because it doesn’t actually elucidate on the ascribed property at all. In fact, this locution is different enough that ‘good state of affairs’ works with it (“in an evil world, this is good as far as states of affairs go”)—so it’s no help to A&H.
From these examples, ‘nature’ seems to be about some sort of function. Defenders of this claim don’t usually want to limit themselves to functions, but it would be a diversion to probe their claim further. ‘Nature’ just loosely suggests ‘what the object is or is for’: it’s not anything metaphysically deep, and can vary over time as ‘nature’ in the sense of something’s essential properties cannot.
For an interesting discussion of statistical methods for identifying ‘good sunsets’, see Pierson 2016.
Geach thought this: 1956. The view goes back to Aristotle.
Of course, there are various evaluative standards for smudges (‘good to use in a Rorschach test’) and speeds. But unlike 'good knife', there's no such thing as being 'good simply as a speed': no particular evaluative standard is basic unless context makes it so.
Saying this is compatible with thinking that side constraints mean we sometimes shouldn’t bring about better states of affairs. Something more general could be said for those wary of teleology about value.
Only ‘suggests’, because this epistemic difference might not line up with the way things really are metaphysically.
References
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Pierson, E. (2016). Detecting and predicting beautiful sunsets using social media data. Presented at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, 6th International Workshop on Climate Informatics. Available at http://cs.stanford.edu/~emmap1/sunset_paper.pdf.
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Acknowledgements
I'd like to thank two anonymous reviewers, Ben Lange, Alexander Heape and an audience at the Ockham Society for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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Peace, F.J. Who needs ‘just plain’ goodness: a reply to Almotahari and Hosein. Philos Stud 174, 2991–3004 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0842-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0842-9