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Image and ontology in Merleau-Ponty

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Abstract

Although better known for his phenomenology of perception and the perceived world, Merleau-Ponty’s writings also contain the outlines of a rich and unique account of the imagination and the imaginary. In this paper, I explicate the phenomenology of the image that Merleau-Ponty develops throughout his work. I show how Merleau-Ponty develops this account of the image in critical response to Sartre and in a way that follows from his own descriptions of what painters do when they paint and of what we experience when we look at their paintings. The investigation of the particular mode of being of images leads to a consideration of the body and Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology.

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Notes

  1. Merleau-Ponty (1964c, p. 40; 1996a, p. 99). For a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of ideality and ideal objects, see Besmer (2007).

  2. Sartre (1962, 2004, 2005, 2007). For examples of Merleau-Ponty’s critical discussions of Sartre’s account of the imagination and the imaginary in his lectures, see especially: Merleau-Ponty’s 1947–1948 course at the École normale supérieure (2001, p. 46; 2002b, p. 29); his 1954–1955 courses at the Collège de France (2003, pp. 193–199; 2010, pp. 146–155); his 1958–1959 and 1960–1961 courses at the Collège de France (1996b, p. 106, 124, 173); and his 1961 course at the Sorbonne (2000, pp. 74–77; 1964c, pp. 59–60). See also Colonna (2003, p. 115n16).

  3. For example, in “Reflection and Interrogation,” Merleau-Ponty writes that after vision and feeling (sentir), “The imaginary will be submitted to a parallel analysis” (1964a, p. 49; 1968, p. 29). And in “Interrogation and Dialectic,” Merleau-Ponty writes that: “there is no thing fully observable, no inspection of the thing that would be without gaps and that would be total […] Conversely, the imaginary is not an absolute inobservable: it finds in the body analogues of itself that incarnate it. This distinction, like the others, has to be reconsidered and is not reducible to that between the full and the void” (1964a, p. 107; 1968, p. 77, my emphasis).

  4. See, for example, Merleau-Ponty (1964a, pp. 310, 314; 1968, pp. 262, 266).

  5. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 22; 1993, p. 126, translation modified).

  6. In his recent book, La chair des images: Merleau-Ponty entre peinture et cinéma, Mauro Carbone clearly differentiates between the presentification of absent objects and the way that images make present to us what “had never been present before”—namely, the relief and the depth of the visible (2011, p. 11, translation mine).

  7. In 1951, appealing to a distinction that Melanie Klein makes between ambivalence and ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty states: “When I speak of ambiguity, this does not mean a wavering thought which passes from white to black, affirming first the black and then the white. I want to speak of a thought that discerns different relations between things, the interior movement that makes them participate in their contraries” (2000, p. 340; 2007, p. 217). See also Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between “bad ambiguity” and “good ambiguity” in 1964c, p. 11; 2000, p. 48.

  8. Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 269; 1968, p. 215).

  9. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 23; 1993, p. 126).

  10. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 23; 1993, p. 126).

  11. For an inconclusive discussion of the “physical object hypothesis,” see Wollheim (1980).

  12. For the idea that the artwork consists in an imaginative activity of the artist, see, for example, Collingwood (1958).

  13. The difficulties with and challenges that have been raised to both previously mentioned accounts are outlined in Thomasson (2008).

  14. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 42; 1993, p. 132).

  15. Merleau-Ponty (1996b, p. 174, translation mine).

  16. Rodrigo (2009, p. 154, translation mine).

  17. Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s statement concerning the “musical ideas” described by Proust: “the ideas we are speaking of would not be better known to us if we had no body and no sensibility; it is then that they would be inaccessible to us […] they could not be given to us as ideas except in a carnal experience” (1964a, p. 194; 1968, p. 150).

  18. For an account of Husserl’s dissociation of image consciousness and phantasy, see Bernet (2002). For an account of Husserl’s phenomenology of image consciousness in particular, see de Warrren (2009). For a critique of Sartre’s classification of both ‘mental’ images and pictures as “so many species of the same genus” that is inspired by Husserl’s dissociation of image consciousness and phantasy, see Stawarska (2001).

  19. According to Sartre, “Husserl blazed the trail, and no study of images can afford to ignore the wealth of insights he provided” (Sartre 1962, p. 143; 2007, p. 158). In a passage that Sartre refers to in both The Imagination and The Imaginary, Husserl writes: “Let us suppose we are considering Dürer’s engraving, ‘Knight, Death, and the Devil.’ In the first place, let us distinguish the normal perceiving, the correlate of which is the physical thing, ‘engraved print,’ this print in the portfolio. In the second place, we distinguish the perceptive consciousness in which, within the black, colorless lines, there appear to us the figures of ‘the knight on his horse,’ ‘death,’ and the ‘devil.’ We do not advert to these in aesthetic contemplation as Objects; we rather advert to the realities presented ‘in the picture’—more precisely, to the ‘depictured’ realities, to the flesh and blood knight, etc.” (1976, p. 226; 1998, p. 261). For Husserl’s more detailed posthumously published reflections of the consciousness of images, see Husserl (1980, 2005).

  20. Sartre (1962, p. 46; 2005, p. 20).

  21. Sartre (1962, p. 49; 2005, p. 22).

  22. Sartre (1962, p. 52; 2005, p. 23).

  23. Husserl (1980, p. 20; 2005, p. 22).

  24. Sartre (1962, p. 52; 2005, p. 23).

  25. Sartre (1962, p. 38; 2005, p. 16).

  26. Sartre (1962, p. 54; 2005, p. 24).

  27. Sartre (1962, p. 50; 2005, p. 23).

  28. For an explication of the double sense in which the image object is in conflict for Husserl, see Husserl (1980, p. 51; 2005, p. 55).

  29. Sartre (1962, p. 53; 2005, p. 23).

  30. Sartre (1962, p. 34; 2005, p. 14, translation modified).

  31. Sartre (1962, p. 351; 2005, p. 183).

  32. Sartre (1962, p. 363; 2005, p. 189). Sartre’s characterization of all works of art as images accords with Husserl’s preliminary identification of all artworks as images. In his 1904–1905 lectures on phantasy and image consciousness, Husserl writes: “Image consciousness [….] is the essential foundation for the possibility of aesthetic feeling in fine art. Without an image, there is no fine art.” Husserl (1980, p. 41; 2005, p. 44). I should note, however, that in 1918 Husserl revises this view and specifically rescinds the claim that all fine art is depictive. As he writes: “Earlier, I believed that it belonged to the essence of fine art to present in an image, and I understood this presenting to be depicting [Abbilden]. Looked at more closely, however, this is not correct.” Husserl (1980, p. 515; 2005, p. 616). Husserl goes on to suggest that when watching a theatrical performance, for example, we “live in a world of perceptual phantasy [perzeptive Phantasie]” or “immediate imagination [unmittelbare Imagination]” that is not at all depictive; instead, he suggests, in this case, “we live in neutrality” or “do not carry out any positing with respect to what is intuited.” Husserl (1980, pp. 514–516; 2005, pp. 616–618).

  33. Sartre (1962, p. 366; 2005, p. 190).

  34. Sartre (1962, p. 363; 2005, p. 189). On the double nihilation involved in the consciousness of the image, see also Sartre (1962, p. 352; 2005, p. 183) and Breeur (2005, pp. 145–150, pp. 265–271).

  35. Sartre (1962, p. 363; 2005, p. 189).

  36. Sartre (1962, p. 231; 2005, p. 120).

  37. Sartre, (1962, p. 34; 2005, p. 14). See, for example, Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 22; 1993, p. 68, p. 126; 1996c, p. 23).

  38. Merleau-Ponty (2002a, p. 55; 2004, p. 95, translation modified).

  39. For example, Husserl states in his 1904–1905 lectures on phantasy and image consciousness that in the case of “aesthetic contemplation,” we do not aim “exclusively” at the depicted subject, but instead “an interest […] fastens onto the image object.” If I am absorbed in the “aesthetic effect of the marble” or “the bold brushwork” of the artist, Husserl continues, the experience that I have of the object is “entirely different from what it is, say, in the case of a photograph that we do not look at aesthetically, but as the picture of a friend, of a great man, and the like.” Husserl (1980, p. 52; 2005, p. 55).

  40. Merleau-Ponty (1993, p. 67; 1996c, p. 23).

  41. Waldenfels (2006, p. 293).

  42. Merleau-Ponty (1993, p. 69; 1996c, p. 25).

  43. Merleau-Ponty (1993, p. 65; 1996c, p. 21).

  44. Merleau-Ponty (1993, p. 68; 1996c, p. 23).

  45. Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 14; 1993, p. 70; 1996c, p. 25, 2012, p. lxxvii). Recently, Rudolf Bernet has shown that despite the similarities of the phenomenological attitude and the aesthetic attitude, the phenomenologist and the painter must suspend different sorts of prejudices. Thus, he distinguishes between a phenomenological epoché and a “pictorial epoché.” See Bernet (2012).

  46. Merleau-Ponty (1993, p. 64; 1996c, p. 19).

  47. Merleau-Ponty (1993, p. 65; 1996c, p. 20). Similarly, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty writes: “We see the weight of a block of cast iron that sinks in the sand, the fluidity of the water, and the viscosity of the syrup” (1945, p. 276; 2012, p. 238).

  48. Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 275; 2012, p. 237).

  49. See, for example, Goldstein (1995, pp. 209–215).

  50. Merleau-Ponty describes how this can be tested by employing stimuli that are either too weak or of too short a duration to be noticed. Goldstein even describes how this effect also holds for “light stimulation of the skin in general” accompanied by the exclusion of all optical influences (1995, p. 211).

  51. Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 255; 2012, p. 218).

  52. Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 256; 2012, p. 219).

  53. Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 259; 2012, p. 222).

  54. Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 259; 2012, p. 222).

  55. Merleau-Ponty (1960, p. 108; 1993, p. 104).

  56. Merleau-Ponty (1960, p. 112; 1993, p. 106).

  57. Merleau-Ponty (2003, p. 163; 2010, p. 234, translation modified).

  58. Merleau-Ponty (1996b, p. 106, translation mine).

  59. Sartre describes the relation between the portrait and its subject as “magical” and argues that this relation explains certain practices of “black magic.” Sartre (1962, p. 53; 2005, pp. 23–24).

  60. Giovannangeli (2007, p. 150, translation mine).

  61. To be clear, Sartre does explicitly state that we observe the picture and the portrait (while there is only ever “quasi-observation” of mental images). However, he immediately adds that when observing a portrait of Pierre, “each detail is perceived, but not for itself, not as a spot of color on a canvas: it straight away incorporates itself in the object, which is to say in Pierre.” Sartre (1962, p. 51; 2005, p. 23).

  62. Merleau-Ponty (2002a, p. 53; 2004, p. 93, translation modified).

  63. Merleau-Ponty (1993, p. 65; 1996c, p. 21).

  64. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 22; 1993, p. 126).

  65. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 22; 1993, p. 126).

  66. The title of the working note is “Painting ([Chastel])” and refers to André Chastel, the editor of Art de France, the journal that “Eye and Mind” was written for.

  67. Merleau-Ponty (2007, p. 440).

  68. Cf. Eugen Fink’s discussion of the “Fensterhaftigkeit” of the image. Fink (1966, p. 77).

  69. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 23; 1993, p. 126).

  70. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 16; 1993, p. 124).

  71. Merleau-Ponty writes that vision “is tied to movement, movement that cannot be blind, where it is prefigured.” Merleau-Ponty (1996b, p. 173, translation mine).

  72. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 17; 1993, p. 124).

  73. Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s description of touch: “How does it happen that I give to my hands, in particular, that degree, that rate, and that direction of movement that are capable of making me feel the textures of smooth and rough? Between the exploration and what it will teach me, between my movements and what I touch, there must exist some relationship by principle, some kinship, according to which they are not only, like the pseudopods of the amoeba, vague and ephemeral deformations of the corporeal space, but the initiation to and the opening upon a tactile world” (1964a, p. 173; 1968, p. 133).

  74. Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 173; 1968, p. 133).

  75. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 22; 1993, p. 125).

  76. Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s statement: “To see and to move [are] two faces of the same phenomenon: my body counts in the visible world and the visible world is included in the ‘reach’ of my body.” Merleau-Ponty (1996b, p. 173, translation mine).

  77. Merleau-Ponty says that the crisscrossing of the touching and the tangible (i.e. the fact that the movements of the touching incorporate themselves into the universe they interrogate), is “no different for vision—except, it is said, that here the exploration and the information it gathers do not belong ‘to the same sense.’ But this delimitation of the senses is crude.” Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 174; 1968, p. 133). Or as Barbaras states: “What holds true for touch also holds true for vision, thanks to the unity of one’s own body.” Barbaras (2004, p. 156).

  78. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 22; 1993, p. 126).

  79. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 21; 1993, p. 125).

  80. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 22; 1993, p. 126).

  81. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 22; 1993, p. 126).

  82. Merleau-Ponty (1996b, p. 174, translation mine).

  83. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 23; 1993, p. 126).

  84. Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 295; 1968, p. 247, translation modified).

  85. Merleau-Ponty (1996b, p. 174, translation mine).

  86. Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 107; 1968, p. 77).

  87. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 24; 1993, p. 126, translation modified).

  88. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 24; 1993, p. 126).

  89. Sartre writes that according to this theory the image that appears is less vivid and clear than a perception, but “in all other respects like it in the flesh.” Sartre (1962, p. 38; 2005, p. 16).

  90. Merleau-Ponty writes: “Consider as Sartre did […] the smile of a long-dead monarch which keeps producing and reproducing itself on the surface of a canvas. It is too little to say that it is there as an image or essence; it is there as itself, as that which was always most alive about it, the moment I look at the painting. […] Essence and existence, imaginary and real, visible and invisible, painting scrambles all our categories.” Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 35; 1993, p. 130).

  91. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 24; 1993, p. 126).

  92. Merleau-Ponty (1996b, p. 174, translation mine).

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Perri, T. Image and ontology in Merleau-Ponty. Cont Philos Rev 46, 75–97 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-013-9249-x

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