How to Build a Person: A ProlegomenonBuilding a person has been an elusive goal in artificial intelligence. This failure, John Pollock argues, is because the problems involved are essentially philosophical; what is needed for the construction of a person is a physical system that mimics human rationality. Pollock describes an exciting theory of rationality and its partial implementation in OSCAR, a computer system whose descendants will literally be persons. In developing the philosophical superstructure for this bold undertaking, Pollock defends the conception of man as an intelligent machine and argues that mental states are physical states and persons are physical objects as described in the fable of Oscar, the self conscious machine. Pollock brings a unique blend of philosophy and artificial intelligence to bear on the vexing problem of how to construct a physical system that thinks, is self conscious, has desires, fears, intentions, and a full range of mental states. He brings together an impressive array of technical work in philosophy to drive theory construction in AI. The result is described in his final chapter on "cognitive carpentry." John Pollock is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Arizona. A Bradford Book |
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appeared to redly argument automated reasoning Automated Theorem Proving backward reasoning basis for mentality behavior beliefs body causal circumstances of type cognizer collective defeat concept conclusion correlation deductive reasoning default defeasible reasoning describe epistemology example facie reason formulate functional description functional properties functional role functional theory human identity inductive inference instance interest-driven introspective reasoner introspective sensors inverted spectrum involved isomorphism kind language of thought liar paradox logical lump of clay machine memory mental occurrences narrow content neurological nomically nomically equivalent nondoxastic Oscar Oscarites output pain sensors perceptual sensors physical basis physical objects physical properties physical structure Pollock practical reasoning precisely problem processes propositions psychophysical supervenience purely psychological qualia rational architecture rational functionalism rationality conditions rationally adequate mapping requires seems semantical sensation sense structure of type supervenient objects suppose syntactical theorem prover theoretical reasoning tions token physicalism true truth conditions Type physicalism visual warrant