Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the significance of the ‘ideologies’ — or ‘middle-level’ normative discourse — described by Kenneth Goodpaster in his paper ‘Business Ethics, Ideology, and the Naturalistic Fallacy’. It is argued that the propositions constitutive of this discourse are not invokable moral principles (i.e. principles which generate solutions to actual moral problems). Rather, they are characterizations of the normative contexts in which moral decisions are made. As such, they place limits on the ways in which the abstract moral principles of traditional moral theory may be applied or interpreted in making real-life moral decisions.
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Michael Philips is Professor at Portland University. He was a Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida 1983–84. During 1979–80 he was Exchange Professor at the University of Hawaii. Important publications from his hand are ‘Bribery’, Ethics 94. (Spring 1984); ‘Racist Acts and Racist Humor’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14. (Spring 1984); ‘A Pleasure Paradox’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (September 1981); ‘Is Kant's Practical Reason Practical?’, Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (September 1981); ‘The Question of Voluntariness in the Plea Bargaining Controversy’, The Law and Society Review 16, No. 2 (1981–82).
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Philips, M. Normative contexts and moral decision. J Bus Ethics 4, 233–237 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00381764
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00381764