Abstract
I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does not support the particularist’s general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Audi, R. 2004, The Good in the Right, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Crisp, R. 2000, ‘Particularizing Particularism’, in: B. Hooker and M. Little, Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23–47.
Dancy, J. 2004, Ethics without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hare, R.M. 1972, ‘Principles’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73, repr. in his Essays in Ethical Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989, 49–65.
Herman, B. 1993, The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge/Mass: Harvard University Press.
Hooker, B. 2000, ‘Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad’, in: B. Hooker and M. Little, Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–22.
Kant, I. 1785, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by JW Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981.
Kant I. 1797, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. By M Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Korsgaard, C. (forthcoming), ‘Acting for a Reason’, in Studies in Practical Reason, edited by V. Bradley Lewis, Catholic University Press.
McNaughton D., & Rawling P. 2000, ‘Unprincipled Ethics’, in: B. Hooker and M. Little, Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 256–275.
Piller, C. 2001, ‘Normative Practical Reasoning’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 75, 195–216.
Raz, J. (1975), Practical Reason and Norms, reprinted, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 1999, ‘Some Varieties of Particularism’, Metaphilosophy 30, 1–12.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Piller, C. Particularism and the structure of reasons. Acta Anal 21, 87–102 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1006-x
Received:
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1006-x