Abstract
An historically important conception of the unity of science is explanatory reductionism, according to which the unity of science is achieved by explaining all laws of science in terms of their connection to microphysical law. There is, however, a separate tradition that advocates the unity of science. According to that tradition, the unity of science consists of the coordination of diverse fields of science, none of which is taken to have privileged epistemic status. This alternate conception has roots in Otto Neurath’s notion of unified science. In this paper, I develop a version of the coordination approach to unity that is inspired by Neurath’s views. The resulting conception of the unity of science achieves aims similar to those of explanatory reductionism, but does so in a radically different way. As a result, it is immune to the criticisms facing explanatory reductionism. This conception of unity is also importantly different from the view that science is disunified, and I conclude by demonstrating how it accords better with scientific practice than do conceptions of the disunity of science.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I do not assume any particular analysis of causation in this paper; several analyses would work equally well for my purposes, including, e.g., the counterfactual, process, and manipulation views. However, I do assume the existence of high-level causal relationships.
To clarify: my claim is not that these types of relationships are causal relationships, but that the interconnections that others have placed in these categories can instead be understood in terms of causal connections among fields. For instance, Darden and Maull’s (1977) main example of a part-whole relationship is Mendelian genes, which were discovered to be parts of chromosomes. An alternate view is that molecular genetics furnishes information about causal processes involving Mendelian genes, e.g., the molecular causes of mutant alleles and the causal processes that lead to genes’ phenotypic effects (cf. Kitcher 1984).
See Potochnik (2010a) for a discussion of how epistemic aims and explanatory aims are often in tension in science.
Potochnik (2010b) defends this conception of the roles of evolutionary ecology and population genetics.
References
Atekwana, E. A., Sauck, W. A. & Werkema, D. D. Jr., (2000). Investigations of geoelectrical signatures at a hydrocarbon contaminated site. Journal of Applied Geophysics, 44(2–3), 167–180.
Batterman, R. (2002). The devil in the details. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bechtel, W. (1984). Reconceptualizations and interfield connections: The discovery of the link between vitamins and coenzymes. Philosophy of Science, 51(2), 265–292.
Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1999). The dappled world: A study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N., Cat, J., Fleck, L., & Uebel, T. E. (1996). Otto Neurath: Philosophy between science and politics, volume 38 of Ideas in context. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Craver, C. F. (2005). Beyond reduction: Mechanisms, multifield integration and the unity of neuroscience. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 373–395.
Darden, L., & Maull, N. (1977). Interfield theories. Philosophy of Science, 44, 43–64.
Dupré, J. (1993). The disorder of things: Metaphysical foundations of the disunity of science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Eshel, I., & Feldman, M. W. (2001). Optimality and evolutionary stability under short-term and long-term selection. In: S. H. Orzack, E. Sober (Eds.), Adaptationism and optimality, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology, chapter 4 (pp. 114–160). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Fodor, J. (1974). Special sciences: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis. Synthese, 28, 97–115.
Godfrey-Smith, P., & Wilkins, J. F. (2008) Adaptationism. In S. Sarkar, A. Plutynski (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of biology. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
Grantham, T. A. (2004). Conceptualizing the (dis)unity of science. Philosophy of Science, 71(2), 133–155.
Hempel, C. (1966). Philosophy of natural science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Kimball, R., Braun, E., Ligon, J., Lucchini, V., & Randi, E. (2001). A molecular phylogeny of the peacock-pheasants (galliformes: Polyplectron spp.) indicates loss and reduction of ornamental traits and display behaviours. Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 73, 187–198.
Kimura, M. (1983). The neutral theory of molecular evolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kitcher, P. (1984). 1953 and all that: A tale of two sciences. Philosophical Review, 93, 335–373.
Kitcher, P. (1992). Gene: Current usages. In E. F. Keller, E. A. Lloyd (Eds.), Keywords in evolutionary biology (pp. 128–131). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mitchell, S. D. (2003). Biological complexity and integrative pluralism, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Nagel, E. (1961). The structure of science, London, UK: Routledge and Kegen Paul.
Neurath, O. (1936a). Encyclopedia as ‘model’. In R. S. Cohen, M. Neurath (Eds.), Philosophical Papers 1913–1946, volume 16 of Vienna Circle Collection. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Neurath, O. (1936b). Individual sciences, unified science, pseudo-rationalism. In R. S. Cohen, M. Neurath (Eds.), Philosophical Papers 1913–1946, volume 16 of Vienna Circle Collection. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Neurath, O. (1936c). An international encyclopedia of unified science. In R. S. Cohen, M. Neurath (Eds.), Philosophical Papers 1913–1946, volume 16 of Vienna Circle Collection. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Neurath, O. (1937). Unified science and its encyclopedia. In R. S. Cohen, M. Neurath (Eds.), Philosophical Papers 1913–1946, volume 16 of Vienna Circle Collection. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Neurath, O. (1938). Encyclopaedism as a pedagogical aim: A Danish approach. Philosophy of Science, 5(4), 484–492.
Neurath, O. (1987) United science and psychology. In B. McGuinness (Ed.), Unified science. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Oppenheim, P., & Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis. In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, Vol. 2 (pp. 3–36). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Owens, I., & Short, R. (1995). Hormonal basis of sexual dimorphism in birds: Implications for new theories of sexual selection. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 10, 44–47.
Potochnik, A. (2010a). Explanatory independence and epistemic interdependence: A case study of the optimality approach. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(1), 213–233.
Potochnik, A. (2010b). Levels of explanation reconceived. Philosophy of Science, 77(1), 59–72.
Reisch, G. A. (1994). Planning science: Otto Neurath and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. British Journal of the History of Science, 27, 131–153.
Rosenberg, A. (1994). Instrumental biology or the disunity of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Roughgarden, J. (2009). The genial gene: Deconstructing Darwinian selfishness. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Strevens, M. (2006). Bigger than chaos: Understanding complexity through probability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Takahashi, M., Arita, H., Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, M., & Hasegawa, T. (2008). Peahens do not prefer peacocks with more elaborate trains. Animal Behavior, 75, 1209–1219.
Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ISHPSSB meeting at the University of Guelph (2005), and in colloquia at California State University at Long Beach, Florida State University, Oklahoma State University, Syracuse University, the University of California at Davis, and the University of Western Ontario. I received much helpful feedback from these audiences, as well as from Lanier Anderson, Michael Friedman, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Helen Longino, Elliott Sober, Michael Weisberg, and three anonymous referees.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Potochnik, A. A Neurathian Conception of the Unity of Science. Erkenn 74, 305–319 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9228-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9228-0