Measuring category intuitiveness in unconstrained categorization tasks
Highlights
► We examined unsupervised categorization processes. ► Participants spontaneously classified stimuli in nine sets. ► More intuitive classifications were assumed to be more frequent ones. ► Cluster tightness was the most important determinant of category intuitiveness. ► The results were modeled with DIVA, the rational model, the simplicity model, SUSTAIN, an unsupervised version of the GCM, and a similarity geometric model.
Introduction
Without concepts, human thought would be impossible as we know it. Concepts help us organize briefly and efficiently the information around us, but they are also at the heart of many abilities which we consider uniquely human, such as reasoning on the basis of abstract ideas (Murphy, 2004, Pothos and Wills, 2011). The question of how concepts arise is one of fundamental importance for our understanding of human behavior. Many concepts are taught, through language, social convention, or education. This tradition of supervised categorization inspired highly influential formalisms, such as prototype and exemplar theory (e.g., Hampton, 2000, Minda and Smith, 2000, Nosofsky, 1984, Vanpaemel and Storms, 2008). Equally, it seems that in many situations groupings can be constructed in an unsupervised manner, that is, without being guided by an external teacher signal. For some time now, researchers have been recognizing the importance of unsupervised categorization processes in the understanding of human concepts.
The focus of the present study is unsupervised categorization in the context of free sorting tasks such as the following: participants receive a set of schematic stimuli, presented individually on printed cards; they are asked to divide the stimuli in any way they like, with no constraints on the number of groups or the number of elements per group. That such a process is unsupervised is evident in that there are no external constraints to guide categorization; a participant can create any kind of groups he/she wants. Several researchers have employed free sorting tasks, mostly to examine the impact of various methodological variations on participant performance (Ashby et al., 1999, Handel and Imai, 1972, Handel and Preusser, 1969, Handel and Rhodes, 1980, Medin et al., 1987, Milton and Wills, 2004, Regehr & Brooks, 1995). For example, does it make a difference whether participants see all the stimuli at once instead of sequentially? Are there circumstances that encourage participants to create classifications on the basis of a single stimulus dimension? This research has produced many important insights, even though the range of stimulus structures employed has been typically limited. One of the objectives of the present research is to motivate and test a wide range of stimulus structures.
We seem to have a natural tendency to organize information in the world. When exposed to a new domain, we implicitly or instinctively look to identify the basic ‘kinds’ that go together. This is a paradigmatic case of unsupervised categorization, though in adult thought it is often hard to separate out such unsupervised categorization processes from influences based on linguistic labels and existing categories. This is not to say that there are not everyday life situations when we engage in purely unsupervised categorization processes similar to those in the lab-based free sorting tasks: for example, arranging books in a bookcase, organizing administrative paperwork, archiving literature search articles, or arranging household items in a garage or garden shed. In all cases, the stimuli can be described with a set of dimensions (not all perceptual), so that there is a similarity structure for the stimuli. Also, in all cases there is a sorting problem, that of deciding which items go together. Such examples show the relevance of unsupervised categorization in limited problem-solving situations, but we contend that the impact of unsupervised categorization in human thought is both more profound and more pervasive.
A controversial issue in development psychology concerns the relation between linguistic and conceptual development. One view is that linguistic development guides conceptual development, as linguistic labels are employed to facilitate the acquisition of concepts. An alternative view is that children first develop concepts, so that at a later stage labels are matched to appropriate concepts (e.g., Nelson, 1974, Quinn and Eimas, 1986, Schyns, 1991). Such a view is supported by evidence that parent–child interaction may involve limited or no corrective feedback, when it comes to children’s inappropriate use of linguistic labels (e.g., Chapman et al., 1986, Nelson et al., 1993; see also, Brown and Hanlon, 1970, Demetras et al., 1986, Johnson and Riezler, 2002). The process which allows conceptual development in children is in some ways analogous to a free sorting task, in that in both cases it is recognized that some items go with others. Indeed, developmental psychologists have shown that children can perform free sorting tasks like the one described above (e.g., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
The sense that certain items go together, which is thought to drive behavior in free sorting experiments, appears relevant in perceptual organization as well. When we interpret a novel visual scene there is often a very strong intuition that certain elements form groups. For example, in the experiments of Compton and Logan, 1993, Compton and Logan, 1999), participants were presented with arrangements of dots in two-dimensional spaces. In some cases, there was a very strong intuition about the presence of groups and most participants agreed in how the dots should be classified. This idea, that when a set of items can be classified in an intuitive way there should be more consistency in participants’ classifications, is a key element of the present research as well. More generally, the link between perceptual organization and unsupervised categorization has been taken up by some researchers, who proposed models of unsupervised categorization based on perceptual principles (Compton and Logan, 1993, Compton and Logan, 1999, Pothos and Chater, 2002).
We can extrapolate this intuition of ‘things going together’ with adult concepts as well. The relative contribution of supervised (through language, social interaction, etc.) and unsupervised processes in adult concepts is difficult to quantify (cf. Malt and Sloman, 2007, Malt et al., 1999; Malt & Sloman, 2007, for assumptions about categories induced by linguistic labels and the impact of linguistic labels on categorization). But, we can observe that many of our categories involve coherent collections of objects, that is objects which are similar to each other or, at the very least, make sense together (Murphy & Medin, 1985). What is the glue which binds together the members of a category? For example, why do we consider a category like ‘chairs’ as intuitive (coherent), a category like ‘games’ as less intuitive (in the sense that people disagree more about the membership of this category), and a category composed of ‘babies, the moon, and rulers’ completely nonsensical? We can call this the problem of what determines category intuitiveness and it is clearly a fundamental one for cognitive psychology. We would like to suggest that, at least part of the solution, relates to understanding performance in free sorting tasks. This is because there seems to be a fundamental equivalence between many of our concepts and the groups created in free sorting tasks, in that in both cases people recognize that certain items should be grouped together.
Research in supervised categorization has been much more extensive than research in unsupervised categorization. If one considers entirely unconstrained classification tasks with an aim related to category intuitiveness, there are few studies, which are methodologically limited (e.g., Compton and Logan, 1999, Pothos and Chater, 2002). Note that unsupervised categorization is not the same as unsupervised learning, though it is possible of course that the two processes are based on similar computational principles (after all, they are both instances of inductive inference). The former concerns the specific (empirical) objective of spontaneously grouping some stimuli together. The latter is more general and concerns all situations of generalizing from some initial stimuli without feedback (e.g., Billman and Knutson, 1996, Fiser and Aslin, 2005, Reber, 1967). Also, while there has been some work on unsupervised categorization, much of it is not appropriate for the study of category intuitiveness. For example, researchers have employed sequential or concurrent presentation procedures for the stimuli. However, there seems to be a strong sense of category intuitiveness only in the case of concurrently presented stimuli. Equally, some researchers have asked participants to spontaneously group a set of stimuli into a specific number of categories (e.g., Medin et al., 1987, Milton et al., 2008). Such a procedure is less appropriate when studying category intuitiveness, since it can restrict participant performance. We employed an unsupervised classification task, with no constraints in the number of groups which could be created.
Part of the success of research in supervised categorization can be attributed to the existence of standard datasets (e.g., Medin and Schaffer, 1978, Shepard et al., 1961), specific dependent variables (e.g., classification probability of novel instances or speed of learning), and detailed computational comparisons between competing formal models (Minda and Smith, 2000, Nosofsky, 1990). With the present work, we try to make progress in unsupervised categorization in all these respects. First, we motivate a dependent variable appropriate for the study of category intuitiveness. Second, we specify a range of stimulus sets, created so as to contrast various factors possibly relevant in free sorting performance, and collect data from a large population sample. Third, we concurrently apply several computational models of unsupervised categorization. Medin et al. (1987) provide an eloquent statement motivating a modeling effort in unsupervised categorization (p. 43): “The categories which people normally create and use represent a tiny subset of the many possible ways in which entities and experiences could be partitioned. Therefore, a central question is what basic principles underlie category construction.” The objective of the unsupervised categorization models is exactly this, to provide hypotheses about the computational principles (and mechanisms) which underlie category construction.
Section snippets
The dependent variable
In supervised categorization, researchers typically study the probability with which novel instances are classified to the different trained categories. We think that having such a specific, simple dependent variable has facilitated the development of supervised categorization models. What is an appropriate empirical measure of classification intuitiveness? That is, under what circumstances can we say that a particular classification is psychologically more intuitive than another?
Consider Fig. 1
The empirical challenge
The space of possible classifications is vast. For 10 stimuli there are about 100,000 classifications (Medin & Ross, 1997) and for 16 stimuli 10.4 billion possible classifications. It is remarkable that ordinarily only a tiny fraction of the possible classifications are psychologically relevant, and one has to wonder about just how intuitive a particular classification has to be in order to stand out amongst so many alternatives. The large problem space could potentially lead to high performance
The modeling challenge
Categorization models can help us understand the underlying psychological process. We applied baseline versions of six unsupervised categorization models, with the view to identify the principles which appear most promising in the formalization of unsupervised categorization and category intuitiveness. This is the first comprehensive comparison of unsupervised categorization models (for limited previous efforts see Pothos and Bailey (2009) and Pothos (2007)). One problem is that the
Participants and design
Participants were 169 students at Swansea University, who took part for a small payment. Each participant classified nine stimulus sets, one after the other (the order of stimulus sets was randomized for each participant). A between-participants condition related to whether the stimuli were described in a neutral way (87 participants) or as real-world objects (82 participants).
Stimuli
We created nine stimulus sets so as to reflect four intuitions about the considerations which might be relevant in
General discussion
It is often the case that cognitive process cannot be guided by an external, supervisory signal, so that it is unsupervised. Research onto unsupervised cognition has been extensive and relates to most key cognitive processes (e.g., Chater, 1996, Elman, 1990, Feldman, 2009, Fiser and Aslin, 2005, Quinn and Eimas, 1986, Schyns, 1991). We have suggested that unsupervised categorization specifically is an important aspect of category intuitiveness, that is, our impression that it makes sense to
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by ESRC Grant R000222655 to EMP. We would like to thank Greg Ashby, Jerome Busemeyer, Nick Chater, Rob Goldstone, Todd Gureckis, Brad Love, Kim Levering, Amy Perfors, and Adam Sanborn for their comments and Paul Barrett for providing the Orthosim software, which can be obtained from his website: http://www.pbarrett.net/. A related preliminary report was made at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. The stimulus sets developed for this study were
References (72)
A new look at the statistical model identification
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
(1974)The adaptive nature of human categorization
Psychological Review
(1991)Multivariate probability distributions
- et al.
The Prep statistic as a measure of confidence in model fitting
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
(2008) - et al.
On the dominance of unidimensional rules in unsupervised categorization
Perception & Psychophysics
(1999) - et al.
The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire: An examination of the factorial similarity of P, E, N, and L across 34 countries
Personality and Individual Differences
(1998) - et al.
Unsupervised concept learning and value systematicity: A complex whole aids learning the parts
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
(1996) - et al.
Derivational complexity and order of acquisition in child speech
- et al.
The effect of feedback on young children’s inappropriate word usage
Journal of Child Language
(1986) Reconciling simplicity and likelihood principles in perceptual organization
Psychological Review
(1996)