New Essays on the Explanation of ActionConstantine Sandis This collection of previously unpublished essays presents the newest developments in the thought of international scholars working on the explanation of action. The contributions focus on a wide range of interlocking issues relating to agency, deliberation, motivation, mental causation, teleology, interprative explanation and the ontology of actions and their reasons. Challenging numerous current orthodoxies, and offering positive suggestions from a variety of different perspectives, this book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the explanation of action. Contributors: Maria Alvarez - Annette Baier - Stephen Boulter - Jonathan Dancy - Fred Dretske - Stephen Everson - P.M.S. Hacker - Sean D. Kelly - Joshua Knobe - E.J. Lowe -Richard Moran - Charles Pigden - A.W. Price - Joseph Raz - David-Hillel Ruben - Constantine Sandis - G.F. Schueler - Helen Steward - Ralf Stoecker - Martin J. Stone - Rowland Stout - Frederick Stoutland - Julia Tanney - Nick Zangwill. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
What Must Actions Be for Reasons to Explain Them? | 13 |
What Are Reasons for Action? | 22 |
Copyright | |
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agency agent Anscombe answer Aquinas argue argument Aristotle attitudes Barad-dûrs bear is chasing behaviour beliefs and desires Bernard Williams bodily movements Cambridge causal explanation cause character claim con-reason concept context course Dancy Davidson described distinction Donald Davidson evaluation example explanation of action expression of intention false favour Ginet goal human action Hume Humean intentional action interpretation J.L. Austin Jonathan Dancy Joseph Raz kind logical space means mental Metaphysics moral Moral Luck motivating reason move Nagel natural non-cognitivism non-cognitivist non-intentional normative reasons notion object one's ontology particular performed person philosophy of action philosophy of mind possible pro-reason propositional attitudes propositions psychological purpose question rational explanation reason for acting reason for running reason for V-ing reasons for action relation relevant role Sally seems sense side effect someone sort suppose theory things thought tion true underlying facts understand Wittgenstein