On anyone's account, however, (16) is not true at all, much less necessarily true. For Frege, it is not true because it has no truth value, because 'the present king of France' is a vacuous referring expression. For Russell, it is not true because it is false; and it is false because it asserts that there is presently a king of France, which is false. (I follow Frege in taking definite descriptions to be referring expressions.) Hence, analyticity is not truth in virtue of meaning. It is, again, a *structural* relation among constituents of sentence meanings, and entails nothing about whether or not the terms expressing them actually refer to something (which is a necessary condition for truth). The possibility that a sentence is not true does not entail that it is not analytic; and the impossibility of its being false does not entail that it is.

Analyticity does not entail necessary truth. (Analytic identity statements – e.g.,, 'this is this' and 'a bearer of "N" is a bearer of "N"– can be *false*.) What it does entail, in the case of sentences like (15)-(18) featuring analytic predication, is what I call "truth-security" (Katz (2004) calls it "security from falsehood"). If a sentence of this kind is analytic, then, necessarily, if it has a truth value at all, it is true: it is "truth-secured." Nor does necessary truth, or truth-security, entail analyticity. A sentence may be necessarily true, or truth-secured, if its terms are not analytically related.

So, if we suppose that the sense of 'Igor' is *a bearer of 'Igor'*, then (15), though analytic, is not *ipso facto* true. And the possibility of its not being true does not entail that 'a bearer of "Igor"' does not give the meaning of 'Igor'. However, since analytic sentences of this kind are truth-secured, it does follow that any referentially successful utterance of 'Igor is a bearer of "Igor"' is, necessarily, true. Still, it does not follow that it is necessarily true.