Cleaning Up, and Moving Past, Simple Swamping
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Abstract: Many philosophers believe that true belief is of epistemic value, but that
knowledge is of even more epistemic value. Some claim that this surplus value is
instrumentally valuable to the value of true belief. I call the conjunction of these
claims the *Instrumentalist's Conjunction*. The so-called "Swamping Problem" is
meant to show that *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is inconsistent. Crudely put, the
problem is that if knowledge only has surplus value to the value of true belief, and
a belief is true because known, then knowledge cannot be of any more value than
true belief. Given the inconsistency, most philosopher reject the claim the surplus
value of knowledge is instrumental to the value of true belief. This paper argues
that the Swamping Problem is illusory. Once we clean up the problem and pay
attention to the distinction between token/type properties, we can see that
Instrumentalist's Conjunction is perfectly coherent.

Many philosophers embrace the following two claims:
> *Value of True Belief*: True beliefs are of final epistemic value.
> *Simple Knowledge Intuition*: Knowledge is of epistemic value, and has more
> epistemic value than true belief.

However, some philosophers endorse a further thesis:
> *Instrumentalism about the Value of Knowledge*: Any epistemic value that
> knowledge has over true belief is instrumental epistemic value, specifically,
> instrumental epistemic value to the value of true belief.

(Hereafter '*Instrumentalism*'). *Instrumentalism* is supposed to follow from a more general view
of epistemic value:
> *Truth Value Monism*: The most basic things of final epistemic value are true
> beliefs.

Truth Value Monism is a minimal theory of epistemic value that purports to explain the epistemic
value of anything in terms of its relation to true belief. *Instrumentalism* may be seen as one way
of retaining *Truth Value Monism* with the first two theses. I will refer to the conjunction of *Value
of True Belief*, *Simple Knowledge Intuition*, and *Instrumentalism* as the *Instrumentalist's
Conjunction*.

A number of authors have argued that *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is inconsistent. (For
classic statements, see e.g., Jones (1997), Swinburne (1998), DePaul (2001), Zagzebski (2003),
Kvanvig (2003, 2010), Pritchard (2010)). Thus, at least one part of the conjunction must be
rejected. But many have thought *Value of True Belief* and *Simple Knowledge Intuition* are more
plausible than *Instrumentalism*. Thus, given their purported incompatibility, *Instrumentalism*
must be rejected. Rejecting *Instrumentalism* is important for two reasons. First, it means
rejecting any theory that implies *Instrumentalism*, like perhaps *Truth Value Monism*. Second, it
means there is a constraint on an account of knowledge: one must have an account of knowledge
that secures something else of final epistemic value besides true belief (cf. Sosa (2011: 2-3)).

Instrumentalist's Conjunction is purportedly inconsistent because it violates plausible
principles about computing value. If X is of instrumental value only to Y, then if something has
Y it cannot have additional value in virtue of having X as well. Thus, given *Instrumentalism*,

knowledge cannot confer additional value to true belief. As it is sometimes put, any value a belief has that is instrumental to true belief gets "swamped" once that belief is true. But that contradicts the *Simple Knowledge Intuition*. I will call this the "Simple Swamping Problem" for *Instrumentalism*—"Simple" Swamping because all that is needed to rule out *Instrumentalism* is a very simple, or basic, intuition about the comparative value of knowledge and true belief.

This paper argues that, once we clarify the Simple Swamping Problem, we will see that it is illusory and the *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is consistent. In section I, after some stage setting, I give a presentation of the Simple Swamping Problem inspired by Duncan Pritchard's influential and representative formulation. In section II, I distinguish between token and type value properties. Given that distinction, we can see that either (i) *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is consistent with the relevant principles for computing value or (ii) it is not but those principles are clearly false. In section III, I provide positive reason for thinking *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is consistent. The key idea is that, on that view, knowledge is of instrumental value relative to the *type* true belief. Thus, even if a particular belief is already true, knowing might be of instrumental epistemic value relative to *other tokens or instances of that type*. The upshot is that *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is consistent. If there is a "swamping problem" for *Instrumentalism,* it is not the Simple Swamping Problem.

I.   The Simple Swamping Problem

A. Preliminaries

First, I distinguish between final epistemic value and instrumental epistemic value.[1] When we speak of the epistemic value of something we may refer to either its final epistemic value, its instrumental epistemic value, or some combination thereof. Something is of final epistemic value just when, from the epistemic point of view, it is of final value. Something is of instrumental epistemic value just when it increases the probability of either bringing about something of epistemic value or preventing something of epistemic disvalue. Notice that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Something can be of final epistemic value *and* instrumental epistemic value.

Second, the Simple Swamping Problem is sometimes presented as a criticism of reliabilism. However, that is not quite apt because reliabilism does not imply *Instrumentalism* and *Instrumentalism* does not imply reliabilism. Reliabilism is a view about justification, not value. So one could hold that knowledge requires justification, justification requires reliable belief forming, and reliable belief forming is of final epistemic value. That view implies reliabilism and the denial of *Instrumentalism*. Alternatively, one could reject reliabilism while still endorsing *Instrumentalism*. For instance, Laurence BonJour (1985: 7-8) endorses a view of justification on which justification is only of instrumental value to the epistemic value of true belief. But BonJour is no reliabilist! The Simple Swamping Problem is orthogonal to the truth of reliabilism, even if as a matter of fact reliabilists are sympathetic to *Instrumentalism.*

Third, I focus on *Instrumentalism* instead of *Truth Value Monism*. For a position might imply *Instrumentalism* without implying *Truth Value Monism*. (Perhaps one thought something else was of basic final epistemic value but it has nothing to do with knowledge.) That position would be just as open to the Simple Swamping Problem despite rejecting *Truth Value Monism*. Additionally, at least one author—Sylvan (2018)—has questioned whether *Truth Value Monism* implies *Instrumentalism*. While I think Sylvan's view is implausible for reasons I explain in Perrine (2020), its negation should not be built into the setup of the problem.

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[1] I'll use 'value' and 'good' interchangeably throughout. This terminological sloppiness will not undermine any points here.

Finally, the Simple Swamping Problem is supposed to turn on general claims about value that abstract away from issues in epistemology. This is why proponents of it often invoke analogies. For instance, Zagzebski (2003) compares two cups of coffee. They are equally good. But one comes from a reliable machine, the other from an unreliable one. Zagzebski claims that despite originating in a reliable machine, the first is not more valuable. Likewise, Kvanvig (2010) compiles two lists. The first states where he can find chocolate. The second states where he can find chocolate *as well as* locations that are likely to have chocolate. He claims the second is not more valuable than the first. These analogies are supposed to illustrate how value can be "computed." And the claim is that defenders of *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* are simply wrong about how value computes. But these claims about computing value aren't specific to their position about the value of knowledge. They would equally apply *mutatis mutandis* to analogous claims about cups of coffee or lists of chocolate.

B. The Swamping Principle and Argument

The *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is purportedly inconsistent because it violates plausible principles about computing value. If that is correct, then it should be possible to derive a contradiction from *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* and such principles.

Some authors do not articulate any principles, merely taking it as obvious that *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is inconsistent. Thus, Michael DePaul once wrote, "….knowledge *cannot* be epistemically better than mere true belief IF true belief is the only epistemic good. The point seems so simple and clear that I'm not even sure how to go about arguing for it" (2001: 175). Some simply rely on analogies. But others are more forthcoming. In an important, and now standard, presentation of the problem, Duncan Pritchard articulates the following principle:

> *Swamping Principle*: If the value of X is only instrumental relative to a further good and that good is already present, then it can confer no additional value.
> (2010: 15)

He writes, "I can see no way of objecting to this claim, nor am I aware of any good objections to this thesis in the literature" (2010: 16). This principle well-captures the intuitions in the analogies of Zagzebski and Kvanvig. If originating from a reliable coffee machine is only valuable to the good of a good cup of a coffee, and this cup of coffee is already good, this cup of coffee does not get any additional value from originating in a reliable coffee maker.

We can now represent the Simple Swamping Problem as a *reductio*. From *Value of True Belief*, we can assume there is some subject S and proposition *p* such that:

(1) S's belief that *p* is true and of final epistemic value.

(2) S knows that *p* and S's knowing *p* is of epistemic value.

However, from (1), (2), and *Simple Knowledge Intuition*, we get:

(3) S's knowing *p* has more epistemic value than S's truly believing *p*.

Given *Instrumentalism* and (3) we get:

(4) The value that S's knowing *p* has, that S's truly believing *p* does not, is value that is instrumental relative to the value of true belief.

But, the thought goes, the *Swamping Principle* when applied to (4) implies:

(5) The value that S's knowing *p* has, that S's truly believing *p* does not, is value that is instrumental relative to the value of true belief only if *p* is not true.

Clearly (4) and (5) will imply:

(6) S's belief that *p* is not true.

But (6) contradicts (1). So from the *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* and *Swamping Principle* we can derive a contradiction. But the *Value of True Belief* and *Simple Knowledge Intuition* are

widely accepted; and few see reason to abandon *Swamping Principle*. Thus, the culprit is *Instrumentalism*. So goes the Simple Swamping Problem against *Instrumentalism*.

II.   Against the Swamping Principle(s)

The Simple Swamping Problem is defective. Once we clarify the *Swamping Principle*, we will see that either (i) it is consistent with *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* and so cannot be used to produce the *reductio* or (ii) is inconsistent with *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* and can be used to produce the *reductio* but is clearly false. Unlike others' criticism (e.g., Olsson (2007), Carter, Jarvis and Rubin (2013)), my criticism will not be that the analogies used to motivate the Simple Swamping Problem are disanalogous to the case of true belief. My criticism will provide more straightforward reasons for thinking the *Swamping Principle*, under suitable clarification, is false.[2]

First, value is something that is had by things; things are of value. Let us make this point more explicit in the *Swamping Principle*:

>   *Swamping Principle**: If the value of X is only instrumental relative to a further good and some object *o* already has the good, then it can confer no additional value to *o*.

Second, we should distinguish between a *property* and *its instances* or, as it is sometimes put, a property "type" and a property "token" (see, e.g., Armstrong (1989: chp. 1); Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2003: 53); Lowe (2006: 23-5)). When G. E. Moore declared goodness unanalyzable, Moore was claiming that a specific property or property type—to wit, goodness—was unanalyzable. When Moore declared a particular aesthetic experience good, Moore was claiming that a particular experience was an instance of—instantiated—the property of goodness; the particular experience had a token of the property type goodness.

The distinction is important to understanding our attribution of properties. Suppose I say that two of my coworkers have the same property, say, the property of industriousness. Then I am saying that there is a single property or property type—industriousness—and each of my coworkers instantiates a property token of that type. But those property tokens are distinct. (One of my coworker could cease to be industrious, while the other remains industrious.)

Once we draw this distinction, there are four ways we can clarify or disambiguate the *Swamping Principle**. Consider the underlined phrase:

>   *Swamping Principle**: If <u>the value of X is only instrumental relative to a further good</u> and some object *o* already has the good, then it can confer no additional value to *o*.

This could mean that X's value is instrumental to some good *token*. Alternatively, this could mean that X's value is instrumental to some good *type*.[3] (For instance, doctors say that cardiovascular exercise is instrumental to the good type *healthy heart*; it is not instrumental to the good type *healthy teeth*.) Likewise consider the underlined phrase:

>   *Swamping Principle**: If the value of X is only instrumental relative to a further good and <u>some object *o* already has the good</u>, then it can confer no additional value to *o*.

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[2] Another critic of the *Swamping Principle* is Stapleford (2016). However, Stapleford using certain analogies that I do not find very plausible. So I will not discuss those criticisms here.

[3] There might be a variety of ways to further unpack the idea of being instrumental to a good type. For instance, perhaps if X is of instrumental value relative to some good type Y, then any time X is of instrumental value, then it has as a consequence some instance of Y. I don't think it is necessary to get into the precise details of how to unpack this idea for my purposes here. After all, understanding it is necessary for understanding *Instrumentalism*, which all parties seem to understand, even if there are fights over precise ways of unpacking.

Once again, we could disambiguate this to mean that *o* has already has a *token* of goodness. Alternatively, it could mean that *o* has already has the good *type*. Thus, we have four potential clarifications or disambiguations:

> *Swamping Principle***: If the value of X is only instrumental relative to a further good token *g* and some object *o* already has *g*, then it can confer no additional value to *o*.
> *Swamping Principle****: If the value of X is only instrumental relative to a further good type G and some object *o* already has some token of G, then it can confer no additional value to *o*.
> *Swamping Principle*****: If the value of X is only instrumental relative to a further good token *g* and some object *o* already has the good type G, then it can confer no additional value to *o*.
> *Swamping Principle******: If the value of X is only instrumental relative to a further good type G and some object *o* already has the good type G, then it can confer no additional value to *o*.

Among these disambiguations, we can set aside the last two. Strictly speaking, objects instantiate property *tokens* not property *types*. Thus to say that "some object *o* already has the good type G" is either false or it means that some object *o* already has some token of G. So either these principles are false or they are the same as the previous pair. Either way, we can safely ignore them.

Swamping Principle** is plausible. It also captures the intuitiveness of the analogies that Zagzebski and Kvanvig use. But it does not derive the contradiction of the previous section. For it does not imply (5) but:

> (5*) S's knowing that *p* has instrumental epistemic value relative to the token value of *p*'s being true only if S's belief that *p* is not true.

But *Instrumentalism* does not imply the antecedent of (5*). For *Instrumentalism* is a general thesis about the value *type* of true belief not any particular value *token* of that type. That is, *Instrumentalism* implies that any additional value knowledge has over true belief is always explained by appealing to the instrumental value of true belief, without stating *which* true beliefs explain *which* amounts of surplus value. So one cannot use *Instrumentalism* and *Swamping Principle*** to derive (6) and thus the contradiction.[4]

Swamping Principle*** does imply (5). Thus, one could use the *Swamping Principle**** to derive (6) and thus the contradiction. But *Swamping Principle**** is false. Its falsity is not hard to see. A valuable type can have many token instances—different objects can have different tokens at the same time, and the same object can have different tokens across time. Thus, even if some token instance of some good is "already present" something could be of instrumental value to *other* instances of that valuable type. Thus, given this, it should not hard to think of various counterexamples to *Swamping Principle****.

Some counterexamples. Suppose I am having a lunch at an Indian buffet. That lunch is quite pleasant. But suppose that lunch has another property—it entitles me to punch a card, which if punched five times, allows me to have a free lunch. That property is of value instrumental to the good type of having a good lunch. And it confers value to my lunch—I appropriately prefer to have lunch at an Indian buffet with such a system as opposed to one without. But that lunch

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[4] Similar points will apply to Dutant's (2013: 361) principle. Dutant defends Pritchard's *Swamping Principle*— or an explication of it—but the principle he defends will not derive a contradiction given *Instrumentalist's Conjunction*.

already tokens, or instantiates, a pleasant lunch. Another example due to Goldman and Olsson (2009: 26). Compare two winning lottery tickets. Both guarantee you 30,000¥. But the second also functions as a ticket for a second, relatively small lottery with a large cash prize. Obviously, the second lottery ticket is more valuable than the first. But the second lottery ticket is only of additional instrumental value to a good type—the good of acquiring money—for which a particular token—30,000¥—is already present.

There is an additional problem with *Swamping Principle****. Properties are had at times. Thus, value properties are had at times. Some properties are had across time. We can analyze having a property across time as having instances of that property in the interval of that time. (I.e., if x has P from t_0 to t_n, then for any n $\in$ [0, n], x has P at t_n.) But those different times will be different instances of P. (After all, having P at t_n is not the same as having it at t_{n+10}.) So having a value property across time is having different instances of that value property across time.

Suppose we index the *Swamping Principle**** to times. A natural way of doing that is:
> *Swamping Principle******: If the value of X at *t* is only instrumental relative to a further good type G and some object *o* already has some instance of G at *t*, then it can confer no additional value to *o* at *t*.

But this principle is also false. For X may be of instrumental value for securing that *o* has some instance of G, not at *t*, but at *t+n*. For instance, suppose a massage parlor has the standing policy: if one agrees to follow it on a social media platform, one is entitled to an additional 15 minutes to one's massage. Agreeing to follow the parlor on social media is of instrumental value to the good of enjoying a pleasurable massage. But suppose I am *right now* enjoying a pleasurable massage. In such a situation, I am currently enjoying a good (a pleasurable massage), but agreeing to follow the massage parlor is of instrumental value even now, for it will increase the length of my massage. So the *Swamping Principle****** is false.

We can sum up the basic problem with *Swamping Principle****-*Swamping Principle****** as follows. A valuable type can have many token instances—different objects can have different tokens at the same time, and the same object can have different tokens across time. Thus, even if some token instance of some valuable type is "already present" something could be of instrumental value to *other* instances of that valuable type.[5]

I've focused on Pritchard's *Swamping Principle* and some disambiguations of it. But other discussions of the "swamping problem" are also problematic for similar reasons. I'll illustrate by describing Carter and Jarvis' (2012) discussion of Pritchard's *Swamping Principle*. They suggest that anyone who accepts Pritchard's:
> *Swamping Principle*: If the value of X is only instrumental relative to a further good and that good is already present, then it can confer no additional value.
> (2010: 15)

should also accept:
> *Swamping Thesis Complement:* If the value of a property possessed by an item is only instrumental value relative to a further good, and that good has already failed to be present in that item, then it can confer no additional value (2012: 693)

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[5] Several authors have criticized the Swamping Problem and/or the *Swamping Principle* by appealing to the diachronic value of holding on to true belief. (See, e.g., Olsson (2007), Fricker (2009), Carter, Jarvis, and Rubin (2013).) However, they do not clearly distinguish between property tokens/types as I have. My approach both subsumes theirs and unifies it with other problems with the *Swamping Principle* and its explications.

They then reason by dilemma: either the relevant good is already present or it has failed to be present. In the first case, the *Swamping Principle* implies that it can confer no additional value. In the second case, the *Swamping Thesis Complement* will imply that it can confer no additional value. Thus, either way, these principles suggest a further claim they simply label (4**):

> If the value of a property possessed by an item is only instrumental value relative to a further good, and that good is already present or has already failed to be present in that item, then it can confer no additional value (2012: 694).

Carter and Jarvis then argue that (4**) has several problematic results. The first problematic result is that any property of belief that is *not* factive cannot contribute epistemic value to the belief (2012: 694-5). The second problematic result is that any property that *is* factive cannot contribute any more epistemic value than being truth (2012: 695). A third problematic result is that, even if epistemic value pluralism is true—and there are several distinct things of (basic) final epistemic value—(4**) would still imply that true belief never has any instrumental epistemic value either (2012: 695-6).

Carter and Jarvis take these problematic results to constitute a *reductio.* Since the results follow from (4**), we should reject it. Since (4**) follows from *Swamping Principle* and *Swamping Thesis Complement*, they claim we should reject that conjunction. But, they maintain, *Swamping Thesis Complement* is a natural result of the *Swamping Principle*. Thus, we should reject the *Swamping Principle*.

Now I agree that there are some understandings of the *Swamping Principle* on which we should reject it. However, I don't think we need the complex multi-principle *reductio* of Carter and Jarvis to see that we should reject *Swamping Principle*. I've given more straightforward reasons.

However, my criticisms of the *Swamping Principle* do not merely make Carter and Jarvis' discussion potentially unnecessary. My criticism also indicate how their discussion makes similar mistakes as Pritchard's. For in both their *Swamping Thesis Complement* and (4**), they use the clause 'If the value of a property possessed by an item is only instrumental value relative to a further good.' As I point out above, this phrase can be disambiguated by determining whether 'further good' is referring to a token of a property or the property type itself. If we disambiguate their principles in terms of property tokens, then they may be true; but they will not be implied by *Instrumentalist's Conjunction*. If we disambiguate their principles in terms of property types, then they are false (or, perhaps, not distinct).[6]

III.   Giving Up, and Moving Past, the Simple Swamping Problem

I've argued that once we've disambiguated the *Swamping Principle* in various ways it cannot be used to generate the Simple Swamping Problem. One might worry that is just happenstance. Perhaps some other principle (or disambiguation of the *Swamping Principle*) could. Instead of considering even further principles and refinements, I'll just argue briefly that *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is consistent.

One way of showing that p, q, r, are consistent is to identify an s such that p, q, s are consistent and they imply r. So let us assume:

> *Value of True Belief*: True beliefs are of final epistemic value.
> *Instrumentalism about the Value of Knowledge*: Any epistemic value that knowledge has over true belief is instrumental epistemic value, specifically, instrumental epistemic value to the value of true belief.

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[6] Actually, I think there are additional issues with Carter and Jarvis (2012). I'm only focusing on the parts that are most germane to my presentation of the issues.

To these let us add a further thesis:

> *Condition C*: Knowledge requires true belief meeting condition C. Further, the probability of S having true beliefs (through having, retaining or forming them) and avoiding false beliefs (through not having, retaining, or forming them) is higher if S's belief meets condition C than not. Finally, there is no other condition on knowledge, Q, such that the probability of having false beliefs and avoiding true beliefs is higher if S's true belief meets Q than if it does not.[7]

These three claims are consistent. *Value of True Belief* and *Instrumentalism about the Value of Knowledge* are consistent. Both of those claims are about the *value* of knowledge and true belief. But *Condition C* is not about the value of knowledge and true belief. Thus, it is hard to see how it could contradict them. Thus, these three claims are consistent.

Additionally, these three claims will imply:

> *Simple Knowledge Intuition*: Knowledge is of epistemic value, and has more epistemic value than true belief.

For given *Value of True Belief* and *Condition C*, it will follow that true beliefs that meet condition C are of more instrumental epistemic value than true beliefs that do not. To be sure, the additional value knowledge has is instrumental to other true beliefs. But that is consistent with the *Simple Knowledge Intuition*. Thus, the *Instrumentalist Conjunction* is consistent. People should stop saying otherwise.

Further, *Condition C* is not some random claim. It sits well with a range of views about knowledge. Consider, for instance, views like: knowledge requires one have many other additional true beliefs (cf. Foley (2012)); knowledge requires one's belief not being inferred from, or depend upon, any false claims (cf. Lehrer (1974)); knowledge requires being formed by reliable processes that are likely to produce other true beliefs (cf. Goldman and Olsson (2009)); knowledge requires that one's belief be formed in a way that increases the probability that one retain it in the future (cf. Olsson (2007)); knowledge requires that one's belief be justified in a way that increases the probability that one retain it in the future (cf. Carter, Jarvis, and Rubin (2013)); knowledge requires justification which requires that one's belief belong to a logically consistent set whose many element have a high likelihood of being true (cf. BonJour (1985), Leite (2005)). This is an incomplete and partial sampling. But these kinds of views do imply, or could be developed to imply, *Condition C*. Thus, the argument that *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is consistent does not turn on some obscure claim that almost all philosophers have rejected. Rather, it is consonant with a range of extant theories of knowledge.

The argument of this paper is similar to Goldman and Olsson (2009), specifically their "Conditional Probability Solution" (2009: 27-31) Thus, a direct comparison may be useful. First and foremost, if the argument of this section is correct, then we can *prove* that the Simple Swamping Problem is illusory. That is, we can prove that *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* is consistent. Goldman and Olsson do not attempt anything as ambitious as that.

Second, Goldman and Olsson's Conditional Probability response is essentially forward looking. As they write, "under reliabilism, the probability of having more true belief (of a similar kind) *in the future* is greater conditional on S's knowing that p than conditional on S's merely truly believing that p (2009: 28, italics added). However, my response does not require a forward looking approach. As indicated above, it may be that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because, *right now*, knowledge requires additional true beliefs or a lacking of some false beliefs. In this way, my response is more flexible than theirs.

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[7] I do not claim that this is the only thesis that could be used to show *Instrumentalist's Conjunction* consistent.

Finally, Goldman and Olsson are defending a process reliabilist account of knowledge and justification from the Simple Swamping Problem. Indeed, they write, "the swamping problem can be seen as arising from combining reliablism with Veritism" (2009: 24). However, as pointed out above, the Simple Swamping Problem does not assume *either* reliablism *or* Veritism. Thus, in responding to the Simple Swamping Problem I have not assumed either reliablism or Veritism. Those who reject reliablism but who may still be susceptible to the Simple Swamping Problem—like, perhaps, BonJour (1985)—can utilize my response.

How to understand the Simple Swamping Problem is not only a matter of determining whose views are consistent, or inconsistent, with my response. A proper understand of the problem is also relevant to Goldman and Olsson's own proposed Conditional Probability Solution. Goldman and Olsson claim that it is normally presupposed that reliabilists can explain the extra value of knowledge only by claiming "that the reliable process itself has value, of one kind or another" (2009: 27). However, they say, that claim immediately leads to the Swamping Problem. Since their Conditional Probability Solution doesn't make that claim about the reliable process itself, they think that it doesn't "solve" the Swamping Problem; rather it "sidesteps it" (2009: 27).

However, as my exposition above indicates, this way of understanding the problem is mistaken. The Simple Swamping Problem doesn't have to claim that the reliable process itself has value. The Simple Swamping Problem can be generated with what I labeled *Instrumentalism about the Value of Knowledge*. Further, their Conditional Probability Solution seems to amount to a version of *Instrumentalism about the Value of Knowledge*. So their solution doesn't sidestep the Simple Swamping Problem *simply* by not claiming that the reliable process itself has value. A more direct response is needed, perhaps like the one presented here.

The Simple Swamping Problem was based on the *Simple Swamping Intuition*. I have hoped to show that this problem is illusory. But that does not mean that there are no other problems for *Instrumentalism*. For instance, consider these more robust claims:

> *Essentialist Knowledge Intuition*: Knowledge is of epistemic value and, essentially, has more epistemic value than true belief. (cf. Kvanvig (2010))
> *Distinctive Knowledge Intuition*: Knowledge is of epistemic value and has more epistemic value than any true belief that falls short of knowledge in any way (cf. Pritchard (2010).
> *Kind Knowledge Intuition*: Knowledge is of epistemic value and of a different kind of epistemic value than true belief. (cf. Pritchard (2010))
> *As-such Knowledge Intuition*: Knowledge is of epistemic value and, as such, has more epistemic value than true belief. (cf. Sylvan (2018))

One might mount analogous arguments against *Instrumentalism* on the basis of these intuitions. However, one problem for motivating additional swamping problems on the basis of these other claims is that they are much less widespread than the *Simple Knowledge Intuition*. So even if one could argue that one of these claims, in conjunction with *Value of True Belief* and *Instrumentalism* derives a contradiction, it is much less clear that the culprit is one of those principles and not one of these intuitions. Indeed, proponents of the Simple Swamping Problem might find that, ultimately, some of these intuitions must go.[8] But given the resolution of the Simple Swamping Problem, it is these successor Swamping Problems that are more worthy of attention.

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[8] For instance, Jones (1997) as well as Fricker (2009) reject *Essentialist Knowledge Intuition*; Pritchard (2010) rejects *Kind Knowledge Intuition*.

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