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Why cognitive science is not formalized folk psychology

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Abstract

It is often assumed that cognitive science is built upon folk psychology, and that challenges to folk psychology are therefore challenges to cognitive science itself. We argue that, in practice, cognitive science and folk psychology treat entirely non-overlapping domains: cognitive science considers aspects of mental life which do not depend on general knowledge, whereas folk psychology considers aspects of mental life which do depend on general knowledge. We back up our argument on theoretical grounds, and also illustrate the separation between cognitive scientific and folk psychological phenomena in a number of cognitive domains. We consider the methodological and theoretical significance of our arguments for cognitive science research.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Human Communication Research Centre, Department of Psychology, University of Glasgow, 56 Hillhead Street, G12 9YR, Glasgow, Scotland

    Martin Pickering

  2. Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, 7 George Square, EH8 9JZ, Edinburgh, Scotland

    Nick Chater

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Pickering, M., Chater, N. Why cognitive science is not formalized folk psychology. Mind Mach 5, 309–337 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00974748

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