Abstract
Timothy Hsiao attempts to defend industrial animal farming by arguing that it is not inherently cruel. We raise three main objections to his defense. First, his argument rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of cruelty. Second, his conclusion, though technically true, is so weak as to be of virtually no moral significance or interest. Third, his contention that animals lack moral standing, and thus that mistreating them is wrong only insofar as it makes one more disposed to mistreat other humans, is untenable on both philosophical and biological grounds.
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Notes
Compare Darwin (1859: 53–54): “I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms. The term variety, again, in comparison with mere individual differences, is also applied arbitrarily, and for mere convenience sake”.
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Puryear, S., Bruers, S. & Erdős, L. On a Failed Defense of Factory Farming. J Agric Environ Ethics 30, 311–323 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-017-9666-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-017-9666-7