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On the Objective Meaningful Life Argument: A Response to Kirk Lougheed

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2017

MYRON A. PENNER
MYRON A. PENNER*
Affiliation:
Trinity Western University
*
*<Myron.Penner@twu.ca>
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Abstract

Kirk Lougheed has argued that the Objective Meaningful Life Argument establishes a type of anti-theism, the view that a theistic God’s existence would make things worse and thus it’s rational to prefer that God not exist. The objective version of this argument is said to be an improvement over my subjective version of the Meaningful Life Argument. I argue that Lougheed’s version fares no better than the subjective version.

Selon Kirk Lougheed, favoriser une version objective de l’argument du sens de la vie (Meaningful Life Argument) établit une sorte d’antithéisme, c’est-à-dire une perspective qui maintient que l’existence d’un Dieu théiste aggraverait les choses et qu’il est donc plus rationnel de préférer que Dieu n’existe pas. Cette version objective est présentée par Lougheed comme une amélioration par rapport à ma version subjective de l’argument du sens de la vie. Je soutiens que la version de Lougheed ne réussit pas mieux que la version subjective que j’ai développée, puis rejetée.

Keywords

theismpro-theismanti-theismmeaningful lifeThomas Nagel
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 173 - 182
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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