Abstract
Evolutionary debunking arguments draw on claims about the biological origins of our moral beliefs to undermine moral realism. In this paper, I argue that moral disagreement gives us reason to doubt the evolutionary explanations of moral judgment on which such arguments rely. The extent of cross-cultural and historical moral diversity suggests that evolution can’t explain the content of moral norms. Nor can it explain the capacity to make moral judgment in the way the debunker requires: empirical studies of folk moral judgments show that they lack the kind of objectivity debunkers point to as an evolutionary contribution to our capacity for moral judgment. Thus, the empirical premise of debunking arguments lacks empirical support.
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Notes
Readers looking for detailed overviews and assessments of the empirical premise of debunking arguments should consult Levy & Levy 2020 and Pölzler (2018), ch 6, both of which offer a comprehensive survey of the empirical commitments of debunking arguments. Here, I focus primarily on disagreement and its implications for the empirical premise.
For an overview and discussion, see Sauer 2018.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for this way of putting the point.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me clarify this.
Sextus Empiricus reports, in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, that “the Persians…marry their mothers; and the Egyptians take their sisters in marriage.” (III.203) An anonymous referee points out that stories of inter-familial marriages are also found throughout the Old Testament.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this objection; for a discussion, see Huemer (2016).
It should be noted that Hopster’s goal is not to refute EDAs but to push back against realist arguments that use convergence as a point in favor of their view.
For a more extensive overview of the evidence, see Pölzler 2018, especially chapter 6, which canvasses various things we might mean by saying evolution explains morality, and assesses the evidence. His ultimate conclusion is skeptical, though less skeptical than I am here: he suggests that for some interpretations of the hypothesis, there’s just not enough evidence one way or the other. I’m making the stronger claim that diversity suggests there just can’t be the kind of evolutionary explanation needed to undermine belief.
See Milgram & Sabini, 1983.
An anonymous referee correctly notes that ancient historians such as Herodotus discuss moral diversity at length. In evolutionary terms, this is still relatively recent; granting that awareness of diversity could have been widespread, actually living in morally diverse communities would be significantly rarer than it is today.
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Plakias, A. Disagreement and Doubts About Darwinian Debunking. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10263-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10263-8