Abstract
It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate. This solution is basedon the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees ofstrength, and it suggests a way of giving a precisemeaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out thatthe solution captures certain intuitions of bothSocrates and Aristotle.
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Peijnenburg, J. Akrasia, Dispositions And Degrees. Erkenntnis 53, 285–308 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026563930319
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026563930319