Percival, P.R. (2002) Epistemic consequentialism: Philip Percival. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 76(1), pp. 121-151. (doi: 10.1111/1467-8349.00092)
Full text not currently available from Enlighten.
Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00092
Abstract
I aim to illuminate foundational epistemological issues by reflecting on 'epistemic consequentialism'—the epistemic analogue of ethical consequentialism. Epistemic consequentialism employs a concept of cognitive value playing a role in epistemic norms governing belief-like states that is analogous to the role goodness plays in act-governing moral norms. A distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' versions of epistemic consequentialism is held to be as important as the familiar ethical distinction on which it is based. These versions are illustrated, respectively, by cognitive decision-theory and reliabilism. Cognitive decision-theory is defended, and various conceptual issues concerning it explored. A simple dilemma suggests that epistemic consequentialism has radical consequences.
Item Type: | Articles |
---|---|
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Percival, Prof Philip |
Authors: | Percival, P.R. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume |
ISSN: | 1467-8349 |
Published Online: | 07 January 2003 |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record