Philosophical Papers: Volume 3, Realism and ReasonThis is the third volume of Hilary Putnam's philosophical papers, published in paperback for the first time. The volume contains his major essays from 1975 to 1982, which reveal a large shift in emphasis in the 'realist' position developed in his earlier work. While not renouncing those views, Professor Putnam has continued to explore their epistemological consequences and conceptual history. He now, crucially, sees theories of truth and of meaning that derive from a firm notion of reference as inadequate. |
Contents
Models and reality | 3 |
Equivalence | 26 |
Possibility and necessity | 46 |
Reference and truth | 69 |
Two dogmas revisited | 87 |
There is at least one a priori truth | 98 |
Analyticity and apriority beyond Wittgenstein and Quine | 115 |
Computational psychology and interpretation theory | 139 |
Philosophers and human understanding | 184 |
Why there isnt a readymade world | 205 |
Why reason cant be naturalized | 229 |
Quantum mechanics and the observer | 248 |
Vagueness and alternative logic | 271 |
Beyond historicism | 287 |
| 304 | |
Acknowledgements | 309 |
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Common terms and phrases
actual world analytic analytical philosophy apriority argument Aristotle assertibility axiom of choice beliefs Carnap causal claim classical logic cognitive conception consists convention correspondence counterfactual culture defined definition described determinate disquotational Dummett emitted empirical epistemic epistemology equivalent example explain fact formal Goodman grug idea ideal incompatible inductive interpretation intuitionist intuitionist logic justification kind Kripke Kripke's mathematical meaning measurement mental representations mentalese metaphysical realism metaphysical realist mind natural norms notion of truth objects observable ordinary language particle Peano arithmetic philosophers photon physical physicalist positivist possible worlds prediction principle of contradiction priori truth problem propositions quantum logic quantum mechanics question Quine Quine's R₁ rationally acceptable reason reference Reichenbach relation relative scientific semantics sentence Snow is white space-time statement synonymy talk Tarski things translation true and false truth conditions truth value vague verificationist verified versions warranted assertibility Wittgenstein word