

The Interpretation of Classically Quantified Sentences: A Set-Theoretic Approach

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Abstract

We present a set-theoretic model of the mental representation of classically quantified sentences (*All P are Q*, *Some P are Q*, *Some P are not Q*, and *No P are Q*). We take inclusion, exclusion, and their negations to be primitive concepts. We show that although these sentences are known to have a diagrammatic expression (in the form of the Gergonne circles) that constitutes a semantic representation, these concepts can also be expressed syntactically in the form of algebraic formulas. We hypothesized that the quantified sentences have an abstract underlying representation common to the formulas and their associated sets of diagrams (models). We derived 9 predictions (3 semantic, 2 pragmatic, and 4 mixed) regarding people's assessment of how well each of the 5 diagrams expresses the meaning of each of the quantified sentences. We report the results from 3 experiments using Gergonne's (1817) circles or an adaptation of Leibniz (1903/1988) lines as external representations and show them to support the predictions.

Keywords: Psychology; Linguistics; Language understanding; Semantics; Pragmatics; Representation; Human experimentation; Logic; Knowledge representation; Quantifiers; Set diagrams; Conversion

1. Introduction

Quantifiers are an essential component of natural and artificial languages, and consequently, they constitute an important topic in linguistics and in logic. In contrast, the number of psychological investigations of quantifier comprehension, particularly among adults, is more limited. Although important contributions such as Moxey and Sanford's (1993, 2000) studies have investigated quantifiers and especially nonclassical quantifiers (e.g., *few*, *most*, *many*,

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etc.), classical Aristotelian quantifiers (*all*, *some*, and *no*), which are not *strongly* context dependent and whose meanings could be assumed to be easy to investigate, have not received the attention they deserve. Of course, there have been many studies of reasoning with quantifiers, for example, in syllogistic reasoning, but these generally take the meaning of quantifiers for granted and aim to explain the overall process leading to the production or the evaluation of conclusions. Unlike these studies of reasoning, in this work, we aimed to directly investigate the way quantified sentences are understood. The work is inspired by a detailed analysis of the system of circle diagrams that is familiar to most people from their early mathematics classes.

The four Aristotelian quantified sentences—A = *all P are Q*, E = *no P are Q*, I = *some P are Q*, and O = *some P are not Q*—can be mapped onto a set of five circle diagrams defined by all the possible combinations of two circles representing the extension of two sets P and Q. This was first introduced by Gergonne (1817).¹ The mapping is given in Fig. 1. From here forward, we refer to the five diagrams as OVERLAP (where the two circles intersect), SUPERSET (where Q




Fig. 1. The mapping of the four classical quantified sentences onto Gergonne (1817) circles.

is strictly included in P), SUBSET (where P is strictly included in Q), EQUIVALENCE (where the two circles perfectly coincide), and DISJOINT (where there is no intersection or inclusion).

In this article, we show that this diagrammatic system is much more than descriptive or didactic. In fact, we show that—by rendering some properties of the system more salient—it can be exploited at both the conceptual and empirical levels to not only account for prior empirical findings but to make original predictions. Our main claim in this article is that the semantics of classically quantified sentences is based on set relations.²

We organized the rest of the article as follows. We start off by showing (Section 2) how the mapping between natural language and diagrams, which is usually viewed as straightforward and semantic, can be further described syntactically (Section 2.1). That is, we describe an equivalent mapping between natural language and a set of algebraic (logical) formulas. We claim that these two mappings are the two sides of a common abstract and deeper structure based on the set relations that define the quantifiers in generalized quantification theory (viz., inclusion, exclusion, and their respective negations; see Westerståhl, 2001, for an introduction), and we claim that this is what the mental representation of the quantifiers consists in. Consequently, this article transcends the debates between semantic (models) and syntactic (rules) representation.

In practical terms, this approach begins with the semantic hypothesis just mentioned and then carefully integrates (standard) pragmatic analyses of the sentences to fully describe the diagrams. Once such an analysis is in place for each diagram, one is, in turn, in a position to derive nine predictions (Section 2.2) that concern participants' preferences for certain set configurations over others when confronted by an individual sentence. For example, we describe how this analysis can explain why the configuration named OVERLAP (see Fig. 1) is the preferred representation for I (*Some P are Q*).

The second part of the article (Section 3) contains a short review of the literature on quantifier understanding that has used either immediate inferences or truth evaluation of sentences in relation to diagrams. We also consider an alternative approach (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). In the third part, we present two experiments (Sections 4 and 5 and their discussion in Section 6) that test the theory using several variants of a task in which participants have to estimate how well (rather than whether or not) each of the five set configurations expressed by the diagrams represents the meaning of each of the quantified sentences. We follow this by a general discussion (Section 7).

2. Some theoretical elaboration on Gergonne's (1817) mapping

Gergonne's (1817) mapping between the four sentences and the five diagrams obviously does not result in a one-to-one correspondence: As shown in Fig. 1, each diagram maps onto two of the four quantified sentences, and each sentence maps onto anywhere from one to four diagrams. In other words, there is no diagram that exclusively represents a given quantified sentence (although there is one sentence, E, that is represented by a unique diagram). Only in modern times, with the development of set theory and more recently, with the concept of generalized quantification could Gergonne's mapping receive a rigorous definition and justifica-

tion. From this point of view, if one considers relations between subsets P and Q of the universe, then the four classical quantifiers are defined by

All P are Q:	$P \subseteq Q$
No P are Q:	$P \cap Q = \emptyset$
Some P are Q:	$P \cap Q \neq \emptyset$
Some P are not Q:	$\text{not } (P \subseteq Q)$

In the remainder of the paper, we designate these four *abstract concepts* by *inclusion*, *exclusion*, *nonexclusion*, and *noninclusion*, respectively, and we abbreviate them by the corresponding letters in square brackets. These formal foundations, which are part and parcel of current logical and semantic accounts (e.g., Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 2000), allow us to posit Gergonne's (1817) system as a normative model for the meaning of classical quantified sentences. We now elaborate on Gergonne's mapping, which enables us to make the novel predictions that provide a severe test of the psychological plausibility of the set relation hypothesis.

2.1. An algebraic version of Gergonne's (1817) mapping

Consider the mapping of Fig. 1 in which several diagrams correspond to one sentence (at least for I, O, and A sentences). We refer to the set of diagrams that correspond to an individual sentence as a *family*. We now ask the following question: What feature(s) are necessary to differentiate between the *members* of a family? We begin with the simplest case, the A sentence that has two diagrams: In one case (SUBSET) there is a strict inclusion of P in Q, and in the other case (EQUIVALENCE), the inclusion is nonstrict. There is no way to express this difference by using any one of the four sentences (I is true of both diagrams, whereas O and E are false of both diagrams) or any combination of them. That is, as it stands, the system cannot always characterize what distinguishes two distinct members from one another. However, the differentiation can be obtained by introducing the converse of O (*some Q are not P*, noted as O') and the converse of A (*all Q are P*, noted as A'): O' is true of SUBSET but false of EQUIVALENCE, whereas A' is false of SUBSET but true of EQUIVALENCE; this is the only contrasting feature that is necessary to differentiate between SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE. This leads to the notion of a *characteristic formula* for each diagram: This is the conjunctive list of the sentences, direct or converse, that are true of a diagram. In this case, SUBSET can be defined as $A \ \& \ O' \ \& \ I$, whereas EQUIVALENCE has the characteristic formula $A \ \& \ A' \ \& \ I$.³ The sentence I' need not be included in the formula because it is equivalent to I: There is no situation in which I' is true and I false.

Similarly, consider now the O sentence whose family has three members (OVERLAP, SUPERSET, and DISJOINT). The first two are differentiated by the same opposition as in the preceding case, the A'/O' opposition, because *some Q are not P* is true in the OVERLAP case but false in the SUPERSET case in which *all Q are P* is true; this yields the characteristic formulas $\text{OVERLAP} = I \ \& \ O \ \& \ O'$ and $\text{SUPERSET} = I \ \& \ O \ \& \ A'$. The reader can verify that the third member of the O family (DISJOINT) is differentiated from the first member (OVERLAP) by the E/I contrast and from the second member (SUPERSET) by two contrasts, E/I and A'/O', hence the following characteristic formula for DISJOINT: $E \ \& \ O \ \& \ O'$ (given that E' is equivalent to E, it




Fig. 2. The mapping of the classical quantified sentences and of their converses onto Gergonne (1817) circles. A = all P are Q; A' = all Q are P; I = some P are Q; E = no P are Q; O = some P are not Q; O' = some Q are not P. The converses of I and E sentences do not appear, as they are equivalent to I and E, respectively.

need not be included). We have now identified the formulas of all five diagrams; they appear in Fig. 2 in which the A' and O' sentences have been added to the mapping.

Each of the five diagrams has a characteristic formula that consists of a conjunction of three terms out of six possible terms (A, A', O, O', I, E). As it should be, each term is invariant across all the members of its family; for instance, I appears in the formula of all four members of the I family, and so forth.

Notice that although three symbols are sufficient to define each diagram unambiguously, they are not all necessary: Whenever a universal term appears in a formula, its particular counterpart (the so-called subaltern) also appears as is logically demanded within the classical framework of quantification that postulates that the domain of universal sentences is nonempty so that a universal sentence implies its subaltern. This is reflected in the notations of Fig. 2 in

which only the terms that are necessary (and sufficient) to identify a diagram are underlined, and we henceforth refer to them as *primitive* terms. These abridged formulas (those that contain only primitive terms) can be used to express the mapping in syntactic form: Instead of saying that A maps onto either SUBSET or EQUIVALENCE; that O maps onto either OVERLAP or SUPERSET or DISJOINT; that I maps onto either OVERLAP, or SUPERSET, or SUBSET, or EQUIVALENCE; and that E maps onto DISJOINT (semantic mapping), one may equivalently use the following expressions made of the disjunctions of the appropriate formulas (syntactic mapping), respectively:

$$\begin{aligned} A &\Leftrightarrow A \& O' \vee A \& A' \\ O &\Leftrightarrow I \& O \& O' \vee O \& A' \vee E \\ I &\Leftrightarrow I \& O \& O' \vee O \& A' \vee A \& O' \vee A \& A', \text{ and trivially,} \\ E &\Leftrightarrow E \end{aligned}$$

which are logical truths, as can easily be verified.⁴

The foregoing formulas have been derived from the diagrams, which seems to give precedence to the semantic description over the syntactic one; but this was done for expository reasons. In fact, given the set of the four basic sentences—augmented with the two converses—defined in set-theoretic terms as previously, the standard logical relations of Aristotle’s square of opposition still obtain. Now, in this system of six sentences, if one tries to identify all the possible “disjunctive normal forms” that are logical truths, one arrives at the four preceding formulas.⁵ This means that from a purely syntactic viewpoint, a term such as, for example, A, has two and only two possible occurrences: one in $A \& O'$, the other in $A \& A'$, and so forth. So one can arrive at the same formulas *without making use of the diagrams*. Even more remarkably, it can be shown that the set of the longest noncontradictory conjunctive sequences of terms comprises exactly the five characteristic formulas, a result that syntactically is equivalent to asserting that there are only five possible relations among the two circles.⁶ In brief, it can be verified that *the Gergonne (1817) set relations as expanded here with the converses can be expressed in a syntactic, as well as a semantic, form* and that it generates all five characteristic formulas (or equivalently, all five diagrams). In other words, there is perfect correspondence between the semantic component (the diagrams) and the syntactic component (the formulas); we refer to both components taken as a whole as the *Gergonne system*.

It is also important to specify the relative status of the representations and systems that have been considered so far. We have hypothesized that quantification—considered at the conceptual or propositional level—has a deep representation in terms of set relations, which in turn has a “shallow” level of representation in terms of the Gergonne (1817) system in which each abstract quantifier can be realized by one instance (for [E]) or several instances (for [A], [I] and [O]). In addition, within the Gergonne system, each instance has two versions: one syntactic and one semantic. Consequently, we do not adopt the point of view that the Gergonne relations relate two descriptions, one syntactic (the natural language) and the other semantic (the diagrams). For one thing, the relation from natural language to diagrams is, as we have just seen, fairly indirect. More important, the semantic character of diagrams is defined within the Gergonne system by opposition to the syntactic character of the logical formulas. Externally, diagrams are not intrinsically semantic in nature as shown by the fact that they have their own

syntactic description as well (the circles and their labels being primitive terms and the way to combine them being the syntax proper).

One more remark about natural language and the Gergonne (1817) system is in order. The Gergonne diagrams are endowed with a high degree of iconicity, and it is worth wondering where this transparent character comes from. As psychological investigations (which we review later) have shown, most people have no difficulty understanding the rationale of the graphical representation without explanation. That the graphical representation of set theoretic concepts such as inclusion, intersection, and exclusion are easily understood is one thing that can be explained straightforwardly by the analogy between the points on a closed surface and set membership; that quantifiers are as easily interpreted by diagrams is quite another thing, which can be explained, as it so happens, by the hypothesis that posits that quantifiers are set relations of inclusion, intersection, and exclusion. Only then is the iconicity of Gergonne diagrams understandable. In brief, the diagrammatic representation of natural language quantified sentences is so intuitive that it generally is taken for granted and prevents any interrogation about where this naturalness comes from. The set relation hypothesis answers this question, which is an important support for it. This can be investigated further in an experimental way as we show.

Finally, we need to dispel a possible misunderstanding. As we have just seen, the theoretical model can be described by the Gergonne (1817) system that has a semantic and a syntactic component. Our hypothesis is situated at the deep level of the set relations that encompasses both components and need not separate them. That individuals have an internal representation of quantifiers in the form of Gergonne diagrams (or any other sort) is an additional, more specified hypothesis and to that extent, different from the one we test. This is an important point because we make use of the diagrams and ask participants to match them with sentences. Any competence exhibited by participants in such a task need not be taken as evidence that diagrams are an internal representation of sentences (although it is compatible with this hypothesis). Rather, it is designed to support the notion that the theorist's abstract model (classical quantifiers viewed as set relations) coincides with the participants'. That is, should participants show that they are proficient in interpreting the diagrams in the task, this would only be taken as evidence for the adequacy of the abstract model.

2.2. Derivation of the hypotheses

We are now in a position to derive a number of predictions. Before doing so, we point out that any study concerned with the comprehension of quantified sentences must integrate a pragmatic component to accommodate interpretive phenomena that the sentences give rise to. Logicians in the 19th century had already noticed and discussed that the two particular sentences I and O often receive an interpretation that excludes their universal counterparts, A and E, respectively, so that, for example, *some P are Q* seems to reject *all P are Q*, which goes counter to the logical definition of *some* that is compatible with *all* (and against the I-SUBSET and the I-EQUIVALENCE links in Fig. 1). Only after Grice's (1975) foundational work did this phenomenon start to receive a coherent theoretical pragmatic explanation in terms of scalar implicature (Horn, 1972, 1989; Levinson, 1983). In a nutshell, *some* and *all* being two items positioned on a quantitative scale, the use of *some* in an utterance implicates, by exploitation of

Grice's first maxim of quantity, that the speaker is not in a position to use the stronger item *all*: hence, the *some but not all* interpretation. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the negative case with *some ... not* and *no/none*. Subsequently, this pragmatic analysis has been refined, and theorists in the field do not always agree on the detailed mechanism by which the scalar inference is produced⁷ and on the terminology used to designate such an inference: Some theorists use the expression "generalized conversational implicature" (Horn, 1972; Levinson, 2000), whereas others would prefer the term *explicature* (Carston, 2004; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). However, all theorists agree that the *not all* pragmatic inference is an additional component of meaning that goes beyond the linguistic (lexical) meaning of *some*. This minimal proposal is sufficient for our purposes, and we use the noncontroversial expression "scalar inferences" to refer to such pragmatic phenomena.

In making the hypothesis that people comprehend classical quantified sentences in accordance with the normative abstract, set-theoretical model, we commit ourselves to its properties that we just expounded. There is a straightforward series of consequences of the five formulas in Fig. 2. Consider first the A sentence together with its two diagrams and the two formulas associated with them. One may ask the question, "Do the two diagrams have the same logical status?" It is easy to answer in the affirmative, for A is a necessary conjunct in the characteristic formula of SUBSET ($\underline{A} \& \underline{O}' \& I$) and of EQUIVALENCE ($\underline{A} \& \underline{A}' \& I$). That is, A cannot be suppressed or inferred, which means that the two diagrams or their two associated formulas are equivalent realizations of the concept of inclusion. Operationally, we predict that *ceteris paribus, people will accept one member of the A family (SUBSET, EQUIVALENCE) as an instantiation of the universal affirmative quantification as readily as they accept the other member.*

Similarly, take the existential negative quantifier [O]. Two of its characteristic formulas, OVERLAP ($\underline{I} \& \underline{O} \& \underline{O}'$) and SUPERSET ($\underline{O} \& \underline{A}' \& I$), have a necessary O conjunct that leads to the same type of prediction: OVERLAP *should be treated as readily as SUPERSET as an instantiation of the existential negative quantifier.* However, this state of indifference between formulas is not always the case: Take the third diagram for noninclusion [O], namely DISJOINT ($\underline{E} \& \underline{O} \& \underline{O}'$). In its associated characteristic formula, O is not a necessary conjunct. In fact, it is inferable from the E conjunct; it is some kind of a by-product of the DISJOINT formula. Therefore, this diagram should be viewed as less fundamental for, or less characteristic of, the concept of noninclusion than the other two (OVERLAP and SUPERSET). There is, of course, an additional reason that should influence any comparative evaluation of meaning for the O case: The pragmatic component of the interpretation of the O sentence countermands the acceptance of DISJOINT as a felicitous exemplar because the E sentence is also true of it. In brief, both the semantic and the pragmatic component of language act in the same direction to disqualify DISJOINT as a good instantiation of the O sentence.

Consider now the existential affirmative quantifier [I]. There is only one characteristic formula that has a necessary I conjunct: It corresponds to OVERLAP ($\underline{I} \& \underline{O} \& \underline{O}'$), and for this reason, it can be predicted that *people should prefer this instantiation of nonexclusion over the other three in which I is not a necessary conjunct.* However, in turn, a distinction can be made among these latter three due to the pragmatic component: SUBSET ($\underline{A} \& \underline{O}' \& I$) and EQUIVALENCE ($\underline{A} \& \underline{A}' \& I$) have an A conjunct; therefore, their use as instantiations of [I] is countermanded, whereas this is not the case for SUPERSET ($\underline{O} \& \underline{A}' \& I$), which consequently is a better

instantiation of [I] than SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE. In other words, both the semantic and the pragmatic components of language contribute to dismiss SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE as appropriate representations of the I sentence: In contrast, only the semantic component contributes to exclude SUPERSET as the most appropriate representation of I. In brief, this model gives rise to nine predictions we repeat in Section 4. Before presenting experimental work devoted to the test of these predictions, we review a number of relevant studies. As this investigation is focused on adults, we do not review the developmental studies of the comprehension of quantifiers.

3. A review of the literature

3.1. *The main tasks*

A number of tasks have been used to investigate the comprehension of classical quantifiers: One, in the Piagetian tradition (Piaget & Inhelder, 1964), consists of using materials such as chips that have dichotomic attributes (e.g., round or square and red or blue) and asking questions such as “Are all the round chips blue?” or to “make it in such a way that all the round chips are blue,” and so forth (Bucci, 1978). A second kind of task uses factual information. This can be done either by exploiting encyclopedic knowledge, in which case participants are asked questions such as “Do all elephants have trunks?” (Noveck, 2001; Smith, 1980; see also Meyer, 1970) or by referring to a picture showing, for example, four clowns in a wagon and asking “Are all the clowns in the wagon?” (Hanlon, 1987; see also Brooks & Braine, 1996; Drozd, 2001). A third kind of task is the immediate inference paradigm that uses one-premise arguments. A last kind of task makes use of the Gergonne (1817) diagrams. Although the first two tasks could in principle be used to test our semantic predictions, they have their own difficulties because in the first case, there are possible confounding variables such as number of items, saillance of categories, and so forth, and in the second case, world knowledge makes it hard to manipulate the abstract properties of interest.

The third kind of task (immediate inference) allows in principle a test of the semantic predictions, but the relevant data have not been reported (with the exception of Fisher, 1981). We nevertheless mention these studies because they yield unambiguous results regarding scalar inferences linked to particular quantifiers. In Fisher’s (1981) study (Experiment 1), participants received the four sentences (of the type “[quantifier] doctors are Kuls”) and eight conclusions (the four sentences and their converses) and were instructed to indicate, for each conclusion, whether the conclusion was possibly true or necessarily false. By considering the *pattern of responses* to the eight conclusions, Fisher could infer each participant’s interpretation of each sentence (which can thus be described in terms of our characteristic formulas).

Newstead and Griggs (1983) and Stenning and Cox (1995, 2006) have used a similar presentation (but with letters of the alphabet standing for subject and predicate); the conclusion had to be evaluated in terms of *true, false or maybe/can’t tell*. Evans, Handley, Harper and Johnson-Laird (1999) used the same kind of materials and asked participants in two conditions to decide about the necessity or the possibility of the conclusion. Politzer (1990) presented premises consisting of each of the four sentences followed by conclusions consisting of one of the

other three sentences or one of the four converse sentences and asked participants to indicate whether the conclusion necessarily followed by responding *true*, *false* or *cannot know* (together with a degree of certainty). Two kinds of materials were used: thematic (people's profession and their civil status particulars) and nonthematic (marbles supposed to be in two colors and two sizes) with similar results. The same nonthematic material was used in a cross-linguistic study (Politzer, 1991) that did not show significant differences across languages (English and Malay).

Regarding the scalar inferences, the results are clear-cut: The predicted responses are always observed; the results differ only by their frequency, which can be anywhere between 15% and 90% depending on the inference concerned (that is, between A and O, or E and I, or O and I, and in which direction) but depending also on the study, with a few important differences between studies (within language) for the same inference. We do not elaborate on the question of the scalar inferences, which is not the main focus of this study.

All of these studies have also reported two response tendencies. One indicates that participants (invalidly) endorse the converse for A as well as for O sentences about half the time (when one averages across studies). The other, which has been documented by the same studies, indicates that participants refuse (incorrectly) to endorse the converses of I and E sentences about one fourth of the time. Stenning and Cox (1995, 2006) have shown that each trend is particularly marked for one subgroup of participants. We consider these observations later.

3.2. Studies using Gergonne (1817) diagrams

For this last kind of task, we indicate first the procedures and the instructions, and then we summarize the results. In most studies, participants are presented with a sentence and asked to identify the diagrams that represent the sentence; this was done using abstract content, that is, letters standing for subject and predicate, with the following instructions. Select each of the alternatives described by the sentence (Neimark & Chapman, 1975); choose the correct diagrams for the sentence (Griggs & Warner, 1982); choose the diagrams that are correctly (for one group) or incorrectly (for another group) described by the sentence (Newstead, 1989, Experiment 1); and choose the diagram(s) that the sentence is true of (Stenning and Cox, 1995).

Johnson-Laird (1970) and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) have asked participants to sort diagrams into two categories: those that are truthfully versus falsely described by the sentence using meaningful content. Erikson (1978) reported an unpublished study in which participants were asked to *draw* diagrams.

Finally, Begg and Harris (1982) described two experiments, both with abstract content. In the first one, participants were first presented with the four sentences and the five diagrams in a matrix form and asked, for each sentence, to share 100 points among the five diagrams, giving more points to those they felt were better interpretations. In a second experiment, each of the four sentences were presented followed by the five diagrams with the instructions to classify the diagrams as *true*, *false*, or *indeterminate*; the same participants were also presented with each of the five diagrams and asked to decide whether each sentence was *true*, *false*, or *indeterminate*.

We now summarize the findings, considering the pragmatic and the semantic predictions in turn. Pragmatically, all the studies have indicated participants' reluctance to associate a partic-

ular sentence with a diagram representing universality (that is, SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE with I sentences and DISJOINT with O sentences). This occurred even in the studies in which participants were instructed that *some* means *at least one and possibly all*, which attests to the strength of the tendency to draw the scalar inferences among a part of the participants.

Regarding the semantic predictions, we summarize the findings for each sentence in turn whenever the relevant data are available. For A sentences, there is an absence of any clear preference between EQUIVALENCE and SUBSET in Neimark and Chapman's (1975) and Fisher's (1981) data in either direction; given Erikson's (1978) report of a trend that is opposite to Begg and Harris's (1982) observations, the results as a whole are compatible with an absence of preference between EQUIVALENCE and SUBSET, in agreement with our semantic hypothesis. For O sentences, results are inconclusive, as the semantic hypothesis of no preference between OVERLAP and SUPERSET has been supported by Begg and Harris's (1982) first experiment and Neimark and Chapman's (1975) observations but not by Fisher's (1981) and Johnson-Laird's (1970). Finally, for I sentences, the hypothesized preference for OVERLAP over SUPERSET is always observed.

In brief, the semantically based pattern of responses that we predict seems, by and large, supported. Notice that we have sought this pattern based on the existing literature given that to our knowledge, there have not been any proposals of this kind let alone any systematic and integrated explanation for it; that is, none of the studies just reviewed makes any prediction in terms of pattern of preference for the three sentences that are of interest to us or even for any one taken individually. There is, however, one theoretical approach that is relevant post hoc to our predictions and the related observations, namely, Stenning and Oberlander's (1995) "characteristic diagrams" developed in connexion with syllogistic reasoning.

3.3. Stenning and Oberlander's (1995) characteristic diagrams

Stenning and Oberlander (1995; henceforth S&O) claimed that the abstract process of reasoning with quantified sentences consists in the construction of "individual descriptions," which can be implemented, inter alia, in diagrams. Given a quantified sentence with subject P and predicate Q, an *individual type* is defined as an individual characterized by one of the four combinations of properties: P, Q; P, not Q; not P, Q; and not P, not Q. Euler's (1768/1960) four pairs of circles are used to represent the four sentences in a one-to-one mapping and are called *characteristic diagrams*. The regions determined by the intersecting lines represent the individual types, and each diagram is complemented by an x mark that indicates the region that must exist (as opposed to regions that are contingent). Each characteristic diagram has the property that it represents the greater number of types of individual consistent with the sentence (called the *maximal model*). For instance, for the A sentence, EQUIVALENCE defines only one (common) region, but SUBSET defines two regions, and therefore, it is the maximal model. It is assumed that at the underlying abstract level, people represent the maximal model. Some straightforward predictions follow from this assumption, which we derive shortly and compare to our predictions.

The existing studies of the interpretation of classical quantifiers have not addressed the main question we raised previously, which concerns *preferred* interpretations. Begg and Harris's (1982) first experiment is an exception, but only 24 participants were involved, and the meth-

odology was not without problems. Also, given that existing data that has been reported in the literature were not always convergent, it is worth testing our predictions with a different method so that stable effects could emerge. The aim of our experiments was to obtain more reliable and fine-grained data on preferences. We therefore used different kinds of diagrams in the two experiments that comprise Experiment 1 (circles vs. straight lines in Experiments 1a and 1b, respectively), followed up by control studies involving different types of contents (abstract vs. concrete contents) and different directions of association (from one sentence to diagrams and from one diagram to sentences). Finally, unlike in most earlier studies, we wanted to explore how individual differences could affect the data.

4. Experiment 1a

We have argued earlier that determining whether a diagram will be considered an appropriate realization of a concept will depend on the explicit presence of a primitive term in a characteristic formula; and that if a primitive term is explicitly present in two characteristic formulas of a sentence, the associated diagrams will be regarded as equally appropriate realizations of the concept. The hypothesis that the presence of a primitive term should affect the willingness of people to recognize a diagram as the expression of the quantifier under consideration can be tested by presenting the diagrams together with a quantified sentence and asking participants *how well* each diagram expresses the meaning of the sentence. In brief, we aim to reveal that to capture the meaning of the quantifier under consideration, in some predictable cases, one of its realizations is more fundamental than another one; whereas in other predictable cases, its realizations are indifferent. The following nine predictions follow from our theoretical model (see Section 2.2). Preference is symbolized by “>” and indifference by “≈.”

For A, there is one semantic prediction: (1) EQUIVALENCE ≈ SUBSET.

For O, there are three predictions. Prediction (2) is semantic, and predictions (3) and (4) have both a semantic and a pragmatic motivation:

(2) OVERLAP ≈ SUPERSET; (3) OVERLAP > DISJOINT; (4) SUPERSET > DISJOINT.

For I, there are five predictions: (5) is purely semantic; (6) and (7) join semantic and pragmatic reasons; (8) and (9) are purely pragmatic:

(5) OVERLAP > SUPERSET; (6) OVERLAP > EQUIVALENCE; (7) OVERLAP > SUBSET;
(8) SUPERSET > EQUIVALENCE; (9) SUPERSET > SUBSET.⁸

These predictions can be compared to those derived from S&O’s (1995) model that predicts that to be a maximal model, the preferred diagram should have the greater number of regions. For parity of treatment, we add predictions linked to scalar inferences as we have done for our own model. To help comparison, we keep the same numbering as we make predictions for their model.

For the A sentence, the maximal model is SUBSET so that the prediction is

(1) SUBSET > EQUIVALENCE.

For the O sentence, the maximal model is OVERLAP so that the predictions are (2) OVERLAP > SUPERSET and (3) OVERLAP > DISJOINT. (One can add (4) SUPERSET > DISJOINT for purely pragmatic reasons).

For the I sentence, the maximal model is OVERLAP so that the predictions are (5) OVERLAP > SUPERSET; (6) OVERLAP > EQUIVALENCE; (7) OVERLAP > SUBSET.

Then, we have (8) SUPERSET > EQUIVALENCE because the former has more regions (besides pragmatic reasons). Next, SUPERSET and SUBSET have the same number of regions but (9) SUPERSET > SUBSET is expected for pragmatic reasons. Finally (10), SUBSET > EQUIVALENCE because the former has more regions.

In summary, comparing our predictions with S&O's (1995) predictions, (1) for A and (2) for O, differ; predictions (3) to (9) are identical; prediction (10) is specific to S&O.

4.1. Method

4.1.1. Participants

A total of 35 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Lyon II participated in this experiment. All participants were French native speakers.

4.1.2. Materials and design

We presented participants with a booklet containing 20 stimuli (i.e., each quantified statement was presented five times) each provided on a separate page. A stimulus was composed of a quantified sentence, presented on the top of the page, and of the five diagrams displayed vertically below the sentence. We provided a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (*not at all*) to $+3$ (*very much*) on the right of each diagram for participants to express their estimate of how well the diagram expressed the meaning of the sentence. For all statements, the subject and predicate always referred to letters, respectively, A and Z (i.e., *all A are Z*, etc.). We presented each of the four quantified sentences (A, E, I, O) five times in five different blocks. (The French quantifiers corresponding to *all*, *none*, *some*, and *some ... not* were, respectively, *tous*, *aucun*, *certain*s and *certain*s ... *ne ... pas*). We ordered the stimuli in such way that two identical sentences never occurred consecutively and that I and O sentences never occurred consecutively more than once for each participant. We adopted two presentation orders.

4.1.3. Procedure

On the first page of the booklet, participants received the instructions. We provided participants with the four quantified sentences they would have to consider and told them that the meaning of those sentences could be illustrated by combining two circles. Thus, we presented them with the five possible diagrams. We explicitly indicated that a sentence could possibly be compatible with several diagrams.

The task consisted in assessing how well each of the five diagrams expressed the meaning of the sentence. Participants had to answer by circling a position on the 7-point scale. The negative endpoint of the scale (i.e., -3) was labelled "*not at all*" (French *pas du tout*), whereas the positive endpoint (i.e. $+3$) was labelled "*very much*" (French *tout à fait*). We tested participants in groups of about 15 to 20 individuals.

4.2. Results and discussion

Before analyzing the data, we consider what counts as a correct or an incorrect answer and explain how we use the rating scale. We consider an answer “erroneous” for any one given trial when the answer is incompatible with a logical or a pragmatic interpretation of the sentence. For instance, considering DISJOINT as a proper representation of A is an error. However, considering SUBSET as an inappropriate representation of I was not regarded as an error because such a choice is pragmatically justified. We decided to eliminate participants who erred on more than 20% of the trials.⁹ Four participants had a percentage of erroneous answers that ranged between 30% and 45%. Such values are high enough to indicate that the task had not been understood or taken seriously. The remaining 31 participants were below 20% (the mean frequency of errors was 5.9% and the median 4%). There were strong between-participant differences; the top 20% committed no error, and the bottom 20% were responsible for one half of all the errors (with a mean error rate of 11.8%). We say more in the discussion regarding these errors and individual differences.

Although the scale of measurement was numbered from -3 to $+3$, it was actually an ordinal scale to which numeric values have been conventionally attributed. For each sentence–diagram pair, a participant produced five ratings. We used the means of the five ratings as the basic individual data for statistical analysis. Although the scale is ordinal, using means based on numeric values is justified based on the assumption that the within-participants meaning of the values on the scale is stable across stimuli, which warrants the comparability of the ratings between estimations. With this reasonable assumption, we can safely consider that no distortion in the data is introduced by using within-participants means. Table 1 presents the means of the estimates. All the statistical tests refer to Wilcoxon’s T .

For the A sentence, there was an absence of preference between EQUIVALENCE and SUBSET, as the difference in ratings was not significant ($p = 0.35$).

For the O sentence, OVERLAP was given preference over SUPERSET ($p < .05$); OVERLAP and SUPERSET were, in agreement with the common prediction, the two preferred diagrams: OVERLAP $>$ DISJOINT, and SUPERSET $>$ DISJOINT ($p < .0001$ in each case).

For the I sentence, all the preferences were in line with the common predictions (5) to (9). OVERLAP was the preferred representation: OVERLAP $>$ SUPERSET ($p < .001$); OVERLAP $>$ EQUIVALENCE ($p < .0001$); and OVERLAP $>$ SUBSET ($p < .0001$). SUPERSET was the next preferred: SUPERSET $>$ EQUIVALENCE ($p < .01$), and SUPERSET $>$ SUBSET ($p < .001$). Prediction

Table 1
Mean estimates in Experiment 1a (circle diagrams)

	EQUIVALENCE		SUBSET		OVERLAP		SUPERSET		DISJOINT	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
A: All P are Q	2.54	1.18	2.32	1.61	-1.82	1.46	-1.72	1.64	-3.00	0.00
I: Some P are Q	-0.09	2.29	-0.57	2.24	2.54	0.99	1.45	2.11	-2.88	0.61
O: Some P are not Q	-2.21	1.60	-2.04	1.77	2.52	1.12	1.77	1.92	-0.98	2.26
E: No P are Q	-2.62	1.07	-2.42	1.38	-2.39	1.03	-1.89	1.67	2.81	1.03

Note. Boldfaced values coincide with Gergonne’s (1817) mapping.

(10) was not supported, as the difference between the SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE ratings was not significant ($p = .182$).

Finally, participants most clearly estimated DISJOINT as a near perfect and unique representation of E.

Overall, the two models fared fairly well, as most of their predictions were satisfied. However, for purpose of comparison, the findings are not completely determinate because considering the two contradictory semantic predictions (1) and (2), our model was correct for (1) but incorrect for (2), whereas the reverse obtains for S&O's (1995) model. More data are needed. Furthermore, methodologically, it might be objected that using circle diagrams to assess the meaning of expressions of quantity faces a problem of validity: Participants might be responsive to diagrams' specific features that are significant for the visual system but orthogonal to logical and semantic value. Results will be all the more robust, as they will resist variation in essential visual characteristics of the diagrams such as dimensionality: Gergonne (1817) diagrams exploit two-dimensional representation, but what about one-dimensional representation?

To take this objection into account, in a twin experiment, we used another set of five diagrams—five line diagrams adapted from Leibniz's (1903/1980) lines (see Fig. 2A in Appendix A), which are no longer bidimensional like Gergonne (1817) circles but unidimensional. As the two are logically isomorphic to each other, consistent results would speak against visual effects and support the validity of our method. On the contrary, important and chaotic differences would detract from the validity of the method, whereas differences in the results that could be *systematically* correlated with visual features could help identify such visual effects without detracting from the validity of the method. Finally, if one believes that manipulating the drawings' dimensionality is not essential, then the experiment will be useful as a replication study.

5. Experiment 1b

5.1. Design and procedure

The design and the procedure were practically identical to Experiment 1a; that is, participants received the material in booklet form, and they acted as their own controls. The only difference is that we replaced each circle diagram with a line diagram. Participants were 31 students from the same pool as in the first experiment.

5.2. Results

As in the previous experiment, we discarded participants who answered erroneously more than 20% of the time (i.e., 5 participants). Overall, the error rates and the characteristics of their distribution over participants were similar to those observed in Experiment 1a (mean percentage of errors was 6.5%; median was 5.5%). Table 2 presents the means of the estimates.

For the A sentence, contrary to the previous experiment, participants preferred EQUIVALENCE to SUBSET ($p < .01$), which differs from our prediction of indifference and furthermore, is in the opposite direction to S&O's (1995) prediction.

Table 2
Mean estimates in Experiment 1b (line diagrams)

	EQUIVALENCE		SUBSET		OVERLAP		SUPERSET		DISJOINT	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
A: All P are Q	2.93	0.55	2.27	1.62	-1.59	1.52	-1.06	0.96	-2.90	0.45
I: Some P are Q	-0.26	2.05	-0.32	2.36	2.54	0.99	1.58	2.00	-2.76	0.83
O: Some P are not Q	-2.36	1.19	-2.02	1.77	2.31	1.40	2.23	1.59	-0.65	2.24
E: No P are Q	-2.90	0.54	-2.81	0.71	-2.06	1.47	-2.41	1.13	2.96	0.36

Note. Boldfaced values coincide with Gergonne's (1817) mapping.

For the O sentence, this time the estimates for OVERLAP and SUPERSET did not differ ($p = 0.442$) as we predicted, whereas they were contrary to predictions from S&O's (1995) model. Predictions (3) and (4) were again supported, OVERLAP and SUPERSET being preferred to DISJOINT ($p < .0001$ in both cases).

For the I sentence, predictions (5) to (9) were again satisfied: OVERLAP was preferred over the other three representations with the same levels of significance as in Experiment 1a. SUPERSET was the next preferred: SUPERSET > EQUIVALENCE ($p < .01$), and SUPERSET > SUBSET ($p < .001$). Contrary to S&O's (1995) prediction (10), the difference in estimates between EQUIVALENCE and SUBSET was again nonsignificant: EQUIVALENCE \approx SUBSET ($p = .649$). Last, as previously, E was the most rejected diagram.

A cross-experiment comparison revealed that out of the 20 possible comparisons (four sentences \times five diagrams) between the two experiments, only two turned out to yield significant differences: Participants in Experiment 1a regarded EQUIVALENCE as a better representation of A (Mann-Whitney $U = 302.5$, $z = 2.259$, $p < .05$) and SUBSET as a better representation of E (Mann-Whitney $U = 271$, $z = 2.259$, $p < .05$) than did participants in Experiment 1b. As these differences were rare, small (they were of less than half a point on the scale), and did not show any systematicity, we conclude that in all likelihood, the effect of the type of diagram was negligible and that the overall pattern of results was not linked with specific properties of circles or with two-dimension figures, nor did they seem to be linked with specific properties attached to straight lines.

6. Discussion of Experiments 1a and 1b

Our theoretical approach results in nine predictions that were tested twice: once with the circle and once with the line diagrams. Seven of these nine predictions were satisfied twice, and the remaining two were satisfied once. Where we failed to observe indifference, this failure was unsystematic, as it occurred for O between OVERLAP and SUPERSET with the circles only and for A between EQUIVALENCE and SUBSET with the lines only. Furthermore, in these two cases, the magnitude of the observed differences was smaller than 1 unit on the scale (two thirds and three fourths of a unit, respectively); by comparison, in the cases in which we predicted an effect, the magnitude of the observed differences was of the order of 1 to 3 units on

the scale: Such a small effect in size relativizes very much the importance of the two negative findings. By comparison, the predictions made by S&O's (1995) approach were not so successful because its prediction (1) for A was not supported either with the circles or with the lines. The same obtains for the I sentence.

Although the overall results seem to nicely support our predictions, we consider two issues relevant to the generality of the results, namely, individual differences and the validity of the task; these issues might also bear on the comparison between the two theoretical approaches.

6.1. Individual differences

We have presented the results aggregated over all the participants. In principle, this is objectionable, as there might be some subgroups of participants who behave differently. Quite some time ago, Newell (1981) warned against what he called the "fixed method fallacy." In an investigation of the immediate inference task, Stenning (2002) and Stenning and Cox (1995, 2006) have cogently demonstrated the interest of analyzing data in terms of patterns of error. Accordingly, we determine whether such patterns of answers exist in our data and then check that the ratings that we have predicted and observed are not due to effects in opposite directions (e.g., the result of cancelling out two extremes in the case of equal ratings).

6.1.1. Processing errors

We now investigate in some detail why some participants commit more errors than others. The two results showing a slight, unpredicted (by us) but also labile difference may suggest that additional factors to those postulated by both models and whose effect is smaller in size can also be involved in the processing of quantified sentences. There is one factor that might affect the encoding of the diagrams and lead to possible errors, namely, the symmetry status exhibited by the constituents (i.e., the two circles or the two lines) of the diagram. For some diagrams, the two constituents are symmetrical, that is, they can be replaced by each other: This is the case for EQUIVALENCE, OVERLAP, and DISJOINT; the other two diagrams (SUBSET and SUPERSET) are asymmetrical so that their constituents cannot be exchanged without turning the diagram into its counterpart (SUBSET into SUPERSET and vice versa). Now, one important logical property is linked to this graphical property. Whenever the subject and predicate are exchanged, the sentence's truth status is invariant for symmetrical diagrams but not for asymmetrical diagrams. More precisely, for the EQUIVALENCE, OVERLAP, and DISJOINT diagrams, A' and O' sentences keep the truth value of their A and O counterparts just as E' and I' sentences do with respect to E and I. In contrast, for the SUBSET and SUPERSET diagrams, whereas E' and I' still keep the same truth value as their counterparts E and I when converted, A' and O' change truth value when converted. This property enables one to formulate the following hypothesis. As occasional lapses of attention or drop in motivation seem unavoidable among some participants, one likely result of this is confusion in working memory between subject and predicate (recall that the sentences had letters as subject and predicate). This will have no consequence for symmetrical diagrams whatever the sentence that is being processed or for asymmetrical diagrams with E and I sentences. In contrast, for asymmetrical diagrams with A and O sentences, this will result in a systematic error. In brief, according to this analysis, we can expect a systematic increase in errors for the evaluation of A and O sentences applied to SUBSET and

SUPERSET diagrams. Interestingly, a few studies of A sentences using a sentence–picture verification task or a truth judgment task have reported a greater rate of errors for SUPERSET (Just, 1974, Experiment 3; Meyer, 1970) or for both SUPERSET and SUBSET (Just, 1974, Experiment 1; Revlin & Leirer, 1980) than for the other set relations. In fact, this kind of error is pervasive in all the relevant literature; it is sometimes much higher than for the other relations and can reach 25%. In our experiments, the confusion of subject and predicate will result in a proportion of evaluations of SUPERSET for O sentences to be negative instead of positive, contributing to a decrease in the value of SUPERSET relative to OVERLAP. Similarly, a proportion of evaluations of SUBSET for A sentences will be negative, which will contribute to a decrease in the value of SUBSET relative to EQUIVALENCE.

As large-scale errors are documented for SUBSET and SUPERSET relations, it becomes essential to reexamine these results in this respect and consider how the data in Tables 1 and 2 might be affected. Two sentence–diagram pairs are of special interest with regard to the semantic predictions, namely, *all P are Q* for SUBSET and *some P are not Q* for SUPERSET. Because they are logically true, they should be evaluated positively; therefore, processing errors will turn their ratings into negative values. This remark provides the rationale that we followed to identify and eliminate these errors. The precise criterion that we used is detailed in Appendix B.

Table 3 presents the mean estimates for A and O sentences after correction. For the four comparisons, the estimates were very close, and even the OVERLAP versus SUPERSET difference for the O sentence with the circles was nonsignificant (Wilcoxon test, $p > .05$). We conclude that the failure to confirm two of the semantic predictions with one of the two types of diagrams (the indifference between SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE for A with the line diagrams and the indifference between OVERLAP and SUPERSET for O with the circles) was, in all likelihood, due to errors that were attributable to a subgroup of participants. These participants did not have erratic behavior overall (unlike those whose answers were discarded right away because they could give nonlogical answers to any of the 20 sentence–diagram pairs). Rather, their ratings were inconsistent within the series of five ratings (in accordance with the criterion defined in Appendix B), specifically for the SUBSET and SUPERSET diagrams. It is important to understand that this inconsistency does not refer to fluctuations in the strength of positive ratings but in sheer changes in the polarity of the rating from positive to negative. These participants committed these processing errors much more often than other participants did. In sum, when only

Table 3
Mean estimates after correction for processing errors for Experiments 1a (circles) and 1b (lines)

	EQUIVALENCE	SUBSET
A: All P are Q		
Circles	2.55	2.61
Lines	2.97	2.76
	OVERLAP	SUPERSET
O: Some P are not Q		
Circles	2.56	2.27
Lines	2.41	2.57

those participants who were consistent on their ratings were considered, the two exceptions to the predictions vanished. Actually, the fact that these two unexpected absences of difference were not consistent across experiments already points to a nonessential factor that had a limited impact.

A last result concerns the I sentence. The difference in mean ratings between SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE was in the direction opposite to the one expected based on prediction (10) for the circles (-0.68 vs. $+0.28$) and for the lines (-1.05 vs. -0.88).

The error analysis has one important consequence for the comparison between the two theories because the two contentious comparisons now follow our predictions, which confirms our approach but disconfirms S&O's (1995). However, before drawing a firm conclusion, there is one additional precaution to take.

6.1.2. *Uniformity of the estimates: Semantic predictions*

Our concern is to check that when we predicted equal ratings for two diagrams, every participant rated them roughly equally; a situation in which one subgroup would rate one diagram higher and another subgroup would rate the other diagram higher (resulting, by compensation, in no overall difference after collapsing the subgroups together) would actually challenge the hypothesis of indifference. We established the within-participants distributions of the differences in evaluation (averaged over the five ratings) for the A sentence (SUBSET minus EQUIVALENCE) and for the O sentence (OVERLAP minus SUPERSET), excluding the cases of erroneous answers we discussed earlier. The distributions, for circle as well as for line diagrams, not only failed to reveal any bimodal pattern of compensation; but on the contrary, they were strictly unimodal, symmetric, with a mode on zero for both sentences. The frequency distributions of negative, null, and positive values in percent were .13, .72, and .15 for A and .36, .39, and .25 for O, respectively. Interestingly, the variability of the distributions was extremely small: The percentages of the distributions lying between -0.5 and $+0.5$ were 82% and 69%, respectively (for differences theoretically ranging between -6 and $+6$).¹⁰ This shows that the group results supporting indifference between diagrams reflected individual estimates of indifference.

Next, we similarly checked that the prediction (common to both theories) of higher ratings for OVERLAP over SUPERSET for the I sentence could not originate from two subgroups producing opposite but unequal ratings. The result was again unambiguous: The within-participants distributions of the differences in ratings showed the same trend for the circles and for the lines; pooling the data together, there were 3 differences in the nonpredicted direction against 24 in the predicted direction, the remaining observations being either ties or cases of processing errors.

We conclude that for the three semantic predictions, almost every participant provided estimates that were individually in agreement with our predicted preference (for I) or lack of preference (for A and O); this means that S&O's (1995) two predictions of preference relative to A and O were not confirmed.

6.1.3. *Nonuniformity of the estimates: Pragmatic predictions*

Regarding the scalar inferences linked to particular sentences (I for SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE, O for DISJOINT), the data were analyzed as follows. When the rejection of a diagram was predicted on the basis of a scalar inference, a mean rating of -1 or lower was considered to

indicate this pragmatic response, a mean rating of +1 or higher indicated the absence of scalar inference, whereas a rating in the midscale (between -1 and +1) indicated indeterminacy. We compared the frequencies of ratings defined by this partition (scalar inference present, absent, indeterminate) for each of the three sentence–diagram pairings. Across participants, for each pairing, the scalar inference was drawn about two thirds of the time. With respect to individual differences, we considered that a participant was consistent in drawing the scalar inference whenever he or she did so on at least two of the three pairings and on the third one, he or she either also made a scalar inference, or it was undetermined. These participants constituted one half of the sample. A similar criterion, *mutatis mutandis*, was taken to define those who did not make a scalar inference: They constituted 21% of the sample. The remaining 30% were undecided: They gave either two undetermined ratings or three different ratings. Although these results taken globally were in agreement with the literature reviewed, the individual distribution has seldom been found in the same literature.

6.2. The validity of the diagram task

6.2.1. To what extent is the inference task relevant?

We mentioned earlier that participants tend to convert A and O sentences and to omit conversion of E and I sentences with the immediate inference task. However, this trend did not appear in our task. This raises the following question: Does the absence of these trends indicate a failure on the part of the diagram task to reveal a semantic phenomenon? If so, this could lend doubt to the validity of the diagram task. We argue that on the contrary, it is the immediate inference task whose validity is questionable for studying the interpretation of quantifiers. In other words, both conversion tendencies could be regarded as evidence of nonlogical interpretations and against both our hypothesis and S&O's (1995). We believe, however, that the two kinds of nonlogical conclusions have a pragmatic origin linked to the immediate inference task; that is, they do not stem from the semantics of quantifiers proper.

We consider an immediate inference task that requires an evaluation stemming from *all P are Q*. A correct answer requires that participants be aware that *all Q are P* may be true or false. This essentially is a test of metacognitive abilities. Across their life span, people encounter numerous instances of A sentences that may be of the following two types:

1. In one, the sentence *all P are Q* can be envisaged in a context in which there are instances of Q that are not P so that A is compatible with O' (*some Q are not P*) but not with A' (*all Q are P*). For example, consider the sentence *all dogs are animals*. Considering the existence of animals that are not dogs leads to suppressing the first disjunct in the formula for [A]: $A \& A' \vee A \& O'$.

2. In the other type of interpretation, *all P are Q* can be envisaged in a context where there are no instances of Q that are not P so that A is compatible with A' (but not with O'). This latter case tends to be relatively frequent because of the common cases in which the predicate can be applied only to the subject set for presuppositional or definitional reasons. In such contexts, the converse A' is consistent with the direct A sentence; for example, *all the children were below 5 years of age* is typical of this kind of use that seems pervasive in daily communication of regu-

lations or descriptions. This leads to suppressing the second disjunct in the formula for [A]: $A \& A' \vee A \& O'$.

With high metacognitive abilities, participants are aware of these two contradictory possibilities (either through implicit learning or through formal learning); this means that they need not process the premise and conclusion at any depth, as they possess a metarule of the type « *all P are Q* does not mean the same as *all Q are P* ». With lower metacognitive abilities, people have to process the premise (*all P are Q*) and the conclusion (*all Q are P*), ideally as $A \& A' \vee A \& O'$ and $A' \& A \vee A' \& O$, respectively. If, for the reasons just mentioned, only the first disjunct remains in each case, they will provide an answer that indicates that the inference follows.

The preceding applies to O sentences as well. A similar analysis can be performed, *mutatis mutandis*, where [O] can be construed in such a way that one of the disjuncts in the formula will be missing. In the interest of space limitations, we do not present this analysis here.

Whereas we have characterized the origin of the conversion of A and O sentences as pragmatic (by referring in general to encyclopedic knowledge) and as being compounded by processing load, we regard the reluctance to convert I and E sentences as pragmatic in its more narrow sense, that is, in relation to language and more specifically to grammar. Unlike the case of A and O sentences, world knowledge does not separate contexts in which the converse is true and others in which it is false: For I and E, the conversion is always valid. This should facilitate the metacognitive awareness of the validity: Indeed, participants correctly accepted the conversion three fourths of the time. Again, we must consider the case of those who were not aware of this conversion's validity and consider how they interpreted and carried out the task.

A psycholinguistic point of view suggests an answer based on the role of the grammatical subject and predicate in relation with the concepts of topic and focus (for a review, see Gundel & Fretheim, 2004). The exchange between subject and predicate is likely to suggest a change in topic (as opposed to focus): Asserting *some Q are P* instead of *some P are Q* may definitely alter the point of an argument so that participants (even among those who are aware of their logical equivalence) may be reluctant to accept the inference of I to I' and E to E'. Participants who represent the task as an inquiry about common sense reasoning (rather than about formal logic) are likely to be sensitive to such pragmatic determinants of sentence comprehension (Politzer, 1997, 2004a; Politzer & Macchi, 2000). In summary, the inference task requires more processing than just a semantic appreciation of the quantified sentences; the task often allows for a range of interpretations. This undermines the validity of the immediate inference task as a way of determining the fundamental meaning of quantified sentences.

To what extent does one find conversions in the diagram task? This question is important because one might want to know whether or not conversion can be identified as a semantic phenomenon. If so, then one would want to know if there was evidence of conversion in our experiments.

Conversion of the A sentence can be understood as either (a) conversion by addition in which any one of the two sets P and Q is included in the other, in which case SUPERSET is added to SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE; or as (b) conversion by elimination in which there is no strict inclusion, in which case SUBSET is eliminated, and only EQUIVALENCE remains. The diagram

task can easily identify such configurations by inspecting the choice of these two sets of diagrams for the A sentence.

Although using a very conservative criterion as an indication for conversion by addition (an average rating $\geq +1$ on each of the three diagrams), we found only 1 case out of 57 that supported this pattern. Taking a similar criterion for conversion by elimination (an average rating $\geq +1$ on EQUIVALENCE together with an average rating ≤ 0 on both SUPERSET and SUBSET, we found again only 1 case out of 57. For the O sentence, for which conversion can also be understood in the same two ways, we found ratings indicating that three participants converted by addition and two by elimination, with similar conservative criteria. Overall, we found 7 cases of conversion (2 for A and 5 for O) out of 228 (57×4) judgements, that is, 3%.

Not surprisingly, one finds few cases of invalid conversion of semantic origin with the diagram task. In contrast, the immediate inference task is beset by invalid conversion stemming from pragmatic enrichments; this task reveals itself a weak test for determining the semantics of quantifiers.

6.2.2. Scope of the hypothesis: The concrete case

One might wonder whether the findings generalize beyond abstract sentences. To answer this question, the circle task was administered with concrete materials, replacing the subject (A) and the predicate (Z) of the sentences with nouns of professions (e.g., doctors) or social status (e.g., bachelors) or physical characteristics (e.g., bearded men); we labeled the diagrams accordingly with nouns instead of letters. A total of 26 students served as participants, with a procedure identical to that of Experiments 1a and 1b in which none had participated. The results were strikingly similar. Five participants again committed more than 20% of errors and we discarded them. The application of the foregoing error analysis led us to identify another three participants who gave erroneous answers specifically located on SUBSET and SUPERSET diagrams for A and O sentences; we also discarded them. The mean ratings are presented in Table 4, which shows that all the predicted orders and absence of preference were observed.

In particular, the purely semantic relations were satisfied (sign test, $p < .05$): There was a preference for OVERLAP over SUPERSET for the I sentence (13 out of 15 observations without a tie showing a higher rating for OVERLAP), and there was no difference in preference between SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE for the A sentence or between OVERLAP and SUPERSET for the O sentence.¹¹ Even though S&O's (1995) prediction (10) is now satisfied, these results again falsify their predictions for (1) and (2).

Table 4
Mean estimates with concrete materials (after correction for processing errors)

	EQUIVALENCE	SUBSET	OVERLAP	SUPERSET	DISJOINT
A: All P are Q	2.56	2.39	-1.99	-1.92	-2.97
I: Some P are Q	-1.81	-1.31	2.81	2.40	-2.88
O: Some P are not Q	-2.48	-2.14	2.58	2.47	-2.04
E: No P are Q	-3.00	-2.99	-2.77	-2.71	2.93

6.2.3. The nature of the task

It might be the case that in asking to estimate the aptness of the diagrams to express the sentence, we compelled participants to carry out an ambiguous task. That is, there could be two construals of the task from the participants' viewpoint: (a) the sentence being true, to what extent does the diagram represent it?, and (b) the diagram representing the actual situation of interest, is the sentence true of it? Our theoretical analysis led us to regard the Gergonne (1817) relations as reversible, that is, whenever there is a link between a sentence and a diagram, this link can be read in both directions: A diagram (or its formula) is one of the possible realizations of the concept associated to the sentence, whereas the sentence is one of the possible expressions that are true of the diagram. Consequently, we do not think that any slant toward one interpretation of the task or the other should affect the validity of the results, as both elicit the participants' judgment of semantic equivalence between sentences and diagrams.¹²

To ascertain that the participants' semantic judgment was not affected by the direction of the presentation (from sentence to diagram), we conducted a control experiment from diagram to sentence with the same materials (using circle and line diagrams) in which, following each diagram on each page of the booklets, we asked the participants (who were 150 students from the same pool that served in the previous experiments) the logically classic question, that is, whether the sentence was true of the diagram, to be answered by *yes* or *no*. The percentage of *true* answers for each sentence–diagram pair for 123 participants (that is, after eliminating those who were incorrect more than 20% of the time, with the same criterion as earlier) were in remarkable agreement with the preceding results. The semantically based predictions were reproduced identically with the same pattern of results, and all the pragmatically based predictions were satisfied. In brief, the diagram-to-sentence question format strikingly reproduced all the trends and differences of interest observed with the sentence-to-diagram question format.

The type of errors that occurred in Experiments 1a and 1b was observed, possibly with even greater frequency (for instance, for SUPERSET, in which A includes Z, up to 15% of the participants judged *all A are Z* to be true). We carried out an analysis based on the same rationale as we described previously: We performed an analysis based on data obtained from the participants who were not subject to committing such processing errors on the two pairings of main interest, namely, A SUBSET or O SUPERSET. These were identified after we eliminated those who committed an error on A SUPERSET or O SUBSET or both (because they are the most likely to have had difficulty with A SUBSET or O SUPERSET). There remained 83 participants. We compared the percentages of *true* answers using sign tests at the level of .05. The prediction of indifference (between SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE) was satisfied for the A sentence with circles and lines; it was also satisfied (between SUPERSET and OVERLAP) for the O sentence with the lines but not with the circles (for which OVERLAP was preferred to SUPERSET, which this time conformed to S&O's [1995] prediction). This is the only result that is at variance with the corrected results obtained in the sentence-to-diagram format of Experiments 1a and 1b. In fact, throughout this study, the result of the comparison between OVERLAP and SUPERSET for O with the circles seemed to oscillate between disconfirmation (uncorrected data of Experiment 1a, corrected data of this diagram-to-sentence experiment) and confirmation (corrected data of Experiment 1a and concrete materials), whereas it has provided perfect confirmation with the lines in all the data sets; this speaks in favor of our hypothesis but raises the question of what is

specific in this unique interaction between O sentence and circle representation, a question that further experimentation will be necessary to answer. Finally, for the I sentence, the frequency of *true* evaluations of SUBSET was almost equal to that of EQUIVALENCE with the circles (37% and 38%, respectively), but it was significantly higher with the lines (54% against 30%, $p < .01$, MacNemar test for change).

In summary, both question formats generally trigger and capture the same cognitive activity, namely, judging the fit between a set-theoretic concept and several of its instances: Our investigations yielded the same results when participants were required to determine the extent to which a diagram exemplifies a given concept well or to judge whether a concept correctly applies to a given diagram. However, the sentence-to-diagram format has the added advantage of providing a graded answer that enables one to perform a fine-grained analysis leading to the observation of the individual errors of treatment. This in turn allows the identification of the source of the few apparent discrepancies between predictions and observations.

7. General discussion

In this work, we proposed that in agreement with the theory of generalized quantifiers, people mentally represent the four classically quantified sentences in set-theoretic terms; that is, each sentential symbol occurs in a number of characteristic formulas (or equivalently, is true of a number of diagrams), which yields, as is well known, one representation for E, two for A, three for O, and four for I. However, due to the implication relations from A to I and from E to O, these numbers reduce to one (for I) or two (for O) preferred representations followed by less preferred representations defined on the basis of pragmatic principles. The model proposed has received strong support from the results of these experiments. We have compared our model with the S&O (1995) model and clearly found that ours makes better predictions. The predictions have been tested on five occasions, that is, with two types of diagrams in two experiments (sentence to diagram, diagram to sentence) and with the circles in one experiment (concrete sentences). After correction for errors, the preference orders and the frequencies of choice support our semantic predictions every time for the A sentence and (with one exception) for the O sentence. On the contrary, S&O's model consistently failed to get support for A, and it was supported only once for O. This model, admittedly, is more simple; also, it is more falsifiable because it makes one additional prediction for I. However, this prediction was supported only twice out of the five tests.

The view that a quantifier has a basic, necessary, and sufficient semantic component that can then be augmented by pragmatic information is already widely accepted: We do not claim that the pragmatic results that we report are new, whether theoretically or empirically, nor that the three semantic effects have never been observed before. On the contrary, the review of the literature that we have presented foreshadows these observations. Rather, our claim is that *no theory has been proposed so far that can predict or explain, as we have done, the semantic results and that no theoretical approach has attempted an integration of the semantics and the pragmatics of the comprehension of quantified sentences of the kind we offer*. Take, for example, the preference for OVERLAP over SUPERSET to represent I sentences. Although consistently present in the data, no one has tried to explain it as we do here. Another more important result

concerns the indifference between SUBSET and EQUIVALENCE for A sentences, which has often been observed but never explained. It is important because it sheds new light on the thorny question of the conversion of A sentences.

In effect, the conversion of A propositions has been frequently described (see Begg & Denny, 1969; Revlin & Leirer, 1980; and studies of immediate inference). We believe that the view that [A] is represented by SUBSET while it may be represented by EQUIVALENCE as a limiting case is normatively incorrect and descriptively wrong. It is not necessarily illicit to assume that the A sentence is symmetric: The inference A' may be pragmatically invited. However, our approach suggests that it would be mistaken to assume that in contrast to the EQUIVALENCE interpretation, the correct interpretation of the A sentence is SUBSET. This is no more and no less licit than the EQUIVALENCE interpretation: The SUBSET interpretation also results from an additional assumption, an O' assumption this time, which may have various origins such as a scalar inference, a presupposition, or a definition. It should be clear that the correct literal meaning of the A sentence encompasses both EQUIVALENCE and SUBSET so that the A sentence can be described as indeterminate between the two disjuncts of the formula $A \& A' \vee A \& O'$. One of the components A' or O' may be suppressed by contextual assumptions. In the first case, there is strict inclusion, and in the second case, apparent conversion. That is, there is no representational process that leads an individual to a converse, but there is a pragmatic mechanism that may lead to this result if the context dictates that A' is the case (or O' not the case). Finally, there are true errors due to lapse of attention or excess load in working memory that may lead the individual to exchange the subject and the predicate and result in a converse indeterminate representation $A \& A' \vee A' \& O$.

In addition to the phenomena on which we have been focused in this study (summarized in the nine predictions), there are other semantic effects that are worth considering post hoc. For the universal sentences, when a diagram is evaluated negatively, there is a very clean-cut trend in the values of the ratings that applies to all the data that have been reported. For the E sentence, EQUIVALENCE and SUBSET were rated more negatively than OVERLAP and SUPERSET. Similarly for the A sentence, DISJOINT was rated more negatively (and very much more so) than were OVERLAP and SUPERSET. This defines 6 inequalities (4 for E and 2 for A). They are always satisfied for Experiments 1a, 1b, and their concrete replication (18 inequalities). A similar trend obtains for the diagram-to-sentence experiment in which the percentages of *false* judgments were also higher for these diagrams (10 out of 12 inequalities are satisfied). This extremely robust phenomenon requires an explanation, which we propose along the following lines. Consider the E sentence first: EQUIVALENCE and SUBSET are not models of E (*no*), and they are models of A (*all*); however, OVERLAP and SUPERSET, which are not models of E, are models of O (*some not*). That the first two are viewed as worst representations of *no* than are the last two suggests that OVERLAP and SUPERSET act as situations that exhibit individuals (*some P that are not Q*) that are still compatible with the target sentence E, unlike the exceptionless situations of EQUIVALENCE and SUBSET in which no such individuals exist (*all P are Q*). The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the diagrams evaluated as not representative of the A sentence: DISJOINT offers no individuals P as candidates to be Q, as none of them are; whereas OVERLAP and SUPERSET, which are models of I, offer such cases (*some P are Q*). In brief, this phenomenon illustrates again that psychological truth operates by degree: Psychologically, some models are "more true" than others. People are sensitive to the existence (and

possibly the number) of cases in the nonmodels of the sentence that are compatible with it. The worst models of the sentence (or the best of the negated sentence) are those for which there are no such cases; models that have such cases are regarded as less remote representations of the sentence.

This hypothesis can explain in turn data pertaining to immediate inferences: In every study, the falsity of the inference from A to E or from E to A has been recognized more accurately (and with greater certainty when data are available) than are the inferences between A and O and between E and I in both directions. In other words, people are better at evaluating contrary propositions than they are at evaluating contradictory propositions, and we suggest that this reflects the property of representational distance between models that we have uncovered, the models of A and E being farther apart from each other than they are from some of the models of I or O. In sum, this semantic approach has allowed us not only to predict three relations between models in terms of goodness of representation; it allows the description of more relations in terms of “badness” of representation.

To conclude, we summarize the novelty of our model and findings in contrast with established knowledge. Although Gergonne’s (1817) mapping between sentences and diagrams has already been used to study the meaning of classically quantified sentences, this has been done on intuitive bases and has not been justified; we offer this justification by appealing to generalized quantifier theory that defines the four quantified sentences in terms of relations between two sets. The standard mapping exhibits the well-known ambiguity of the sentences but does not reveal its origin: We characterize this origin in terms of two converse sentences and offer a comprehensive mapping that accommodates these sentences, allowing the explicit representation of the source of the ambiguity. Although the foregoing representation is diagrammatic, we provide an entirely independent equivalent formulation of it in terms of logical formulas, which constitutes a syntactic formalism with respect to which the diagrammatic representation can be viewed as a semantic counterpart. We consider these two formalisms as two variants of one single deeper abstract system of relations between two sets, which we posit as a psychological model for the representation of quantified sentences. From one of the subsystems (the algebraic formalism), we derive predictions in terms of preferred representations that we test via the other subsystem (the diagrams). There are three purely semantic, novel predictions (whereas another two join pragmatic considerations to the semantic analysis, and yet another four are made in accordance with standard Gricean, 1975, analysis). Focusing on the three semantic predictions that concern the *some*, *all*, and *some ... not* sentences, one can reanalyze the experimental literature and find data in their favor (although such predictions have never been made). The three reported experiments confirm the novel semantic predictions (as well as the other predictions).

Notes

1. The five Gergonne (1817) diagrams are often called, and confused with, Euler (1768/1960) circles. In Appendix A, we give a brief historical note that aims to correct the somewhat erratic common denominations of set diagrams.

2. As becomes clear later, in this article, we do not test and are not committed to the notion that people have internal representations in the form of Gergonne (1817) diagrams.
3. In writing these expressions, we now use the letters A, A', I, O, E, and E' as sentential constants of logical formulas to be distinguished from abbreviations of natural language sentences.
4. The proof exploits the fact that expressions such as $A \vee O$, $I \vee O$, and $E \vee I$ are tautologies.
5. Here is the gist of an informal proof: Any other conjunction of two or more symbols that contains A results in a contradiction (such as A&O, A&E) or in a simplification changing A&I into A.
6. An informal proof can be outlined with an example. Take the symbol E: It can be observed that the longest, noncontradictory, conjunctive expression that it is possible to write in conjunction with it is E&O&O' (hence, one of the five formulas). This is because all conjunctions such as E&A, E&A', and E&I are contradictions so that there remains only E&O and E&O', which can be conjoined into E&O&O'. A similar situation obtains for the other symbols.
7. For two diverging views, see Levinson (2000) and Sperber and Wilson (1995); and for some experimental work on the topic, see Noveck (2001), Noveck and Posada (2003), Bott and Noveck (2004), and Noveck (2004).
8. For E, we also predict that DISJOINT will be the preferred diagram, but this prediction is trivial because DISJOINT is the only diagram compatible with E and does not really follow from our theoretical account that can be tested when several diagrams are compatible with a given statement.
9. A close examination of their pattern of answers shows that those errors were systematic within a given sentence–diagram pair; most of the time, they occurred on at least four of the five trials. Also, the absolute values of the ratings was generally high, that is, no participants were discarded because they gave an unusually high number of –1 ratings to logically correct sentence–diagram pairings; this could just have reflected a conservative use of the scale to convey a judgment of inappropriateness, not necessarily one of falsehood.
10. To help appraise the significance of this result, a participant who would consistently give the highest rating to one diagram (+3) and the lowest to the other (–3) would have a differential score of +6.
11. Comparison of Tables 1 and 4 shows that the majority of the values are close but that there are cases in which the values differ by an order of magnitude of about 1 point on the scale. These cases coincide either with the SUBSET or SUPERSET columns and reflect the correction for errors or with the pragmatically countermanded positive answers. This latter case is interesting, as the data observed with the concrete materials always corresponded to a shift to a negative value or to a more negative value than with the abstract materials. It so appears that participants were more inclined to draw the scalar inference with the concrete sentences than they were with the abstract sentences, presumably because the former but not necessarily the latter suggested that the literal meaning is optimally relevant.
12. One example might be helpful: Given the sentence *this is a rectangle*, people might be asked to which extent each of three rectangles whose length to width ratios are, respec-

tively, 20, 3, and 1, are good instances. Conversely, given the same rectangles, people might be asked to say whether the sentence is true or false of each figure. Whichever the interpretation of the question in any of the two ways, an individual who believes that a square is not a rectangle (or is an inappropriate example of a rectangle) will rate the square negatively in the first case and answer “false” in the second case. What is important is that naïve individuals be given a way to express their judgment of semantic congruence between the sentence and the diagram.

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Appendix A. Historical Background of Set Diagrams

The systematic use of diagrams to represent classical quantified sentences is generally associated with Euler's (1768/1960) name, but in fact, it dates back to Leibniz (1903/1988), about a century earlier. Bochenski (1970) mentions that Alstedt (Alstedius) used diagrams as early as 1614. According to Scholz (1931/1961), their use can be found even earlier (in 1584) in the writings of Giulio Pace (Julius Pacius) who interestingly does not present them as a novelty. Leibniz and Euler have defined the same circle diagrams and made essentially the same use of them: To each of the four Aristotelian subject–predicate sentences, $A = \text{all } P \text{ are } Q$, $E = \text{no } P \text{ are } Q$, $I = \text{some } P \text{ are } Q$, and $O = \text{some } P \text{ are not } Q$, they associated one and only one diagram (see Fig. 1A). In addition, Leibniz also defined another kind of diagram, the line diagrams (Fig. 2A), which are isomorphic to the circle diagrams.

Such diagrams were designed to help solve categorical syllogisms; their usage can be qualified as figurative in the sense that they were only graphical tools to help mentally encode the premises and to illustrate the conclusion of the syllogism. Furthermore, Leibniz (1903/1988) and Euler (1768/1960) diagrams make sense with regard to the specific syllogism that they are illustrating but are not suited to exhibit the meaning of the quantified sentences in general: Indeed, the conventions applied to label the various parts of the diagrams, even though intuitively appealing, lead to incoherence. Consider the representation of the I sentence *some P are Q* in which the label P indicates, as it should be, the existence of a region common to P and Q. Consider now the representation of the O sentence *some P are not Q*: The same convention correctly indicates the existence of a region of P outside Q. However, this leads to the unfortunate




Fig. 1A. Euler's (1768/1960) and Leibniz's (1903/1988) representation of the four quantified sentences.

consequences of *Q* being considered as a region outside *P* (which is equivalent to inferring *some Q are not P* from *some P are not Q*), and similarly on the preceding diagram, *some Q are not P* seems to be incorrectly implied by *some P are Q*. This does not mean that it is not possible to define a system of four diagrams in a one-to-one correspondence with the sentences, but it has to rely on different conventions. Such systems, which have been considered in the recent psychological literature on syllogisms (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995; Stenning & Yule, 1997; Wetherick, 1993), necessitate either the definition of optional elements in the diagrams or, as Euler (1768/1960) himself had already done, the use of conventional marks to indicate nonempty parts.

In the 19th century, Venn (1866/1971) designed a fairly different system (often confused with Euler's [1768/1960]) of three (or more) overlapping circles to encode the premises of syllogisms and work out the solution by reading it off the diagram; this usage can be qualified as operative (Poltzer, 2004b). Quantified sentences are not represented in isolation by Venn diagrams (although they could, but with poor legibility).

Great progress was accomplished when the mathematician and astronomer Gergonne (1817) considered all the possible combinations of two "ideas" (i.e., of the extension of two concepts) represented by two circles. It is Gergonne's diagrams that have become popular in textbooks on elementary set theory and that have incorrectly been named Euler (1768/1960) diagrams or Venn (1886/1971) diagrams. There is more than erroneous attribution of author-




Fig. 2A. Leibniz's (1903/1988) line diagrams.

ship in this denomination: It is also unfortunate because as we have seen, although the three types of diagrams (viz., Leibniz, 1903/1988, and/or Euler, 1768/1960; Venn, 1886/1971; and Gergonne, 1817) share the intuitive analogy between a closed area and the extension of a concept, they result in different conventions, representations, and, as importantly, different uses; in addition, the first type is defective. The expression “Euler diagrams” is appropriate only to refer to systems that make use of four diagrams, one for each quantified sentence.

Appendix B. The Criterion Used to Identify Inconsistent Ratings

At first sight, one could envisage a straightforward revision of the data based on the claim that any negative evaluation of a logically true sentence can be considered as an indication of a processing error; this would lead to discarding such observations. However, this claim is objectionable because one does not know exactly how each individual is calibrated on the scale. That is, a negative rating on some specific pairings might, in principle, reflect reluctance to accept the relation instead of being an erroneous answer. We prefer to use a more conservative principle to eliminate errors based on the notion that errors introduce inconsistency within the set of five ratings made by each participant on each sentence–diagram pair. We eliminated the series of five ratings that met a criterion of inconsistency based on these considerations. Consider, for example, a participant who correctly gives a +3 rating on four of the five trials and gives a –3 rating on the remaining trial. It is very doubtful that the exceptional rating reflects a

motivated change in evaluation; rather, we take this to be, in all likelihood, a typical case of a processing error. Accordingly, we decided to suppress from the data the negative values when they appeared in a set that contained at least two positive values and provided the range of the distribution was equal to at least four points on the scale (for a maximum possible of six: This last criterion helps maintain the notion of inconsistency; a distribution such as, e.g., +1, +1, +1, +1, and -1 whose range equals 2, suggests fluctuations around the midpoint of the scale rather than genuine inconsistency). Notice that the criterion that has been chosen is conservative in the sense that it leads one to maintain negative observations that could in fact be erroneous. (The trend in any change in the results that would follow from the suppression of data could only increase if more data were discarded). The opposite could also be true: We might remove negative observations that do not originate from the subject-predicate confusion (even though the two criteria tend to also eliminate this possibility). There is a way to control for this because we are interested in a comparison of means, not in their values in isolation. Assuming that some negative evaluations that are not due to the subject-predicate confusion could occur for all logically true sentence-diagram associations with the same probability, we may also apply the correction just defined to the other member of the experimental comparison, that is, to EQUIVALENCE for the A sentence (compared to SUBSET) and to OVERLAP for the O sentence (compared to SUPERSET). Using this differential method, a change in the difference between means could not be attributed to a factor that affects both sentence-diagram pairs but to the factor that affects only one of them. The application of the criterion that has just been defined resulted in the suppression of 31% of the means (series of five ratings) associated with this correction process.