Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Mind & Language
Publication Date
2-1-2011
Volume
26
Issue
1
First Page
115
Last Page
139
Abstract
Experimental philosophers have gathered impressive evidence for the surprising conclusion that philosophers' intuitions are out of step with those of the folk. As a result, many argue that philosophers' intuitions are unreliable. Focusing on the Knobe Effect, a leading finding of experimental philosophy, we defend traditional philosophy against this conclusion. Our key premise relies on experiments we conducted which indicate that judgments of the folk elicited under higher quality cognitive or epistemic conditions are more likely to resemble those of the philosopher. We end by showing how our experimental findings can help us better understand the Knobe Effect.
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01412.x
Print ISSN
02681064
E-ISSN
14680017
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Recommended Citation
Pinillos, N. A., Smith, N., Nair, G. S., Marchetto, P., & Mun, C. (2011). Philosophy's new challenge: Experiments and intentional action. Mind & Language, 26(1), 115-139. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01412.x