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A Neurathian Conception of the Unity of Science

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Abstract

An historically important conception of the unity of science is explanatory reductionism, according to which the unity of science is achieved by explaining all laws of science in terms of their connection to microphysical law. There is, however, a separate tradition that advocates the unity of science. According to that tradition, the unity of science consists of the coordination of diverse fields of science, none of which is taken to have privileged epistemic status. This alternate conception has roots in Otto Neurath’s notion of unified science. In this paper, I develop a version of the coordination approach to unity that is inspired by Neurath’s views. The resulting conception of the unity of science achieves aims similar to those of explanatory reductionism, but does so in a radically different way. As a result, it is immune to the criticisms facing explanatory reductionism. This conception of unity is also importantly different from the view that science is disunified, and I conclude by demonstrating how it accords better with scientific practice than do conceptions of the disunity of science.

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Notes

  1. For example, consider Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), Nagel (1961), Hempel (1966), Fodor (1974), Dupré (1993), Rosenberg (1994).

  2. Views that I take to be versions of coordinate unity have been developed by Darden and Maull (1977), Bechtel (1984), Mitchell (2003), Grantham (2004); and specifically for neuroscience, Craver (2005). I briefly address the relationship between my view and these other accounts in Sect. 2.

  3. This last example is like one introduced by Neurath (1987) and discussed by Cartwright (1999) for a different purpose.

  4. I do not assume any particular analysis of causation in this paper; several analyses would work equally well for my purposes, including, e.g., the counterfactual, process, and manipulation views. However, I do assume the existence of high-level causal relationships.

  5. To clarify: my claim is not that these types of relationships are causal relationships, but that the interconnections that others have placed in these categories can instead be understood in terms of causal connections among fields. For instance, Darden and Maull’s (1977) main example of a part-whole relationship is Mendelian genes, which were discovered to be parts of chromosomes. An alternate view is that molecular genetics furnishes information about causal processes involving Mendelian genes, e.g., the molecular causes of mutant alleles and the causal processes that lead to genes’ phenotypic effects (cf. Kitcher 1984).

  6. See Potochnik (2010a) for a discussion of how epistemic aims and explanatory aims are often in tension in science.

  7. Potochnik (2010b) defends this conception of the roles of evolutionary ecology and population genetics.

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Acknowledgments

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ISHPSSB meeting at the University of Guelph (2005), and in colloquia at California State University at Long Beach, Florida State University, Oklahoma State University, Syracuse University, the University of California at Davis, and the University of Western Ontario. I received much helpful feedback from these audiences, as well as from Lanier Anderson, Michael Friedman, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Helen Longino, Elliott Sober, Michael Weisberg, and three anonymous referees.

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Potochnik, A. A Neurathian Conception of the Unity of Science. Erkenn 74, 305–319 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9228-0

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