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The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox

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Abstract

A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. Borg and Larson and Segal defend a version of the view on which semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a truth-conditional semantic theory—a semantic theory which is true. Let us call this view the “cognitivist account of meaning”. In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that the cognitivist account of meaning faces in light of the liar paradox. I raise an argument to the effect that, in light of linguistic evidence concerning the liar paradox, the cognised semantic theory is inconsistent. This contradicts the cognitivist account. I consider a range of possible responses to the difficulty, raising problems for each. The liar paradox poses a serious difficulty to the cognitivist account of meaning, and it is unclear whether the difficulty can be resolved.

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Notes

  1. I largely put aside the issue of context sensitivity in this paper, taking it up principally in §4.1 to discuss Burge’s indexicalist account of truth.

  2. See e.g. Chomsky (2000), and Pietroski (2003). See also Laurence (1996) for a brand of cognitivism that does not incorporate the neo-Davidsonian account.

  3. Cf. Chomsky’s distinction between competence and performance. See e.g. Chomsky (1965, p. 4).

  4. Different theorists employ different conceptions of modularity here. For Borg, this module is a genuine Fodorian module (characterised in particular by domain specificity and informational encapsulation); see Borg (2004, 74ff), and Fodor (1983). Larson and Segal (1995, pp. 557–558n23), however, prefer a weaker understanding of modularity.

  5. See my comments in §1 about why we should not reject the neo-Davidsonian account in response to the liar paradox.

  6. See also e.g. Segal (1999, p. 56), and Borg (2012, p. 55).

  7. See e.g. Chomsky (2000) and Pietroski (2003) for the first possibility and Carston (2008) for the second.

  8. Although, see my comments in §4.2 about ‘thin-meaning’. For an extended defence of the claim that meaning is truth-conditional, see Borg (2012, pp. 73–111).

  9. See e.g. Ludwig (2002) and Lepore and Ludwig (2005).

  10. See e.g. Gross (2006).

  11. For now, I put aside various attempts—such as, notably, Field (2008), and dialetheism—to save such T-sentences through the adoption of a non-classical logic.

  12. For more details, see Pinder forthcoming: §2. Cf. Gross (2006, pp. 59–68).

  13. Patterson (2009) makes a similar hypothesis. He does not, however, present explicit arguments or evidence for the hypothesis, but rather offers it as a solution to the liar paradox. I shall consider his view as a possible line of response for the cognitivist in §4.2.

  14. In saying the cognised theory is inconsistent I do not insist that the theory yields an explicit contradiction; I allow that an additional true premise (such as: λ = “λ is not true”) might also be required.

  15. See Cappelen and Lepore (2005) and Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) respectively for recent defences of the tests I employ below. I should note that Borg (2012, pp. 31–32) is critical of using such tests for establishing context sensitivity; failing the tests, however, plausibly remains good evidence for the absence of context sensitivity.

  16. See e.g. Larson and Segal (1995, pp. 34–37).

  17. There are other views in the literature according to which the liar paradox arises due to context sensitivity, but that do not treat the truth predicate as an indexical. For reasons of space, I cannot discuss them here. See e.g. Glanzberg (2001, 2004), and Parsons (1974).

  18. Cf. the literature on deflationary theories of truth, e.g. Horwich (2010). (Note that one can accept the above comments without being a deflationist.)

  19. What are the relevant respects? I mean that speakers in w 1 and w 2 would not notice anything unusual in the linguistic behaviour of the speakers in w 2 and w 1 respectively.

  20. I consider lines of response that deny that the truth of the inconsistency hypothesis is a problem for cognitivism in §4.2.

  21. Additional concerns are raised in Pinder forthcoming: §3.

  22. Field’s (2008) paracomplete theory of truth is an important and highly sophisticated example: it involves the adoption of a third truth value, and the semantics for its conditional are given by a transfinitely-iterated revision procedure which need not concern us here.

  23. See e.g. Priest (2006).

  24. See e.g. the papers in Priest et al. (2005).

  25. I shall not discuss Scharp’s (2013a, b) inconsistency theory, which is perhaps the most sophisticated in the literature: it seems that the cognitivist may not adopt Scharp’s view as Scharp is required to explicitly deny that a semantic theory (as he envisages it) might have cognitive reality. See his (2013b, 459f).

  26. Eklund raises a similar worry in his (2007, pp. 571–572).

  27. This question simplifies issues a little; I implicitly assume the explanations in question may appeal to other empirical claims, so long as those claims are construed so as not to imply anything about linguistic meaning.

  28. See e.g. Davidson (1976, 1977).

  29. Kripke’s theory of truth is first introduced in his 1975. See Leitgeb (2005) for a similar, related view and discussion.

  30. Some variants of the Kripkean approach to the liar paradox, such as Maudlin’s (2004), treat ungrounded sentences as possessing a third truth value, rather than as lacking a truth value. This issue need not concern us here.

  31. There are additional difficulties, not discussed here, which I raise in Pinder forthcoming: §4.

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Acknowledgments

For very helpful comments, feedback and discussion on the current and previous versions of this paper, I would like to thank Emma Borg, Øystein Linnebo, Samir Okasha, an anonymous referee and, in particular, Anthony Everett. This paper has evolved out of research funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK).

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, Bristol, BS6 6JL, UK

    Mark Pinder

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Pinder, M. The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox. Philos Stud 172, 1221–1242 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0345-5

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