Abstract
This paper develops a novel defense of the non-sensory phenomenology of desires, and more broadly, of attitudes. I argue that the way to defend this type of phenomenology is to: (i) offer a defense of the view that attitudes are states that realize the causal role of attitude types and (ii) argue that what realizes the causal role of attitudes are, in certain cases, states that possess non-sensory phenomenology. I carry out this approach with respect to desires by developing the view that desires play the causal role of motivating action, and in some cases, the states that play this role are states that possess the non-sensory phenomenology of attraction. I proceed to argue that if this way of defending the non-sensory phenomenology of desires, and more broadly, of attitudes, is unsuccessful, we should be eliminativists about this type of phenomenology.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Nelkin (1989) is one philosopher who thinks attitudes lack phenomenology. He writes, “There are propositional attitudes, and we are sometimes noninferentially conscious about our attitudinal states. But such consciousness does not feel like anything. A propositional attitude and consciousness about that attitude have no phenomenological properties” (430). See Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007; p. 468) for a similar claim.
Non-sensory phenomenology also sometimes goes by the name “cognitive phenomenology.” In this paper, I will use the two phrases to mean the same thing.
It bears mentioning here that one can embrace this explanation of what it means to say an attitude possesses phenomenology, while also embracing the view that the phenomenology of the attitude in question changes its felt quality over time. This is because even if the phenomenal character of a state changes over time, we still need an explanation of what it is for that state to possess phenomenology at a given point in time. And the above gloss of possession provides such an explanation.
I am sympathetic with the view that certain attitudes possess phenomenology that not only suffices for making the attitude in question the attitude type it is, but is also proprietary in nature. I will not, however, defend these stronger claims here.
Note that as I have characterized things, it is possible to be an NSAP conservative and embrace the view that attitudinal phenomenology exists. One can do so if one thinks the phenomenology certain attitudes possess is a type of experiential property encompassed by (a)–(d).
Horgan (2011), for instance, thinks that the arguments he offers in defense of cognitive phenomenology justify the claim that NSAP exists.
Siewert (1998, p. 275) defends a similar type of contrast case argument.
By curiosity, here, I mean the state of being curious.
As opposed to the realizer states being the only states that possess phenomenology.
As I will discuss below, I think (i) can be defended. However, defending this claim will take some work. I will argue that (ii), on the other hand, cannot be reasonably defended. But I won’t defend that claim in this section.
It might be objected that contrast arguments were never intended to get liberals to the conclusion that NSAP exists. But if understanding and states like it are cognitive attitudes, then this objection, I think, misses its mark. Proponents of these arguments such as Strawson (1994) and Siewert (1998) do take these arguments to enable them to arrive at the conclusion that such states possess non-sensory phenomenology. But even if the types of states referenced in these arguments are not attitudes proper, the important thing to note is that contrast arguments do not suffice for getting the NSAP liberal to the conclusion that NSAP exists. At the very least then, certain arguments NSAP liberals have offered in defense of the non-sensory phenomenology non-attitudinal cognitive states are thought to possess, cannot be adopted for more commonplace attitudes.
A conservative could, for instance, argue that our phenomenal lives would mirror Zoe’s phenomenal life if we too lacked sensory phenomenology. The reason, it could be argued, that we don’t realize this is because we aren’t aware of the various ways our sensory phenomenology actually constitutes the phenomenology Kriegel thinks Zoe lacks.
For example, Shield's (2011) parity-arguments. Briefly put, Shields argues that if one holds that mental states such as sensations are phenomenal states, then one should think that certain attitudes possess non-sensory phenomenology. His strategy is to point out that some features that sensory states possess are also features that cognitive states possess, and that positing NSAP is the only way to explain this similarity. I lack the space here to address Shield's parity-arguments in detail. I do, however, want to note that I think such arguments do not get one to the conclusion that NSAP exists for similar reasons to the ones adduced above with respect to contrast arguments and partial-zombie arguments. I also worry that regardless of this problem, Shields arguments will be seen as question-begging by conservatives.
It might be suggested that proponents of contrast arguments and partial-zombie arguments have independently motivated views about the nature of attitudes that are being assumed to be true when they offer such arguments. If these independently motivated views are true, then these arguments really would get liberals to the conclusion that NSAP exists. But note that one who offers this suggestion is conceding the main point of this section—viz. that contrast arguments and partial-zombie arguments alone don’t get one to the conclusion that NSAP exists. One must also rely on controversial positions about the nature of attitudes as well. In the next section of the paper I make these controversial positions about the nature of attitudes NSAP liberals need to rely on explicit.
It bears stressing that I have not argued here that role functionalism and the existence of NSAP are incompatible. I do, however, defend this incompatibility claim later in the paper.
By distinctive phenomenology, Pitt means a phenomenal quality that entails that token thoughts are phenomenologically different. By individuative phenomenology, Pitt means a phenomenal quality that constitutes a thought's representational content. See his (2004, p. 4–5) for a discussion of proprietary, distinctive, and individuative phenomenology.
Bonjour (2003), for example, defends the view that we are directly acquainted with conscious attitudes without positing that these attitudes possess phenomenology.
See, for example, Carruthers (2010) and Cassam (2014).
“Object” here is being used in a neutral way to refer to that which we desire. A number of philosophers of mind think that what we desire is the realization of certain states of affairs; see Smith (1994) for this common view. Recently, however, some have argued that what we desire are, in some cases, concrete particulars; see Montague (2007) for this alternative position. I need not weigh in on this debate here.
Tye writes: "Often when we strongly desire something, we experience a feeling of being 'pulled' or 'tugged.'" The type of experience Tye references here, I think, is akin to what Chang calls attraction. Tye goes on to suggest that this type of experience is reducible to a set of sensory experiences. I will address this typical conservative move below.
I emphasize the word “some” because I do not think that all desires possess phenomenology.
Chang does not provide a defense of (a) and (b). This is perhaps because her primary concern is not with the NSAP liberal/conservative debate, but with the debate over whether desires can provide reasons for action. As will be noted below, Chang holds, pace Scanlon (1998), Raz (1999) and Parfit (2001), that some desires do provide reasons for action.
That being said, realizer functionalists like Armstrong and Lewis have typically not been sympathetic with the view that NSAP exists.
Admittedly, it is not easy to make more specific what types of perceptual experiences, beliefs, and other desires typically cause desires, although some would be sympathetic with the view that, e.g., the types of beliefs that tend to cause desires are beliefs about the goodness of states of affairs obtaining.
Such conditions would include having the appropriate beliefs and lacking stronger conflicting desires.
Indeed, Schroeder (2004), in one of the few recent full-length works on the metaphysics of desire, notes that the view that "desiring is purely a matter of being motivated to attain an end is such a commonplace in many quarters of the philosophy of mind that it is not even defended" (10). Schroeder proceeds to label the motivational approach to desire: "The Standard View of Desire" (11).
This clause is needed because if the agent does not have the appropriate beliefs or has other conflicting stronger desires then the agent will not act in ways to bring about the content of her desire.
This example could also be spelled out in the language of states of affairs to make the same point.
It might be suggested that in all of the cases mentioned above, states with attraction merely cause us to instantiate other states, and one of these latter states is what motivates the agents in question to act. This is, I acknowledge, a possibility. But note that if the state with attraction and the state that does the motivating are merely contingently related, then it would in principle be possible for agents to go their whole lives experiencing attraction and yet not be moved to act at all. Such agents would experience strong draws to say, satiate specific bodily needs, and yet not be motivated to act to do so. These persons, I submit, would be very strange to us. We would be inclined to look for some explanation that accounts for how they could experience such strong draws and never be moved to act. Now, as I acknowledged above, I cannot rule out the possibility that there could be such agents. But we certainly need a principled reason to think that there is this additional state that is caused by states of attraction. Additionally, it would have to be the case that in order to pose a problem for my defense of the view that non-sensory phenomenology exists with respect to desire, absolutely no state with attraction ever motivates. That would be a startling conclusion to arrive at.
On the other hand, one might think that states with attraction and the additional state that (allegedly) motivates, are necessarily connected in the sense that whenever there is a state with such attraction, such a state necessarily causes a state that generates action. In that case, states with attraction and motivational states could not come apart in the way envisioned above, and whenever one experiences attraction, that causes one to be moved to act. But if that is the case, then it seems like a mere terminological preference to not think of states with attraction as in some sense motivational. Furthermore, as with the claim that states with attraction are contingently related to an additional state that motivates, we would need a principled reason concerning this necessity hypothesis for positing an additional state besides attraction that motivates. It will not surprise the reader that I think such reasons are not likely to be offered. Attraction alone seems sufficient to motivate action.
Prinz (2011) claims that, "Cognitive desires may be accompanied by emotions. If I want it to be the case that my candidate wins, I will feel nervous anticipation, and the thought of victory will instill delight, while the thought of defeat will usher in waves of despair. On experiencing any of these fluctuating feelings, I may report that I desire a victory. There is no one feeling of desire, but rather a family of anticipatory emotions" (190) [emphasis added]. I take it that Prinz might claim that some of the emotions that compose this family can explain what I am calling attraction.
I take it as obvious that we can experience the drag of desire without also experiencing dread, anxiety, or apprehension. This also seems possible with respect to delight. Consider an alcoholic who experiences the draw of having a drink but who does not experience anything close to delight at this thought. It is of course possible for a conservative to dig in her heels here and contend that there must be some set of sensory experiences the combination of which feels like what I am calling attraction. But such a move seems like a last resort that only one with die-hard conservative sympathies would find plausible.
In particular, I argue that Alvarez's account of desire leads to an awkward, bifurcated view of desires that is best to abandon. On the view of desires I favor, the sensations that Alvarez appears to think partially constitute desires are in fact mere causes of desires. I should mention here that there is a reading of Alvarez in which she is not arguing that desires are partially constituted by sensations, but rather, that these sensations merely accompany them.
The same objection applies, mutatis mutandis, to attitudes as opposed to sensations. Putnam (1967) was the first to defend a version of the multiple realizability objection. It has since become one of the most widely discussed arguments in philosophy of mind. For a survey of the literature on multiple realizability, see Funkhouser (2007) and Bickle (2013).
Such a dualist, of course, will have to hold that these immaterial states have causal efficacy.
A number of philosophers have posed a similar question to reductive physicalists who embrace domain-specific or local reductions of psychological states. See Kornblith and Pereboom (1991). I will have more to say about domain-specific reductions below.
Although I imagine some NSAP liberals who are property dualists might be sympathetic with this position. It might be wondered, however, how phenomenology could play this unifying role if there are dispositional and unconscious desires that lack phenomenology. One plausible response to this question is to embrace the view that such non-phenomenal desires are desires in virtue of their relation to phenomenally conscious desires. This approach to non-phenomenal attitudes is defended by Kriegel (2015) among others.
This is the case because such a dualist does not hold that desires are second-order properties of having some first-order property that plays the causal role of desire. Kim (1992), qua reductive physicalist, offers a similar response to the question of what unifies the heterogeneous lot of physical realizers of desire. I will have more to say about Kim's defense of reductive physicalism below.
See Polger (2002) for a similar, more developed response to this worry.
I do not, however, think the same can be said about sensations. But I do not need to defend that claim here.
Note that while I pointed out earlier that some philosophers think that we have direct awareness of our attitudes, the philosophers in question would not hold, I think, that we had such direct awareness if attitudes were the type of second-order properties the role functionalist thinks are attitudes.
I thank Andrew Melnyk for raising this objection.
There are certainly many cases in which realized properties fail to inherit the property of their realizers. To take but one example, the property of costing $5 does not inherit the properties of the things that realize that property. The property of costing $5, for instance, does not inherit the bitterness of the pint of beer that realizes that property. So one might reasonably ask why we should think such inheritance takes place in the case of the type of second-order and first-order properties the role functionalist invokes.
It bears mentioning here that if role properties really do inherit the phenomenology of their first-order realizer states, pace what I have just argued, and one also accepts my contention that first-order realizer states possess non-sensory phenomenology, then one should be committed to the view that NSAP exists.
Direct, here, means non-inferential.
I stress the defeasible nature of such a reason. It is certainly possible that there are other reasons that make it the case that, all things considered, I should not act on this particular desire.
Indeed, a number of rationalists including Scanlon (1998), Raz (1999) and Parfit (2001) embrace non-phenomenological views of desire and then proceed to argue that given what desires are, these states cannot provide reasons for action. For example, we find Scanlon (1998) arguing that desires (or at least the most significant type of desires) are inclinations to have one's attention directed to reasons that count in favor of the desired object. He then goes on to argue that having one's attention directed in such a way does not provide normative reasons to act; it is rather the reasons one directs one's attention to that provide such normative support. But as Chang contends, if certain desires are instead attractions to objects, then regardless of whether one has the inclination to think about the reasons for having such objects, it is not difficult to see how being attracted to Φ can provide a reason to acquire Φ. Adopting such an attitude towards an object appears to be a perfectly viable candidate for rationalizing one's action.
References
Alvarez, M. (2011). Kinds of reasons: An essay in philosophy of action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Armstrong, D. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. London: Routledge Press.
Bayne, T., & Montague, M. (2011). Cognitive phenomenology: An introduction. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive phenomenology (pp. 1–34). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bickle, J. (2013). Multiple realizability. In E. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Fall 2013.
Bonjour, L. (2003). Back to foundationalism. In L. Bonjour & E. Sosa (Eds.), Epistemic justification: Internalism versus externalism, foundations versus virtues (pp. 60–76). Malden: Blackwell Press.
Braddon-Mitchel, D., & Jackson, F. (2007). Philosophy of mind and cognition (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell Press.
Cassam, Q. (2014). Self-knowledge for humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2010). Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(1), 76–111.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chang, R. (2008). Can desires provide reasons for action? In P. Pettit, S. Scheffler, M. Smith & R. Jay (Eds.) Reason and value: Themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz (pp. 56–90). Wallace Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dreiser, T. (1994). Sister Carrie. 1900. New York: Penguin Press.
Fumerton, R. (2013). Knowledge, thought, and the case for dualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Funkhouser, E. (2007). Multiple realizability. Philosophy Compass, 2(2), 303–315.
Gertler, B. (2008). In defense of mind body dualism. In J. Feinberg & R. Shafer-Landau (Eds.), Reason and responsibility (13th ed., pp. 285–296). Belmont: Thomson-Wadsworth Press.
Goldman, Alvin. (1993). The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 15–28.
Horgan, T. (1993). Nonreductive materialism and the explanatory autonomy of psychology. In S. Wagner & R. Warner (Eds.), Naturalism: A critical appraisal (pp. 295–320). Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
Horgan, T. (2011). From agentive phenomenology to cognitive phenomenology: A guide for the perplexed. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive phenomenology (pp. 57–78). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings (pp. 520–533). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kim, J. (1992). Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 1–26.
Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or something near enough. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Kornblith, H., & Pereboom, D. (1991). The metaphysics of irreducibility. Philosophical Studies, 63(2), 125–145.
Kriegel, U. (2015). Varieties of consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1980). Mad pain and Martian pain. In N. Block (Ed.), Readings in philosophy of psychology (Vol. I, pp. 216–232). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
McLaughlin, B. (2006). Is role functionalism committed to epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13, 39–66.
Montague, M. (2007). Against propositionalism. Noûs, 41(3), 503–518.
Nelkin, N. (1989). Propositional attitudes and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49(3), 413–430.
Parfit, D. (2001). Rationality and reasons. In D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Petersson, & T. Ronnow-Rasmussen (Eds.), Exploring practical philosophy: From action to values (pp. 17–39). Burlington: Ashgate Press.
Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition or what is it like to think that P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69, 1–36.
Polger, T. (2002). Putnam’s intuition. Philosophical Studies, 109, 143–170.
Prinz, J. (2011). The sensory basis of cognitive phenomenology. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive phenomenology (pp. 174–196). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological predicates. In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind, and religion (pp. 37–48). Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
Raz, J. (1999). Engaging reason: On the theory of value and action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Schroeder, T. (2004). Three faces of desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schueler, G. F. (1995). Desire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shields, C. (2011). On behalf of cognitive qualia. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology (pp. 215–235). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Siewert, C. (1998). The significance of consciousness. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Malden: Blackwell Press.
Strawson, G. (1994). Mental reality. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2015). Qualia. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Fall 2015.
Tye, M., & Wright, B. (2011). Is there a phenomenology of thought? In T. Bayne & M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive phenomenology (pp. 326–344). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks to Baron Reed, Brie Gertler, and Andrew Melnyk for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper, as well as to Sanford Goldberg, Jennifer Lackey, Lauren Ashwell, Ruth Chang, Eli Alshanetsky, Matt Duncan, Derek Green, Nicholas Leonard, Rebecca Mason, and audience members at the 2017 Central APA conference for their insightful comments concerning issues related to this project.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Peterson, J. How to defend the phenomenology of attitudes. Philos Stud 175, 2609–2629 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0974-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0974-6