¹ See‘On Continuity’ in Discussions of Wittgenstein (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970)Google Scholar. Rhees is not defending the notion of ‘the philosophical mind’ I am propounding. His sympathies are with the comments I make in the next paragraph.

² For further discussion see Rhees, Rush, Wittgenstein's On Certainty, Phillips, D. Z. (ed.) (Basil Blackwell 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ SeeRhees, Rush, ‘Unanswerable Questions’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XL (1966)Google Scholar, a symposium with Renford Bambrough. A discussion of the response to scepticism in these terms was the basis of my Introducing Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996)Google Scholar, where I try to show how this issue applies to every branch of philosophy.

⁴ In attempting to do so, I shall draw on a discussion of this topic at the 1992 Claremont Conference on the Philosophy of Religion surrounding a paper by Winch, Peter on that occasion called, ‘Asking Too Many Questions’, published in Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief, Tessin, Timothy and von der Ruhr, Mario (eds.) (Basingstoke: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1995)Google Scholar.

⁵ This paragraph repeats, more or less, one found in ’Voices in Discussion’ in Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief.

⁶ I was stimulated to think further about such responses by papers read at a Research Colloquium in October 1997 (now published as Identity and Change in the Christian Tradition, Sarot, Marcel and van den Brink, Gijsbert (eds.) (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999Google Scholar)) and by informal discussions of my introduction to the Plenary Session of the Colloquium, especially a discussion with Peter Helm. The first version of this paper was written in 1997.

⁷ I owe this example to Cavell, Stanley, The Claim of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

⁸ Gaita, Raimond, A Common Humanity (Melbourne, Australia: Text Publishing, 1999), 172Google Scholar.

⁹ ibid., 174.

¹⁰ These arguments are found in Beardsmore, R. W., ‘Hume and the Miraculous’ in Religion and Hume's Legacy, Phillips, D. Z. and Tessin, Timothy (eds.) (Basingstoke: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

¹¹ SeeHolland, R. F., ‘The Miraculous’ in Against Empiricism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980Google Scholar); ‘Lusus Naturae’ in Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars: Essays in Honour of Rush Rhees, Phillips, D. Z. and Winch, Peter (eds.) (London: Macmillan, 1989CrossRefGoogle Scholar); and ‘Naturalism and Preternatural Change’ in Values and Understanding: Essays for Peter Winch, Gaita, Raimond (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1990)Google Scholar. See also Phillips, D. Z., ‘Miracles and Open-Door Epistemology’, Scottish Journal of Religious Studies (1993)Google Scholar.

¹² See Beardsmore, op. cit., 142–3.

¹³ The importance of emphasising this point was brought home to me by a discussion of a version of this paper at a Philosophy Research Colloquium at Swansea in November 1997.

¹⁴ For a detailed discussion of these points see Winch, Peter, ‘Ceasing to Exist’ in Trying to Make Sense (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)Google Scholar. See also Phillips, D. Z., ‘Waiting for the Vanishing Shed’, in Wittgenstein and Religion, Basingstoke: Macmillan 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Rhees, Rush, ‘Miracles’ in Rush Rhees, On Religion and Philosophy, Phillips, D. Z., assisted by von der Ruhr, Mario (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 326Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See Rhees, ibid.

¹⁷ Rhees and Winch emphasize this point.

¹⁸ See‘On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power’ in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Theological Writings, Chadwick, Henry (ed.) (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1956)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See Winch, ‘Asking Too Many Questions’.

²⁰ Gaita, opcit., 177.

²¹ ibid., 182–3.

²² ibid., 181.