Abstract
Many people in the animal welfare communityhave argued that the use of nonhuman animals inmedical research is necessarily based onspeciesism, an unjustified prejudice based onspecies membership. As such it is morally akinto racism and sexism. This is misguided. Thecombined capacities for autonomy and sentiencewith the obligations derived from relationssupport a morally justifiable rationale forusing some nonhuman animals in order to limitthe risk of harm to humans. There may be a fewcases where it is morally better to use a neversentient human than a sentient animal, butthese cases are few and would not fulfill thecurrent need for research subjects. The use ofnonautonomous animals instead of humans inrisky research can be based on solid moralground. It is not necessarily speciesism.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
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I do not mean to imply that autonomous beings are purely free in the isolationist interpretation that has been used to criticize autonomy. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. writes, “Respecting people's autonomy requires resisting the temptation to ‘take charge’ of their lives without their consent, but it does not deny anyone the choice to share with others, to acknowledge one's dependency, to accept advice, or even to sacrifice for the interests of others” (Hill, Jr. TE. Autonomy and Self Respect. London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 49). Autonomy is not necessarily in conflict with compassion for or relationship to others. For example, it may not be undue interference for a patient to autonomously choose a course of medical care that is in keeping with the wishes of loved ones, although not her personal preferences. The key here is that the patient had a choice, made with a good grasp of the situation and relevant options. The family did not force the decision on her, although clearly her concern for them was an important factor in her decision.
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The reaction to the experiments involving injection of live cancer cells into unaware, terminally ill patients at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn, New York supports the claim that the public reaction to a policy of using PVS patients for research, without consent, would be negative (Beecher HK. Ethics and clinical research. New England Journal of Medicine 1996; 274: 1354–1360). Whether this would be sufficiently negative to justify using animals instead requires greater consideration.
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Perry, C.K. A Compassionate Autonomy Alternative to Speciesism. Theor Med Bioeth 22, 237–246 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011415718424
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011415718424