Abstract
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004). Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments proved in List and Pettit (Economics and Philosophy 18:89–110, 2002) and Arrow’s theorem (Arrow, Social choice and individual values, 1963). I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004) to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.
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Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Valeria Ottonelli for the invaluable discussions. I also thank an anonymous referee for the very helpful comments on notation.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Porello, D. Ranking judgments in Arrow’s setting. Synthese 173, 199–210 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9568-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9568-y