Skip to content
Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg November 14, 2019

The Crucifix Dispute and Value Pluralism

  • Beata Polanowska-Sygulska
From the journal Analyse & Kritik

Abstract

This article seeks to interpret the striking divergence between the two judgments passed by the European Court of Human Rights in the Lautsi v Italy case in terms of value pluralism. The latter is a hotly debated position in ethics, brought to life in the second half of the twentieth century by Isaiah Berlin. Pluralism elucidates these in interesting ways. First, value pluralism sheds light on three major aspects of the trial before the European Court of Human Rights: the nature of the collision of values, the discrepancy between the two decisions, and the rationale of the final judgment. Secondly, this is my thesis that while the first judgment fits ethical monism, which underlies Dworkin’s ‘one right answer’ theory, the second ruling chimes with pluralism. The pluralist spirit of the Grand Chamber’s final decision turned Europe away from the path of Americanization.

Published Online: 2019-11-14
Published in Print: 2019-11-01

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 19.4.2024 from https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/auk-2019-0019/html
Scroll to top button