Skip to main content
Log in

On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA

  • Published:
Sophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Skeptical theism is a family of responses to arguments from evil. One important member of that family is Stephen Wykstra’s CORNEA-based criticism of William Rowe’s arguments from evil. A cornerstone of Wykstra’s approach is his CORNEA principle. However, a number of authors have criticized CORNEA on various grounds, including that it has odd results, it cannot do the work it was meant to, and it problematically conflicts with the so-called common sense epistemology. In this paper, I explicate and defend a CORNEA principle. After sketching a brief argument for it, I show how it can be acquitted of these recent charges.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. An anonymous reviewer has objected that this entire exercise is mute because Johnson (2013) refutes skeptical theism. I cannot discuss Johnson’s article in detail here. But I will say two things. First, Johnson (2013: 429) defines skeptical theism as the view that the existence of seemingly unjustified evils does not reduce the probability of theism at all. This is an incredibly demanding definition of skeptical theism and, for this reason, a particularly uninteresting one. For instance, as the discussion in the ‘Epistemological Background’ section helps illustrate, skeptical theism, so defined, could be false and yet the existence of seemingly unjustified evils is never sufficient evidence to make it reasonable to believe atheism. Such a situation would mean skeptical theism is false; but that would be a pyrrhic victory, since it would not yet be reasonable to believe atheism on the basis of seemingly unjustified evils. Second, as Perrine (2015) points out, Johnson’s attempted refutation of skeptical theism is unsuccessful because Johnson’s paper does not include conditional probabilities that are necessary for using Bayes’ theorem. In response to Perrine, Johnson (2017) does specify various conditional probabilities. But there are other problems. For instance, some of the values—for his case 3 (2017: 369) and 4 (2017: 370)—are given without any strong justification that I can find; the absence of strong justification is especially problematic as those are the probabilistic values that skeptical theists have spent a lot of time ruminating over. A more troublesome problem is that Johnson is arguing by cases, but his assignment of values to prior probabilities for those cases appears incoherent to me. For instance, his first case is one where God ensures both the existence and undetectability of a justifying reason for some specific evil E (cf. Johnson (2017: 268 fn. 3)). In this case, Johnson then goes to assign a value of .125 to the prior probability that there is a God-justifying reason for E that is detectable. However, this strikes me as incoherent. If we are considering a case where God ensures the undetectability of a justifying reason for E, then the probability that there is a God-justifying reason for E that is detectable should be 0! While there might be ways around this problem, I do not have the space to explore them (and Johnson’s own proposal (in 2017: 268 fn. 2) is too nascent to respond to).

  2. Notice that, in Rowe’s original arguments, he focused on one or two specific evils and argued that they provide what I will call levering evidence that there are unjustified evils. However, when it comes to an application of CORNEA or CORNEA-1, it does not matter if the class of seemingly unjustified evils is widened to include many more seemingly unjustified evils. It would just mean that the body of evidence that is supposed to be levering evidence for Rowe’s second premise is much larger than what Rowe himself used.

  3. I will use ‘justified’ and ‘reasonable’ interchangeably. To say someone is prima facie justified in believing p will mean that S’s believing that p is justified unless defeated. Some authors use the term ‘pro tanto justified.’ I will not use that term to denote being reasonable or justified. I will say that something provides prima facie support for a proposition if it would, on its own, be sufficient to underwrite a reasonable or justified belief. Pro tanto support for a proposition is support that provides some support for a proposition but perhaps not enough for justified belief. Using this terminology, all prima facie support is pro tanto support, but not conversely.

  4. I will use Bayes’ theorem instead of conditionalization for four reasons. First, a pragmatic one: many philosophers of religion are more familiar with Bayes’ theorem than conditionalization. Second, conditionalization has the result that when one learns new information that information gets a probability of 1. I would rather avoid that result. Third, conditionalization is a substantive diachronic constraint on rational credences, whereas I am interested in modeling full beliefs. Finally, Bayes’ theorem is a theorem of probability. Conditionalization is not. Nonetheless, no major points turn on using Bayes’ theorem to model reasonable changes instead of conditionalization.

  5. Suppose P(H) has an assignment of 1 and thus P(~H) has an assignment of 0:

    $$ P\left(H|E\right)=1\ast \frac{P\left(E|H\right)}{P\left(E|H\right)\ast 1+P\left(E|\sim H\right)\ast 0} $$

    Simplifying we get:

    $$ P\left(H|E\right)=\frac{P\left(E|H\right)}{P\left(E|H\right)} $$

    This clearly has the result that P(H|E) has a value of 1. Thus, so long as P(H) has a value of 1 so too will P(H|E).

  6. We could also assign precise intervals to an agent’s belief (e.g., Kaplan, 1996) or intervals with ‘fuzzy’ edges (e.g., Kaplan, 2010). These proposals—specifically the second—might paint a more metaphysically realistic model, but would make some of the mathematics more difficult.

  7. If evidence is sufficient to reasonably shift someone from (say) .5 or lower to .99, then it is presumably also sufficient to reasonably shift someone from (say) .6 to .99 as well. From the mere fact that someone acquires evidence that shifts then from above .5 to .99 or higher, it does not follow that the evidence they acquired is not levering evidence. It might be. It is just, in such a situation, the evidence does not do all that it could.

  8. An alternative response is suggested by fn. 6. In such a case as they describe, perhaps the person does have levering evidence, but it is not doing everything it could. I think this response could also succeed, but it is simply unnecessary.

  9. More cautiously, block it when combined with the second part of Wykstra’s criticism.

  10. A further oddity. The dice coming up 3 is probabilistically independent of both the hypothesis—the needle is free of pathogens—and the other element of evidence—a description of the doctor’s visual experience. Additionally, the doctor’s visual experience is just as probable given the hypothesis as the negation of the hypothesis. From these facts, it follows that the probability of the relevant evidence is the same given both the hypothesis and the negation of that hypothesis. (I have omitted the probabilistic reasoning here for reasons of brevity.) But a basic condition for something being levering evidence is that this does not happen. So BHI’s case flunks a basic test for being levering evidence.

  11. I give a more sophisticated criticism of principles like PC1 and PC2 Perrine (2020). The arguments presented here are independent of those.

  12. The objection here is related to, but distinct from, the ‘cognitive penetration’ objection. (For discussion of this objection and related issues, see Markie (2005: 356ff), Siegel (2012), Brogaard (2013), McGrath (2013a), Tucker (2014).) That objection holds that one’s seemings can be caused by being cognitive penetrated by other mental states (e.g., wishful thinking). Since such penetration is an epistemically dubious way of forming beliefs, beliefs formed in accordance with the relevant seeming are not thereby prima facie justified. My objection can be understood as a generalization of such cases. For there are many epistemically dubious ways of forming beliefs that do not rely on cognitive penetration. For additional discussion of some of these issues, see the cluster of papers Siegel (2013a, 2013b), Fumerton (2013), Huemer (2013b), McGrath (2013b).

  13. An anonymous reviewer points out that Humean arguments from evil compare theism and some inconsistent rival to theism with regards to some data about good and evil. But that data might appeal to very specific goods and evils. If it does, then the probability of that data, given the rival to theism, might be below .5 and thus it might ‘pass’ the CORNEA-1 test for levering evidence. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Perrine and Wykstra (2014: 149 fn. 12), Perrine (2019: 117 fn. 5)), if the data is too specific, it will be close to equivalent on both theism and the rival to theism. In such a case, it will likely fail some other test for levering evidence (see fn. 10). An adequate Humean argument will need to describe its data in such a way to avoid being too specific. But, again, CORNEA-1 is only one part of the skeptical theistic response to arguments from evil. I do not regard it as a profound objection that other epistemic principles will be more relevant to other formulations of other arguments. My point here is that just because Humean arguments do not appeal to a ‘noseeum’ inference, it does not automatically follow that CORNEA-1 is irrelevant.

References

  • Achinstein, P. (2001). The book of evidence. Oxford University Press.

  • Almedia, M. J. (2014). Skeptical theism and undercutting defeat. In Skeptical Theism:New Essays. Oxford University Press.

  • Alston, W. (1989). Epistemic justification. Cornell University Press.

  • Alston, W. (2005). Beyond “justification”. Cornell University Press.

  • Benton, M., Hawthorne, J., & Isaacs, Y. (2016). Evil and evidence. In J. Kvanvig (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Vol. 7).

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, M. (2001). Skeptical theism and Rowe's new evidential argument from evil. Nous, 35(2), 278–296.

  • BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Harvard University Press.

  • Brogaard, B. (2013). Phenomenal seemings and sensible dogmatism. In C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification (pp. 270–289). Oxford University Press.

  • Carnap, R. (1962). The philosophical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press.

  • Chisholm, R. (1966). Theory of knowledge. Prentice-Hall.

  • Chisholm, R. (1977). Theory of knowledge (2nd ed.). Prentice-Hall.

  • Dougherty, T. (2008). Epistemological considerations concerning skeptical theism. Faith and Philosophy., 25(2), 172–177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dougherty, T. (2011). Further considerations concerning skeptical theism. Faith and Philosophy., 28(3), 332–340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dougherty, T. (2014). Phenomenal conservatism, skeptical theism, and probabilistic reasoning. In Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

  • Draper, P. (1989). Pain and pleasure: an evidential problem for theists. Noûs, 23(3), 331.

  • Draper, P. (1992). Probabilistic arguments from evil. Religious Studies, 28(3), 303–317.

  • Draper, P. (2009). The problem of evil. In T. Flint & M. Rea (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.

  • Draper, P. (2014). Confirmation theory and the core of CORNEA. In Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

  • Fisher, D. (2020). Doing without: philosophy of logic and language against and for nominalist ontology. PhD Dissertation: Indiana University.

  • Fumerton, R. (2013). Siegel and epistemic impact of “checkered” experience. Philosophical Studies., 162, 733–739.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1988). Strong and weak justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 2(Epistemology), 51–69.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Howard-Snyder, D. (1992). Seeing through CORNEA. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion., 32(1), 25–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. Rowman and Littlefield.

  • Huemer, M. (2007). Compassionate phenomenal conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research., 74(1), 30–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huemer, M. (2013a). Phenomenal conservativism uber alles. In C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oxford University Press.

  • Huemer, M. (2013b). Epistemological asymmetries between beliefs and experience. Philosophical Studies., 162, 741–748.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, M. (1996). Decision theory as philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

  • Kaplan, M. (2010). In defense of modest Bayesianism. Synthese., 176(1), 41–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lackey, J. (2008). Learning from words. Oxford University Press.

  • Lemos, N. (2004). Common sense. Cambridge University Press.

  • Matheson, J. (2011). Epistemological considerations concern skeptical theism: A response to Dougherty. Faith and Philosophy., 28(3), 323–331.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matheson, J. (2014). Phenomenal conservatism and skeptical theism. In Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

  • McBrayer, J. (2009). CORNEA and inductive evidence. Faith and Philosophy., 26(1), 77–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGrath, M. (2013a). Phenomenal conservativism and cognitive penetration: The “bad basis” counterexamples. In Tucker (2013).

  • McGrath, M. (2013b). Siegel and the impact for epistemological internalism. Philosophical Studies., 162, 723–732.

  • Moretti, L. (2015). Phenomenal conservatism. Analysis., 75(2), 296–309.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morriston, W. (2014). Skeptical Demonism: A failed response to a humean challenge. In T. Dougherty & J. McBrayer (Eds.), Skeptical Theism: Oxford University Press, 221–239.

  • Perrine, T. (2015). A note on Johnson’s ‘a refutation of skeptical theism’. Sophia, 54(1), 35–43.

  • Perrine, T. (2019). Skeptical theism and morriston’s humean argument from evil. Sophia, 58(2), 115–135.

  • Perrine, T. (2020). Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism. Synthese, 197(7), 3171–3191.

  • Perrine, T., & Wykstra, S. (2014). Skeptical theism, abductive atheology, and theory versioning. In T. Dougherty & J. McBrayer (Eds.), Skeptical theism: new essays.

  • Perrine, T., & Wykstra, S. (2017). Skeptical Theism. In P. K. Moser & C. Meister (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to the problem of evil (pp. 85–107).

  • Plantinga, A. (1979). The probabilistic argument from evil. Philosophical Studies, 35, 1–53.

  • Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant: The current debate. Oxford University Press.

  • Plantinga, A., & Tooley, M. (2008). Knowledge of God. Wiley Blackwell.

  • Pyror, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Nous., 34(4), 517–549.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rowe, W. (1979). The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly., 16(4), 335–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowe, W. (1984). Evil and the theistic hypothesis: A response to Wykstra. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion., 16(2), 95–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rowe, W. (1986). The empirical argument from evil. In W. Wainwright & R. Audi (Eds.), Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment. Cornell University Press.

  • Rowe, W. (1996). The evidential argument from evil: A second look. In D. Howard-Snyder (Ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana University Press.

  • Russell, B., & Wykstra, S. (1988). The Inductive argument from Evil: A dialogue. Philosophical Topics, 16(2), 133–160.

  • Siegel, S. (2012). Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification. Nous., 46(2), 201–222.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2013a). The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience. Philosophical Studies., 162, 697–722.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2013b). Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Philosophical Studies., 162, 749–757.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swinburne, R. (1973). An introduction to confirmation theory. Methuen & Co..

  • Swinburne, R. (2004). The existence of God (revised ed.). Oxford University Press.

  • Tucker, C. (2010). Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives., 24(1), 529–545.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tucker, C. (2014). If dogmatists have a problem with cognitive penetration, then you do too. Dialectica., 68(1), 35–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tweedt, C. (2015). Defusing the common sense problem of evil. Faith and Philosophy., 32(4), 391–403.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wykstra, S. (1984). The Humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion., 16(2), 73–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wykstra, S. (1996). Rowe’s noseeum argument from evil. In D. Howard-Snyder (Ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana University Press.

  • Wykstra, S., & Perrine, T. (2012). The foundations of skeptical theism. Faith and Philosophy., 29(4), 375–399.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

For help and encouragement while working on these topics, I thank David Crane, Jeffery Klarik, Stephen Wykstra, some participants of the now-defunct blog Prosblogian, and some reviewers.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Timothy Perrine.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Perrine, T. On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA. SOPHIA 61, 533–555 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00846-4

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00846-4

Keywords

Navigation