Abstract
Consider a firm as an organization that needs to efficiently coordinate several specialized departments in an uncertain environment. Decision making involves collective planning sessions and decentralized operational processes. In this setting this paper explores the role of economic modeling through an experimental game. Results support the idea that economic modeling favors higher performance. Economic modeling facilitates the emergence of common knowledge and the decomposition of a group decision problem into individual decision problems that are meaningfully interrelated.
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This paper was presented at the Porquerolles Summer School on Cognitive Sciences, September 2001.
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Ponssard, J.P., Saulpic, O. Economic Modeling Triggers More Efficient Planning: An Experimental Justification. Theor Decis 58, 239–282 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6593-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6593-2