Commentary
Why believe in demonstrative concepts?

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Introduction

Mandik (2011) claims that his defense of nondemonstrative conceptualism does not require showing that demonstrative concepts do not exist (p. 2). There are difficulties with this claim. Brewer (1999) argues forcefully against the view that all perceptual judgments are purely descriptive (henceforth ‘P-descriptivism’), and introduces demonstrative concepts as the only viable resource for overcoming the alleged problems facing P-descriptivism. Mandik’s nondemonstrative conceptualism is arguably a species of P-descriptivism,1 so a full defense of his view requires a response to Brewer’s argument. Moreover, Mandik’s brief attack on demonstrative conceptualism (pp. 2–3) would be strengthened if it could be shown that demonstrative concepts do not exist. Though it is hardly possible to defend such a strong claim in the space of a short commentary, I would like to indicate the direction that such an argument might take.

Note from the outset that the onus is on the theorist who posits demonstrative concepts. It is widely (perhaps universally) acknowledged that descriptive concepts play a significant role in cognition. Thus, it needs to be shown that descriptive concepts cannot do all the explanatory work that needs to be done. And if there is no explanatory task for which demonstrative concepts are exclusively suited, then there are no grounds for positing them in our theories of perception and thought.

Below, I examine two arguments for the existence of demonstrative concepts—one due to Chuard (2006) and another due to Brewer (1999). I point out some important difficulties in each. While I do not claim to present decisive refutations of these arguments, I do hope to show that much more work must be done to legitimize the positing of demonstrative concepts.

Section snippets

Chuard’s argument from public language

Chuard (2006) infers the existence of demonstrative concepts from the existence of demonstrative terms in public language. He presents the following scenario:

“A stone from outer space suddenly lands on Susie’s desk. She has never seen anything like it before. Its color, insofar as it seems to have one, looks completely different from any color Susie might have experienced in the past; and likewise for its shape. She focuses her perceptual attention on the stone. As a result, she can point at it

Brewer’s argument from massive reduplication

Brewer (1999, chap. 2) argues that purely descriptive perceptual judgments cannot secure “knowledgeable reference” to mind-independent entities. He claims, furthermore, that only demonstrative concepts can serve this purpose. Brewer’s argument is rather involved; here I reproduce only the bare essentials.

Following Strawson (1959), Brewer discusses the possibility of “massive reduplication,” wherein even the richest, most detailed and broadly ramified descriptions of some arrangement in a

Conclusion

I cannot pretend that these brief remarks do full justice to Brewer and Chuard’s extremely rich and careful discussions. Certainly much more needs to be said in clarifying the distinction between demonstrative and purely descriptive speech acts. Likewise, the P-descriptivist’s commitments regarding premises (2) and (3) of Brewer’s argument must be made explicit and defended in detail. Nevertheless, I hope to have sketched the basic lines along which Mandik (2011) might extend his attack on

Acknowledgments

I thank Jacob Berger, Jennifer Corns, and Pete Mandik for helpful conversations on the topics discussed herein, as well as detailed comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Needless to say, whatever errors remain are entirely my own.

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References (6)

  • B. Brewer

    Perception and reason

    (1999)
  • P. Chuard

    Demonstrative concepts without re-identification

    Philosophical Studies

    (2006)
  • J.A. Fodor

    The language of thought

    (1975)
There are more references available in the full text version of this article.

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Commentary on Mandik, P. (2012). Color-consciousness conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 617-631. This article is part of a special issue of this journal on Standing on the Verge: Lessons and Limits from the Empirical study of Consciousness.

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