Abstract
Death is a bad thing by virtue of its ability to frustrate the subjectively valuable projects that shape our identities and render our lives meaningful. While the presumption that immortality would necessarily result in boredom worse than death proves unwarranted, if the constraint of mortality is a necessary element for virtues, relationships, and motivation to pursue our life-projects, then death might nevertheless be a necessary evil. Mortal or immortal, it’s clear that the value of one’s life depends on its subjectively determined quality, rather than its quantity. Thus, it is imperative to live forever in the present, with flourishing always in mind.
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Preston, T.M., Dixon, S. Who wants to live forever? Immortality, authenticity, and living forever in the present. Int J Philos Relig 61, 99–117 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-007-9114-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-007-9114-0