Abstract
Relations between risk properties of Pareto optimal n-person bargaining solutions are studied. The (weak) worse alternative property, risk sensitivity property, and risk profit opportunity property are considered, in particular relations between these properties, and between these properties and other properties such as independence of irrelevant alternatives and individual monotonicity. A distinction is made between bargaining games where all Pareto optimal outcomes are riskless, and bargaining games where Pareto optimal outcomes may represent the utilities of lotteries between riskless alternatives. In the first mentioned case, more general results can be obtained.
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Peters, H., Tijs, S. Risk aversion in n-person bargaining. Theor Decis 18, 47–72 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134077
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134077