Abstract
The paper explains how a paraconsistent logician can appropriate all classical reasoning. This is to take consistency as a default assumption, and hence to work within those models of the theory at hand which are minimally inconsistent. The paper spells out the formal application of this strategy to one paraconsistent logic, first-order LP. (See, Ch. 5 of: G. Priest, In Contradiction, Nijhoff, 1987.) The result is a strong non-monotonic paraconsistent logic agreeing with classical logic in consistent situations. It is shown that the logical closure of a theory under this logic is trivial only if its closure under LP is trivial.
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Priest, G. Minimally inconsistent LP. Stud Logica 50, 321–331 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00370190
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00370190