Abstract
The problem of reconciling the philosophical denial of ontological vagueness with common-sense beliefs positing vague objects, properties and relations is addressed. This project arises for any view denying ontological vagueness but is especially pressing for transvaluationism, which claims that ontological vagueness is impossible. The idea that truth, for vague discourse and vague thought-content, is an indirect form of language-thought correspondence is invoked and applied. It is pointed out that supervaluationism provides one way, but not necessarily the only way, of implementing the idea of indirect correspondence.
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Potrč, M. Transvaluationism, common sense and indirect correspondence. Acta Analytica 17, 101–119 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-002-1007-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-002-1007-3