An Answer to the Problem of Other Minds

Abstract

The present paper sets out to counter the claim put forward by British philosopher of mind, Robert Kirk, according to which Sartre’s notion of consciousness as for-itself, while offering some valuable insights regarding human existence, nonetheless fails to engage with the problem of how to establish the existence of such conscious beings on philosophical grounds. To the extent that it succeeds in meeting the challenge raised by Kirk’s comment, the reading of Being and Nothingness offered here could be considered as fulfilling a twofold aim. Firstly, it offers an answer to the problem of other minds which is construed on the basis of Sartre’s ontological work, thus contributing to a still open debate in the scholarly literature devoted to Sartre’s thought. Secondly, it illustrates one way in which a specific problem which is amply discussed among contemporary philosophers of mind could be tackled from within a conceptual framework rooted in the continental tradition of philosophy.