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Jaroslav Peregrin, Is inferentialism circular?, Analysis, Volume 78, Issue 3, July 2018, Pages 450–454, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx130
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Abstract
Variations on the argument “Inferences are moves from meaningful statements to meaningful statements; hence the meanings cannot be inferential roles” are often used as knock-down argument against inferentialism. In this short paper I indicate that the argument is simply a non sequitur.
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