Abstract
Dharmakīrti’s apoha (exclusion) theory of concept formation aims to provide an account of intersubjectivity without relying on the existence of real universals. He uses the pan-Yogācāra theory of karmic imprints (vāsanā) to claim that sentient beings form concepts by treating unique particulars as if a certain subset of them had the same effects. Since this judgment of sameness depends on an individual's habits, desires, and sensory capacities, and these in turn depend on the karmic imprints developed over countless lifetimes and continuously reshaped by ongoing actions, the extent to which individuals experience themselves as acting within a shared world (or not!) depends on these imprints. However, a number of critics—traditional and contemporary—have expressed compelling doubts about whether or not apoha can be successful given Dharmakīrti's ontology which, in addition to denying universals, eventually denies the reality of even the most basic structure of conventional experience: subject/object duality. In line with the tradition he inherits, Dharmakīrti considers even the mere division of a moment of awareness into defined structures of subject and object to be a distortion shaped by beginningless karmic imprints. While this initial moment of awareness is nonconceptual, the experience of a certain world is always already shaped by the previous actions of sentient beings trapped within the web of saṃsāra, in a process driven by ignorance. Dharmakīrti’s reliance on karmic imprints on two distinct levels—one within the conventional world, and one which constitutes the conventional world—may thereby provide a compelling account of intersubjectivity without relying on universals.
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Notes
Siderits directs his defense of apoha against Raja Ram Dravid’s (1972) presentation. While Siderits sees much of value in Dravid’s work, he also indicates that it has a crucial methodological flaw: it fails to see the potential usefulness of the apoha theory to advance contemporary understandings of universals (Siderits 1982, 187).
While there is no evidence that Dharmakīrti himself employed these two kinds of negations, many of his later commentators explicitly used them to explain how apoha works. Siderits bases his own presentation off of the works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, although historically their presentation appears to largely replicate that of their predecessor, Śākyabuddhi.
This is unlike classical Western theories of negation where negating the negation of a given term is equivalent to a positive assertion of this term.
Indeed, working within the same paradigm, Brendan Gillon is even more direct about the failure of classical semantics to provide support for the logic of apoha. As Gillon summarizes his aim and conclusion: “The aim of this paper is to show that the two most obvious candidates from contemporary logic that one might use to explicate the apoha-vādin’s notions of exclusion (apoha) and difference (anya), namely internal and external negation, do not provide the apoha-vādins with the ersatz universals they were looking for” (Gillon 2011, 274).
In his Explanation of Trustworthy Awareness (Pramāṇavārttika, henceforth PV in notes), Dharmakīrti articulates this link in the context of defining a means of trustworthy awareness (pramāṇa): “A means of trustworthy awareness is an awareness that is not misleading. ‘Not misleading’ means that it instantiates causal efficacy,” pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ / avisaṃvādanam, PV 2.1ac (Dharmakīrti and Manorathanandin 1938, p. 3).
tad ayaṃ gavādiśabdapratyupasthāpitam arthaṃ bhinnam abhinnaṃ vā pṛcchann… tasmād yo ʼsyātmā ʼnanyasādhāraṇo yaṃ puraskṛtya puruṣo viśiṣṭārthakriyārthī pravartate yathā gor vāhadohādau, PVSV ad 1.179–1.182 (Dharmakīrti 1960, p. 89). If not otherwise specified, translations in this article are my own. I would like to thank my doctoral advisor John Dunne for reading much of Dharmakīrti’s Autocommentary on Trustworthy Awareness (Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti, henceforth PVSV in the notes) with me and for generously sharing draft translations of unpublished portions. It goes without saying that any mistakes in this article are fully my own.
For a parallel summary account of how practical concerns guide the creation of a given concept, see Dunne (2011, 93–94).
See, for instance, “Even when a particular object that is devoid of parts is grasped through perception, that supporting condition which exists in relation to the determination of a specific [aspect] is cognized,” pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte ʼpi viśeṣe ʼṃśavivarjite / yadviśeṣāvasāye ʼsti pratyayaḥ sa pratīyate //, PVSV 1.58 (Dharmakīrti 1960, p. 32).
yady apy aṃśarahitaḥ sarvato bhinnasvabhāvo bhāvo ʼnubhūtas tathāpi na sarvabhedeṣu tāvatā niścayo bhavati. Kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt. anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ niścayapratyayān janayati. Yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe ʼpi kuṇapakāminībhakṣyavikalpāḥ. Tatra buddhipāṭavaṃ tadvāsanābhyāsaḥ prakaraṇam ityādayo ʼnubhavād bhedaniścayotpattisahakārinaḥ, PVSV ad 1.58 (Dharmakīrti 1960, p. 32). For an insightful discussion of this passage, see Kellner (2004, 19–32). I have consulted her translation of part of this passage on page 19 of this article in the course of preparing my own.
pratyāsattitāratamyādibhedāt paurvāparyam. Yathā janakatvādhyāpakatvāviśeṣe ʼpi pitaram āyāntaṃ dṛṣṭvā pitā me āgacchati nopādhyāya iti, PVSV ad 1.58 (Dharmakīrti 1960, 32).
uktaṃ prāg yathā saṃsṛṣṭabāhyādhyātmikabhedā buddhiḥ svam evābhāsaṃ vyavahāraviṣayam* [*corr.: vyavahāraviṣāyam] arthakriyāyogyam adhyavasāya śabdārtham upanayatīti. Tatraiva ca te śabdās tais tair bhrāntikāraṇaiḥ saṃsṛṣṭarūpa ivābhāti, PVSV ad 1.129–1.130 (Dharmakīrti 1960, p. 64).
As Dunne summarizes, “Since the phenomenal form is construed in terms of a beginningless imprint that makes one mistake it for the actual object to which it refers, a conceptual cognition can provoke one to act on an object in the world, even though the phenomenal form that is actually appearing in the cognition is not actually that object” (Dunne 2011, p. 103).
Translation in Dunne (2004, pp. 346–47), yad etaj jñānaṃ vastusvabhāvagrāhiṇānubhavenāhitāṃ vāsanām āśritya vikalpakam utpadyate ʼtadviṣayam api tadviṣayam iva tadanubhavāhitavāsanāprabhavaprakṛter adhyavasitatadbhāvasvarūpam abhinnakāryapadārthaprasūter abhinnārthagrāhīva tadanyabhedaparamārthasamānākāram, (Dharmakīrti 1960, p. 42).
Dharmakīrti seems to think that this is a pointless question, equivalent to asking why the nature of fire is to burn. As he states in PVSV ad 1.167ab (Dunne’s translation in (2004, 125, fn 114)): “Indeed, it is not correct (na… arhati) to question (paryanuyoga) the nature of things, as in ‘Why does fire burn? Why is it hot, and water is not?’ One should just ask this much, ‘From what cause does a thing with this nature come?,’” na hi svabhāvā bhāvānāṃ paryanuyogam arhanti kim agnir dahaty uṣṇo vā nodakam iti / etāvat tu syāt kuto ʼyaṃ svabhāva iti, (Dharmakīrti 1960, p. 84). I do not think that the question can be dismissed so easily, and neither do a number of Dharmakīrti’s critics, both medieval and contemporary. Further, as I hope to show, although Dharmakīrti denies the legitimacy of this question when it is directly posed, his appeal to the second, innate set of vāsanās may address it.
Although she rightly emphasizes that Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory should not be considered a theory of correspondence, Laura Guerrero makes this same move in her discussion of vāsanā: “In more modern and secular parlance, we can understand innate vāsanās in terms of evolutionarily acquired dispositions that a sentient being has in virtue of being the kind of being that it is” (Guerrero 2015, p. 202).
It is telling that in his book Buddhism as Philosophy, Siderits regularly presents what he terms “the doctrine of karma and rebirth” as a paradigmatic example of what may be considered an (irrational) belief within an otherwise philosophically-oriented tradition (e.g., Siderits 2007, pp. 67, 158). Siderits follows on a long tradition of disparaging the philosophical coherence of Buddhist ideas about karma and rebirth. For instance, as early as 1982, Paul Griffiths devotes an entire article to vociferously condemning the idea that karma makes any philosophical (or moral) sense (Griffiths 1982). This approach has, however, begun to receive pushback in recent years. I will discuss Matthew MacKenzie’s (2013) compelling exploration of karma in light of contemporary enactment theories in philosophical psychology and phenomenology in Part III of this article. Even here, though, it is notable that MacKenzie limits his use of karma to a “general theory [that] does not require belief in rebirth” (2013, p. 195). For other perspectives on this debate, see in particular Prebish, Keown, and Wright (2007) and Cho (2014).
Kachru (2015, 282, fn 38) provides a more extended discussion of objections to assimilating Buddhist theories of karma and habituation to Darwinian ideas about evolutionary adaptation.
Arnold’s understanding of the constitutive role of subjective factors in the judgment of sameness leads him to focus on the initial setting of a linguistic convention as a particularly problematic moment for Dharmakīrti. He contends that Dharmakīrti simply cannot account for the human ability to find language meaningful by appealing to a group of humans, no matter how august, who supposedly first devised this meaningfulness without themselves already being able to understand language as meaningful (2013, 153–156). Pascale Hugon also notes that in a discussion of the initial setting of conventions in PVSV 1.113c-1.121, Dharmakīrti does not respond directly to Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā objections that apoha is circular, but rather indicates that the realist would have the same problem (Hugon 2011). She emphasizes that passages such as this one force the critique from circularity per se “back to the more fundamental question of how the apohavādin can account for our acquisition of the basic ability to grasp as similar things that are in reality different” (2011, 121), but leaves open whether or not Dharmakīrti effectively addresses these objections elsewhere.
Dharmakīrti details this position through his famous “sahopalambhaniyama” argument. As he states in the Third Chapter of the Explanation of Trustworthy Awareness: “That which is being cognized immediately necessarily [occurs] along with the cognition. Therefore, by what form is difference from the object established?” and in the Ascertainment of Trustworthy Awareness (Pramāṇaviniścaya): “Because they necessarily arise together, there is no difference between blue and its cognition,” sakṛtsaṃvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyā saha / viṣayasya tato ʼnyatvaṃ kenākāreṇa siddhyati //, PV 3.387; sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyor/ PVin, Pratyakṣaparichheda 54ab (Dharmakīrti 2007, 39). For more on sahopalambhaniyama in Dharmakīrti’s works, see Arnold (2013, 175–183) and Iwata (1991).
For an excellent overview of Vasubandhu’s thought, see Gold (2014).
In emphasizing the importance of taking traditional Buddhist cosmological theories seriously as examples of real worlds, I strongly agree with Sonam Kachru’s exploration of the example of the wardens in hell in Vasubandhu’s Twenty Verses. Kachru indicates that failing to consider these as real possible beings risks losing the philosophical import of the example, and therefore leads to misunderstanding Vasubandhu’s larger point about the co-creation of individuals and their worlds. As Kachru elegantly states, taking this example seriously does not mean that we must affirm the actual existence of Buddhist hells specifically, but rather that we recognize that Vasubandhu is dealing with a conception of a world that is not limited to an anthropocentric awareness of pre-constituted external objects: “It is this conceptual connection between forms of life and world-directed thought I wish to save, not the belief in real hells” (Kachru 2015, 266). My engagement with the resources available to Dharmakīrti through traditional Buddhist cosmology should be taken in this same spirit.
Given the multiple ontologies and streams of argument present in Dharmakīrti’s thought, the question of his sources is highly complex. In this section, I offer an initial exploration of Dharmakīrti’s likely assumptions based on positions widely shared within his tradition. Considerable additional research is necessary to pin down Dharmakīrti’s sources more precisely.
For a particularly detailed and cogent exploration of the relationship between action and intention in Buddhaghosa’s thought, see Heim (2013).
Waldron’s translation in (2003, 68). karmajaṃ lokavaicitrayam iti uktam. tāni ca karmāṇi anuśayavaśād upacayaṃ gacchanti, antareṇa ca anuśayān bhavābhinirvartante na samarthāni bhavanti. Ato veditavyāḥ mūlaṃ bhavasya anuśayāḥ. Sanskrit in Waldron (2003, 210, fn 66).
For a review and affirmation of Franco’s (1994) argument, leveled against Schmithausen, that Dharmakīrti accepts the existence of the ālayavijñāna, see Prueitt (2017, 30, fn 21). For a comprehensive treatment of the ālaya with a special focus on identifying the earliest usage of this term, see Schmithausen (1987). For an excellent and more recent analysis, see Waldron (2003).
Sanskrit and translation from the Twenty Verses (Viṃśikā) Verse 7 in Bronkhorst (2000, 57). vijñānasantānasanniviṣṭā, nānyatra / yatraiva ca vāsanā, tatraiva tasyāḥ phalaṃ tādṛśo vijñānapariṇāmaḥ kiṃ neṣyate / yatra vāsanā nāsti tatra tasyāḥ phalaṃ kalpyate—iti kim atra kāraṇam?
For a cogent explanation of the importance of seeing the various examples in the Twenty Verses as making distinct philosophical points, see Tzohar (2016).
For Arnold’s elaboration of this critique, see Arnold (2013, 158–98).
For more on subject/object duality as a nonconceptual error in Dharmakīrti’s thought, see Prueitt (2017, 30–34).
na vai bāhyāpekṣā eva bhrāntayo bhavanti. Kiṃ tu viplavād āntarād api keśādivibhramavat. PVSV ad 1.98–1.99ab (Dharmakīrti 1960, 50).
avidyodbhavād viplavatve cakṣurvijñānādiṣv api prasaṅgaḥ. PVSV ad 1.98–1.99ab (Dharmakīrti 1960, 50).
na vā teṣv apy eṣa doṣo ʼdvayānāṃ dvayanirbhāsād iti vakṣyāmaḥ. PVSV ad 1.98–1.99ab (Dharmakīrti 1960, 51). For a French translation of this passage, see Eltschinger (2005, 159). Dharmakīrti here likely refers to PV 3.288–3.362 (Dharmakīrti 1979, 383–413), (Dharmakīrti 1985, 4–47), in which he discusses different types of perceptual error, and then moves into his rejection of the reality of subject/object duality.
The question of what it could mean for an error to constitute the basis of reality is highly complex. Interpretations of statements like this could proceed in two basic directions: either “conventional reality” is not actually reality at all, or conventional reality is real, but in a fundamentally different way from ultimate reality. Parsing out this distinction is beyond the scope of the current paper, but deserves independent treatment.
sarveṣāṃ viplave ʼpi pramāṇatadābhāsavyavasthā ā āśrayaparāvṛtter arthakriyāyogyābhimatasaṃvādanāt, PVSV 1.98–1.99ab (Dharmakīrti 1960, 51). For more on Dharmakīrti’s soteriological use of Yogācāra categories, including especially the āśrayaparāvṛtti, see Eltschinger (2005) and (2014, 299, 315–317). Eltschinger reads these passages in light of Dharmakīrti’s affirmation of “the mind’s natural radiance” as indicating “perception before and after the āśrayaparivṛtti to be one and the same with regard to its content and operation” (2014, 315–16). While Eltschinger’s arguments are compelling, it is important to emphasize that phrasing in terms of the ultimate content of awareness may be misleading. Ultimately, consciousness is pure, nondual luminosity. It has no contents in any way analogous to the idea of an “object” of a perception: it is not intentionally structured.
For a detailed discussion of the role of cintāmayīprajñā in Dharmakīrti’s thought, see Eltschinger (2014, 318–28).
This idea that the creation of subject/object structure is the foundational form of ignorance which is either equated with or from which all the afflictions that keep a sentient being trapped within saṃsāra arise is most likely closely related to Dharmakīrti’s discussions of the innate (sahaja) form of the personalistic false view (satkāyadṛṣṭi), discussed at length by Eltschinger. See especially Eltschinger (2014, 266–98). Eltschinger notes that Dharmakīrti sometimes identifies ignorance with vikalpa and sometimes with satkāyadṛṣṭi or ātmasneha, and that the relationship between these categories sits uneasily both within Dharmakīrti’s own thought and in relation to orthodox Abhidharmic analyses. Satkāyadṛṣṭi itself has multiple forms, one of which is the theory of a permanent Self espoused by some Brahmanical traditions and the other or which is a foundational type of clinging that divides the world of any sentient being into “I” and “mine.” For additional discussions of satkāyadṛṣṭi in Dharmakīrti’s works, see also Eltschinger and Ratié (2013).
Legeia Lugli (2011) addresses the particular role of language in constituting conventional worlds as articulated in various Yogācāra sūtras. She convincingly argues that these sūtras posit that language is the fundamental driving force behind saṃsāra. Tzohar also emphasizes the importance of “‘impressions of speech’ (abhilāpavāsanā)” in Vasubandhu’s account of intersubjectivity (Tzohar 2016, 13). The apparent contrast between Dharmakīrti’s statements on nonconceptual error and these sūtras’ repeated claim that the conventional world arises due to vikalpa likely reflects a shift in the meaning of vikalpa from Ābhidharmic to Yogācāra sources rather than a real tension. Dharmakīrti’s discussion of the relationship between ignorance and conceptuality in PVSV 1.98–1.99cd indicates that he may shift the meaning of vikalpa at his final level of analysis to include subject/object structure itself, thereby bridging the two frames.
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Prueitt, C. Karmic Imprints, Exclusion, and the Creation of the Worlds of Conventional Experience in Dharmakīrti’s Thought. SOPHIA 57, 313–335 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0618-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0618-5