Abstract
This essay reviews a collection of thirteen critical essays on the work of Ruth Millikan. The collection covers a broad range of her work, focusing in particular on her account of simple intentionality, her theory of concepts and her metaphysical views. I highlight and briefly discuss three issues that crop up repeatedly though the collection: (1) Millikan’s externalism (and in particular, her emphasis on how intentional states are used, rather than how they are produced); (2) the nature of intentional explanation; and (3) the normativity of meaning.
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Price, C. Teleosemantics re-examined: content, explanation and norms. Biol Philos 29, 587–596 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9431-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9431-5