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Rethinking Epistemic Appropriation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2021

Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky Open the ORCID record for Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky [Opens in a new window]
Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky*
Affiliation:
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
*
Email: pmpodosky@gmail.com
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Abstract

Emmalon Davis has offered an insightful analysis of an under-theorized form of epistemic oppression called epistemic appropriation. This occurs when an epistemic resource developed within marginalized situatedness gains inter-communal uptake, but the author of the epistemic resource is unacknowledged. In this paper, I argue that Davis's definition of epistemic appropriation is not exhaustive. In particular, she misses out on explaining cases of epistemic appropriation in which an intra-communal epistemic resource is obscured through inter-communal uptake. Being attentive to this form of epistemic appropriation allows us to identify unique forms of epistemic oppression that emerge as a result of socially maintained active ignorance.

Keywords

Appropriationepistemic appropriationactive ignoranceepistemic injustice
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 142 - 162
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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