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Explanation and Reference

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 52))

Abstract

In this paper I try to contrast Marxist (and more broadly realist) theories of meaning with what may be called ‘idealist’ theories of meaning. But a word of explanation is clearly in order.

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References

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© 1973 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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Putnam, H. (1973). Explanation and Reference. In: Pearce, G., Maynard, P. (eds) Conceptual Change. Synthese Library, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2548-5_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2548-5_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0339-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2548-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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